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Why people comply with rules, why they contribute to public goods and why they behave pro-
socially in general is a fundamental question of social science. In the tradition of Gary Becker
and the chicago school, economists have traditionally considered punishment by the authorities
as the main or sole reason why people would comply with the law and contribute to public
goods. In this thesis I argue that this model is importantly incomplete and leads to lopsided or
even mistaken policy advice. I stress the importance of social interactions between agents and
apply game theoric examples to show how the standard model can be enriched.
In the second chapter, I survey the empirical literature, both experimental and econometric, on
the deterrence literature. From this review I conclude that the literature does not demonstrate
a robust eect of deterrence. I then review theoretical work in which sanctions interact with
social norms or long-term processes of preferences formation. In such models deterrence often
does not have the straightforward eect that it has in standard theory. The chapter concludes
with an example: a model of crime in neighborhoods where signaling is important. I show that
in this case, the threat of police violence may be counterproductive on its own, but can be useful
in combination with other, softer approaches.
The third chapter departs from the fact that the population of contributors to a public good
consists of a mix of reciprocal and selsh agents, an assumption borne out by much experimental
evidence. I then show that if there exists a government or authority that is superiorly informed
about the fractions of these types in the population, a policy of harsh sanctions may convey
that there are a lot of bad types in equilibrium. As a result, equilibrium sanctions will generally
be lower then they would be under symmetric information.
In the fourth chapter, I report the results of a laboratory experiment aimed to test if sanctions
can indeed have a signaling eect. In accordance with the signaling hypothesis I nd that `en-
dogenous sanctions' tend to make people more pessimistic, especially those who were optimistic
at the start of the game.
In the last chapter, I model an alternative approach to compliance. I consider the widely re-
ported fact that the possibility to participate in a decision making procedure tends to raise
voluntary compliance with authorities, even if the actual decision is not benecial to the agent.
I show that the introduction of a decision making procedure in which an agent can change a
decision of the policymaker with some probability, can be a signal of altruistic motives of the
policy maker towards the agent. This means that even if she does not change the outcome of
the decision in practice, the agent trusts the policy maker to treat her well in the future, and
will engage in more voluntary compliance.
In the Epilogue I add some remarks on the potential of participatory decision making as an
alternative policy tool to the standard economic command and control framework.
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This thesis questions the simplistic model of social control that is predominant in economics,
known as the deterrence model. The deterrence model holds that an authority can raise com-
pliance with the rules by introducing ocial sanctions for non-compliance and/or rewards for
compliance. The idea can be expressed in the following syllogism:
P1: People respond to incentives for compliance by complying more.
P2: Ocial rewards and punishments provide incentives for compliance.
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
) Ocial rewards and punishments induce people to comply more.
This argument is so ingrained in economic theory that few economists, nor perhaps many others
will question it. Nevertheless, I will quarrel with this logic in this thesis. Specically, I will quar-
rel with premise P2. I will argue that the deterrence model is importantly incomplete, because it
does not take into account the complex social lifeworld of individuals. My argument will be that
the informal interactions between individuals provide myriads of motives for compliance and
non-compliance. These motives are created by intrinsic forms of motivation, social norms, by
internalized moral values and the desire for the esteem of others. These motives are sustained,
reinforced and sometimes undermined by ocial incentives in ways that economists are only
beginning to understand. They may resonate with formal policy or counteract it. In exceptional
situations informal interactions may even lead ocial sanctions to be counterproductive.
The reason that economists have so far relied on such a simple account of social control is that
underlying the deterrence theory is another 
awed model which pervades all of economic theory.
This is the Hobbesian model, which departs from the assumption that without authority, people
would nd themselves in a state of nature in which they make life miserable for one another.
1




Thus the role of government is to save a collection of individuals from the destructive pursuit
of their self-interest trough the threat of force.
I do not contest the idea that a government can improve human coordination and cooperation,
and also that the threat of force needs to be a part of the toolbox of a government. However,
the idea of that the absence of government should be compared to an anarchic state of nature
is quite mistaken. It is a caricature of human societies and human nature that was useful to the
philosopher Hobbes to make the general points he was interested in, but it cannot be a basis for
more specic social policies. Instead, much behavior is produced by social interactions between
agents. Policy analyses that do not take into account these social interactions are impoverished
and in many cases 
awed.
This argument is elaborated in chapter 2. The rest of the thesis provides examples investigates
what happens if we allow a specic type of interaction, the signaling of preferences, into the
analysis of the exercise of authority. Thus, I move away from the traditional focus that investi-
gates the impact of policies on payos. Instead, I argue that policies may induce or discourage
compliance with the authority through their eect on the beliefs of agents. There are two ways
in which the policies can transmit information. First, they can aect expectations that agents
have about each other's behavior. This will aect their own behavior in horizontal interactions
between group members. Second, they can aect beliefs that agents have about the authorities.
This will aect behavior in vertical interactions between an authority and an agent.
I investigate an example of both horizontal and vertical interaction, and show how these infor-
mation 
ows will in
uence the policy of the authorities. These examples will lead me to argue
that although deterrence will always be an important tool of any authority, economists have
neglected other tools that are perhaps equally more important.
1.1 Chapter by chapter overview of the thesis
Whether the deterrence model is a good model is eventually an empirical question. Thus,
the second chapter opens with an investigation of the empirical performance of the deterrence
model. Surprisingly perhaps, because of the intuitive nature of the model, the theory does
not perform that well empirically. In general, econometric studies that examine the eect of
deterrence on street crime and tax evasion show that deterrence seems to have an eect in the
predicted direction, especially if the deterrence is strong. However, the eect is inconsistent and
generally quite small. As a consequence, the deterrence model cannot explain the high level of
variation in the level of cooperation with the law that is observed in many cases. Sometimes
compliance is high despite low deterrence, while the opposite also occurs. Second, laboratory
experiments that are specically designed to test the deterrence hypothesis provide anything




but a consistent picture. On the contrary, they nd that deterrence will sometimes increase
deviant behavior.
The chapter continues with a survey of theoretical approaches that have been pioneered in
economics in the last decades. These approaches investigate the eect of sanctions in a richer
pshychological or social framework. I investigate the interaction of ocial sanctions with in-
trinsic motives for behavior, the diusion of (moral) values in society through processes of
socialization, and social norms of behavior. This survey shows that taking into account such
mechanisms substantially weakens the link between sanctions and deterrence, without leaving
the rational choice framework. The chapter nishes with a formal illustration of how dierent
policy instruments interact in producing compliance. It shows how deterrence can be coun-
terproductive on its own while it can be a very useful tool if combined with other, `softer'
approaches.
The third chapter looks at horizontal relations between group members. In the chapter, I model
social dilemma or public good game in a large, heterogeneous population consisting of egoists
and conditional cooperators. Each player is uncertain about the cooperative inclinations of the
other players. A government or principal who has private information about the distribution of
types may introduce sanctions if agents defect. I study the impact of such sanctions through
the eect on the beliefs of the players about the distribution of types they are facing. In
equilibrium, sanctions can crowd out trust between agents by sending a signal that there are
many egoists around. This can lead the authority to set low sanctions to induce trust and
`crowd in' contributions from the conditional cooperators. In social dilemmas where conditional
cooperation is an important factor, as is the case in tax compliance, the model provides a
rationale for low observed penalties in the real world.
The mechanism in the third chapter is a theoretical exercise, and evidence that such a mechanism
is at work is rather sketchy. The fourth chapter aims to remedy this by presenting the results of
a laboratory experiment, designed to investigate the signaling role of sanctions in coordination
environments1. I study a two-period minimum eort coordination game between two players, in
the presence of a third player or `principal'. This principal benets from coordination on higher
eort, and is the only one informed of pre-sanction coordination levels. I compare the eects of
a mild sanction, when it is imposed exogenously by the experimenters and when it is imposed by
the superiorly informed principal. The results indicate that exogenously introduced sanctions
are eective in inducing optimistic beliefs about others and in raising eort levels. However,
endogenously introduced sanctions are much less so. For subjects who play cooperatively in the
rst round, endogenous sanctions induce pessimism about the eort of the other player, and are
1The research presented in this chapter has been conducted together with Roberto Galbiati (EconomiX Nan-
terre) and Karl Schlag (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)




not eective in raising eort levels. The results supports the idea that the sanctions have an
expressive dimension which can undermine their eectiveness by discouraging optimistic players.
The fth and chapter considers vertical relations between the authority and an agent. Its point
of departure is a large literature in social psychology on the importance of `fair' procedures.
Perhaps the most important component of fairness is the degree participation by agents in the
decision making process. Participation has been shown to lead to increased compliance, even
if the outcome of the decision is not favorable to the agent. This chapter presents a signaling
model that explains these ndings. I propose a stylized denition of participation as stochastic
control of the agent on the outcome of the decision process. I then use this denition in a
formal signaling model and show that an authority can use the level of participation as a signal
of her benevolence. This explains why participatory procedures may increase cooperation in
subsequent interactions.
Thus, while the dominant command and control approach embodied in the deterrence hypothesis
will be qualied in chapter 2-4, the 5th chapter oers a glimpse of a completely dierent style
of governing . This chapter shows how the authority, instead of exercising control, can increase
cooperation and compliance through institutions that explicitly imply a loss of control. In the
Epilogue I re
ect brie
y on the importance of the dispersion of decision making power in modern
societies, and its implications for economic research.




Deterrence in context: how formal
and informal incentives for
compliance interact.
\[A] useful theory of criminal behavior can dispense with special theories of
anomie, psychological inadequacies, or inheritance of special traits and simply extend
the economist's usual analysis of choice."
G. C. Becker (1968, p.170).
"If we do not even bother to sort out the many dierent ways in which people
(and other animals) are moved, how can we hope to have an adequate descriptive,
much less a normative, theory?"
M. Nussbaum (1997, p.1210).
2.1 Introduction
Of every 100 adults in the U.S., more than one is in jail according to a report by the Pew
Center (2008). This represents a more than 6-fold increase since the early 70s, the result of an
uninterrupted 36 year rise in the prison population. Total state spending on corrections topped
$49 billion last year, up from $12 billion in 1987. By 2011, continued prison growth is expected
to cost states an additional $25 billion. The trend of rising prison populations is present in most
other OECD countries (OECD, 2007, p. 79), although on a far lower level of incarceration.
What drives this explosion in prison population over the last 30 years? Criminologists Blumstein
and Beck (1999) investigated the near-tripling of the U.S. prison population during the period
5
van der Weele, Joël (2009), On Sanctions and Signals: How Formal and Informal Mechanisms Produce Compliance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12176Deterrence in context 6
1980-96 and conclude that changes in crime rates explained only 12% of the rise. Changes in
sentencing policy on the other hand accounted for 88% of the increase. Policies to `get tough'
on crime are mostly responsible for the explosion in prison population.
In his book The Culture of Control, Criminologist David Garland (2001) has attributed the
trend towards tougher policies in the U.S. and Britain to a renewed public condence in the
economic model of crime. This model is as simple as it is controversial: it states that a potential
criminal will weigh the benets of breaking the law with its cost, which consist of the probability
of getting caught multiplied by the disutility induced by the penalty. Thus, the authorities in
charge will be able to reduce crime by setting suciently high rates of deterrence. This theory
is intuitive, simple and elegant. Its opponents claim it is also fatally 
awed, precisely because
crime is not simple, but depends on a complex interplay of social factors (e.g. Nussbaum 1997).
Is the deterrence theory a useful theory of crime, as Becker (1968) claims? Or is it mainly
rhetoric proclaiming an illusion of social control, as criminologist David Garland (2001) argues?
The stakes behind these questions are high, and a (largely fruitless) debate on the merits of
the economic model has been raging for decades. In the midst of it, it is easy to forget that
the validity of the deterrence theory is simply an empirical question, that should be judged on
the basis of empirical evidence: can the economic model predict patterns of crime and non-
compliance with the law more generally? The rst part of this chapter is dedicated to a review
of evidence on this question. This review shows that although the economic model has some
empirical support, the overall evidence for it is rather inconsistent. Perhaps more importantly,
variations in the levels of deterrence can not nearly explain the variation in level of compliance.
The uneven empirical record of the deterrence hypothesis suggests that economists are working
with a model of social control that captures at best a small part of the reasons why people
comply with the rules. Moreover, standard theory has no explanation for why deterrence works
in some circumstances and not in others. Given that the deterrence hypothesis is such an
important pillar of economic theory, does this disqualify the economic theory of incentives as
being a `useful' theory of crime and deviant behavior? I will argue that this conclusion is too
quick.
Over the last decade, economic and legal theorist have begun to take their critics from other
social sciences seriously and have started to incorporate models of social context in their analysis
of crime. In Section 2.4 I show how this new economic literature can help account for the mixed
press of deterrence. Generally, this literature distinguishes between a direct and an indirect
eect of sanctions. The direct eect of sanctions is their standard eect; to provide incentives
for compliance by changing economic payos. This is the eect that traditional economic theory
in the tradition of Becker has focused on. The indirect eect operates trough the interaction of
formal incentives with informal mechanisms in society. I have singled out a few such mechanisms.
The rst is what is known as `motivational crowding out', the idea that external incentives have
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an impact on individual preferences to engage in virtuous behavior. The second is the way
in which sanctions disturb equilibria in games played between agents. These can be long-run
evolutionary games that aect the formation of preferences for virtuous behavior. The impact
of sanctions on such games is discussed in Section 2.4.2. Or they can more instantaneous
games of signaling or coordination, in which equilibria may be associated with social norms or
conventions, as discussed in Section 2.4.3. As we will see, taking into account the endogeneity of
equilibria may cause deterrence to have very dierent eects than those predicted by standard
theory.
The conclusion that emerges from these theoretical analyses is that both the short and long-
run the eects of ocial sanctions are highly dependent on the social context. The impact of
sanctions on behavior depends on whether they will crowd out virtuous motivations, are able to
sustain and reinforce social norms of compliance and foster the existence and survival of prefer-
ences that favor compliance in the population. This has implications for economic theory, that
generally prides itself for the generality of its models. In the discussion I argue that economists
have been hampered by the `Hobbesian' framework that usually underlies economic policy pre-
scriptions. This framework perceives the actor as essentially individualistic and engaged in a
never-ending `war of all against all'. Although this Hobbesian view has its merits in terms of
simplicity and rigor, it cannot generate specic policy advice. I argue that when we expand this
narrow concept of economic man, not only does the eect of deterrence become more ambigu-
ous, but other policy instruments that impact on dierent motivations become salient. What
is needed is a clearer picture of how dierent policy instruments can be combined to increase
compliance. To illustrate this last point, I present a simple model where an authority can use
both a `hard' deterrent policy and a `soft' cultural policy aimed at reducing a norms of criminal
behavior. I show that the hard policy may be counterproductive on it's own, but that it is an
eective complement to the softer policy.
Thus, I will conclude, nding the optimal level of deterrence involves an analysis of the social
context, something that economists have become increasingly good at doing. Moreover, deter-
rence is only one of a range of policy instruments to induce compliance, and much work is to
be done to analyze the integrated eects of these dierent policy instruments.
2.2 The deterrence hypothesis and some evidence
The idea that authorities can reduce deviant or criminal behavior by changing the price of such
behavior is one of the most basic building blocks of law and economics and economic policy
more generally. The underlying model is that in deciding whether to commit an illegal act,
criminals or deviants weigh the expected benets and the expected costs of doing so. If one
denes s as the (utility) cost of punishment, p as the probability of getting caught for a crime,
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and b as the (utility) benet of committing a crime, then the deterrence hypothesis holds that
a person will commit a crime if:
b > p  s
Although this idea was already explicitly discussed by Beccaria (1770), Becker (1968) was the
rst to formally model the idea that criminal acts are the result of an expected utility maxi-
mization, and therefore highly predictable. Becker derived some important implications about
optimal enforcement. An immediate implication is that punishment and probability of detection
are substitutes in deterring crime, although the exact substitutability relation depends on the
risk aversion of the potential criminal. This implies that the law-enforcers are 
exible in choos-
ing their instruments. Moreover, to be deterrent, punishments should increase in the benets of
the crime. Becker also argues that since raising the probability of detection by increased mon-
itoring is costly, optimal deterrence should instead rely on high punishments. He specically
argues for the use of nes, since they are costless to administer and may provide compensation
to the victims.
The deterrence hypothesis is very attractive because it is simple and intuitive. For these good
reasons, it underlies an enormous literature in law and economics, surveyed by Polinsky and
Shavel (2007) and Garoupa (1997). A prominent application is the Allingham and Sandmo
model (1972) of tax evasion. They model tax evasion as a choice between a safe asset (declared
income) with a low return, and an unsafe one (concealed income) with a potentially high return.
They then show that an increase in the deterrence variables p and s make the risky option less
attractive, and lead agents to conceal less income.
2.2.1 Does deterrence work?
A simple and elegant theory is not necessarily correct. Whether governments or authorities in
general can eectively use deterrence to induce compliance in the population is an empirical
question, that I will try to answer in this section. Given the size of the literature I can and do
not aim to be exhaustive. Instead I rely on review studies conducted by others, and try to give
a 
avor of the literature by mentioning some specic examples that I think are instructive1.
One immediate conclusion is that there is substantial disagreement among scholars about what
the evidence says. Two quotes from dierent review-studies on deterrence will make this clear:
1I will take a very wide range of applications of deterrence. I will consider both criminal acts such as assault,
theft and tax evasion, and mere anti-social behavior such as littering or not contributing to a public good in an
experiment. There are many reasons to think that these are very dierent acts that warrant very dierent policy
measures. However, from the point of the deterrence hypothesis, there is no fundamental dierence between
these acts or the way they should be counteracted. In this article I will not drop this particular generalization
for reasons of space and time. However, I am condent that doing so will reinforce rather than diminish the
conclusions of this chapter.
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\[R]esearchers have enjoyed signicant progress in recent years in testing the
economic model. They have found that deterrence has a substantial but far from
complete role in explaining observed patterns of criminal activity."
Levitt and Miles (2007, p. 457).
\Does criminal law deter? Given available behavioral science data, the short
answer is: generally, no."
Robinson and Darley (2004, p. 173).
Part of the dierence between these conclusions can be explained by the fact that these two
articles review partly dierent studies. However, a more important reason is that assessing the
eects of deterrence in the real world is very hard indeed, and the evidence is open to dierent
interpretations. For example, the econometric literature on real world data suers from thorny
identication problems and limited availability of data. For this reason I will also include data
from eld and lab experiments in this short (meta-)survey, since these methodologies can solve
the problems associated with econometric studies. However, these studies generally cannot
investigate real crimes, but rather milder forms of anti-social behavior. Moreover, given the
articial nature of laboratory experiments, the external validity of these studies is questionable2.
Panel data and instrumental variables. Within the econometric literature that deals
with real world data, I will discuss research on street, property and violent crime and tax evasion.
The reason is simply that most evidence on the eect of deterrence has been gathered in these
areas. The literature on crime has inspired several surveys (e.g. Eide 2000, Levitt and Miles
2007, Robinson and Darley 2004). There also exists a sizable literature on the determinants of
tax evasion (e.g. Andreoni et al. 1998, Frazoni 1999, Alm 1998).
Most of the econometric literature on deterrence can be understood as the attempt to dodge
two thorny identication problems. First, the amount of deterrence will often be a response to
the level of crime, yielding a spurious positive correlation between deterrence and crime. For
example, Dubin and Wilde (1988) nd that tax audit rates are often endogenous. This may (but
need not) explain the results found by Cameron (1988), who surveys 22 studies that investigate
the relation between increase in the number of policemen and crime. Of these, only 4 nd a
2Note that even though econometric studies rely on real world data, their generalizability cannot be taken for
granted either. For example, Ayres and Levitt (1998) investigated the introduction of LoJack, a radio-tracking
device for cars. LoJack greatly increases the possibility of the police to track down stolen cars and can not be
detected from the outside. Ayres and Levitt (1998) nd that it reduces auto thefts by as much 50% when it
was implemented in the US. However, Gonzalez-Navarro (2008) studies the eectiveness of the device in Mexico,
where it was only introduced in certain states. He shows that the reduction in thefts in those states where
matched almost one for one by an increase in theft in neighboring states where LoJack was not introduced. This
shows that a deterrent measure may be very successful in one situation and ineective (on aggregate) in another.
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negative relationship, the others nd either no relationship or a positive one. Dills et al. (2008)
investigate simple correlations of time series and cross-country data, and nd that police arrests,
incarceration and the size of the police force are either not correlated, or positively correlated
with crime. A second problem is that even if one nds an eect of punishments, the question
is how to distinguish between deterrence and incapacitation. Do sanctions work because they
deter, or because the potential criminals are behind bars?
The identication problems described above can be tackled by using instrumental variables:
variables that correlate with the size of deterrence but not with crime. Alternatively, one can
disentangle the direction of the causation with the use lagged variables. Panel data can help to
correct for unobserved characteristics of particular communities of study.
Levitt has tried to tackle endogeneity problems by using a panel data set and instrumental
variables. Levitt (1997) uses the fact that politicians tend to spend more resources on deterrence
in electoral years to estimate the impact of deterrence across cities. He shows that a spurious
positive correlation disappears when the instrument is used and turns into a modest negative
relationship. Levitt estimates an elasticity of violent crime with respect to the number of police
ocers of  1:0. For property crime the elasticity is  0:3. However, the instrument is weak and
the estimations are imprecise. McCrary (2002) also points out a computational error that leaves
the results insignicant. In response to McCrary, Levitt (2002) uses the number of reghters
and municipal workers as instruments and nds smaller but more signicant negative elasticities:
Around  0:5 for both violent and property crime.
Some authors have taken other approaches to circumvent endogeneity. Moody and Marvell
(1996) use a Granger-causal approach: using a panel data set they estimate whether bigger
police forces precede drops in the crime rate. Corman and Mocan (2000) use monthly data
to circumvent the simultaneity problem, arguing that a political response to rising crime rates
takes long to materialize. Both studies nd similar values to Levitt (2002).
The question how much of this is due to incapacitation and how much to deterrence is still
largely open, although there is evidence that both phenomena play a role. For example, Kessler
and Levitt (1999) focus on the short long term-impact of the eect of enhanced sentences for
some oenses. They nd that the short-term impact (due mainly to deterrence) is signicant
but lower than the long-term impact (due to both deterrence and incapacitation).
In their survey of the econometric literature, based on the studies cited here and other ones,
Levitt and Miles (2007) conclude that there is rather consistent evidence that bigger police
forces and more prisons reduce crime. However, not all studies using instrumental variables
corroborate these results. Cornwell and Trumbull (2000) use a panel data set on counties in
North Carolina. They use within estimators to correct for unobserved heterogeneity, which they
nd to be important. They nd that the elasticities of crime to the probability of arrest are
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signicant but small (around -0.35 for the probability of arrest). They then use tax revenue as
an instrumental variable for the number of police ocers, and the ratio of `face to face' crimes
to other crimes as instrumental variable for the probability of arrest (because these crimes are
more easily solved). When they use these two corrections, they nd that signicance of deterrent
measures disappears. Labor market variables, such as the market wage, are more strongly (and
inversely) correlated with crime.
In fact, general statements about the eect of deterrence are hard to make. Two debates in
the empirical literature demonstrate this vividly. The rst is the debate over the eects of
the right to carry (concealed) handguns. In theory, allowing people to do so should have a
deterrent eect, because criminals know that their victim may be armed. Lott and Mustard
(1997) investigate the introduction from right to carry laws using a panel data set with county
level data. They present evidence that concealed handguns have a signicant deterrence eect
on various crime categories. They estimate that at least 1,411 murders, 4,177 rapes, and more
than 11,000 robberies could have been avoided if every state in the US would have introduced the
legislation in 1992. However, their results have been sharply criticized by a number of authors.
Dezhbakshs and Rubin (1998) attack the assumption of Lott and Mustard that right to carry
legislation only aects the intercept of the relation between crime and the control variables and
has no impact on the eect of individual controls. They show that in a more general model the
eect is much smaller and no longer goes in one direction for all crime categories. Similarly,
Black and Nagin (1998) expand the model of Lott and Mustard to allow the eect to be dierent
across states that introduced the legislation. The eect of handgun regulation is very dierent
across states and crime categories and no uniformly negative eect on crime is found.
A similar discussion rages over the deterrent eects of the death penalty. Donohue and Wolfers
(2006) review research on this topic, and nd that the empirical results are very sensitive to
small model changes. They conclude that the literature has not demonstrated a robust eect
of the death penalty, mainly because of a lack of variation in the available data.
These controversies show how dicult it is to get adequate measurements of deterrence eects.
In the case of the handgun debate, it also shows how aggregating data on a high level tends to
obscure the large variations between dierent communities. In the analysis below we will show
that such heterogeneity is exactly what one would expect if sanctions interact with localized
norms and values.
Moving from street and property crime to tax evasion, the results are rather similar. Franzoni
(1999) and Andreoni et al. (1998) and Alm (1998) survey the theoretical and empirical literature
on tax evasion. They all conclude that econometric studies indicate that penalties and audit
probabilities seem to have some deterrent eects, where the typical elasticity of reported income
to the audit rate is around 0:2. However, like in the case of crime, the estimated responses vary
across studies.
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Natural experiments. One of the most powerful identication strategies is the use of
natural experiments. When using a natural experiment, the researcher investigates the eect
of a (random) event or policy that causes an exogenous change in the deterrence policy. One
can see this as a stronger variant of the instrumental variable techniques, because it does not
rely on (the sometimes weak) correlation between the instrument and the explanatory variable.
The art is to come up with suitable and clever natural experiments.
Lee and McCrary (2005) use the increase in the length of sentences at the age of 18 in the U.S.
They do not nd that adolescents reduce the amount of crimes at this age, a result they attribute
to imperfect perception of the sentence length, or extreme short-sightedness of the oenders.
Drago et al. (forthcoming) use an Italian clemency bill as a natural experiment. The bill released
22.000 criminals on the condition that if they were to commit a crime in the next ve years,
they would have to serve the residual jail sentence as well as the new sentence. This means that
dierent people faced dierent penalties for comparable crimes. The authors nd evidence for an
eect of deterrence: an extra month of residual sentence reduces the probability of recidivism
by 1.24 percent. Helland and Tabarrok (2007) use the three strikes legislation in California
as a source of natural experiment. This legislation constitutes a harsh piece of deterrence: an
oender is automatically given a life-sentence if he is convicted for the third `strike-able' oense.
The authors compare criminals who were convicted for a second strike, with those who were
tried for a second strike-able oense but convicted of a non-strike-able oense. They nd that
the three-strike legislation signicantly reduces felony arrest rates among the class of criminals
with two strikes by 17-20 percent.
Field experiments. The problems in the econometric literature on crime can be resolved to
a large extent using eld experiments. Varying deterrence rates while controlling for other vari-
ables is a powerful method to test the deterrence hypothesis, and provide sharper insights into
the eects of deterrence. Experiments with policies to combat crime tend to be controversial,
so eld experiment have typically focused on lighter forms of deviant behavior.
A study that deals a serious blow to the deterrence hypothesis is Gneezy and Rustichini (2000).
In a eld experiment in daycare centers in Haifa, the experimental condition consisted of the
introduction of a small ne if for picking up one's child late. The results contradicted the
deterrence hypothesis: when a ne was introduced late-coming went up signicantly. Moreover,
revoking the ne did not lead to a reversal in behavior; the post-ne level of late-coming was
higher than before the introduction of a ne.
Cardenas et al. (2000) conducted an experiment among Columbian farmers, who were asked
how much they would extract from a common resource. The farmers extracted more than the
ecient level. After sanctions for extraction were introduced extraction levels initially went
down, but after a few periods they rose again to almost the pre-sanction level. Bowles (2008)
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surveys 24 experimental studies that found results of a similar nature. There is a consistent
nding that small levels of incentives or nes reduce cooperative or compliant behavior, while
large levels increase it.
Coleman (1997) reports the results of a large-scale eld experiment on tax evasion amongst
47,000 taxpayers in Minnesota. Some 1700 of the taxpayers received a letter saying that the
recipient was randomly selected for an audit. Coleman nds that this warning increases tax
payments among low and middle income taxpayers, but not for high income taxpayers. The
eect was most pronounced for a small group who had the most opportunity to evade taxes.
For the rest of the taxpayers the eect was so modest that Coleman concludes that the benets
do not justify the cost of the audit.
Laboratory experiments. Laboratory experiments provide maximum possibility for con-
trol of environmental circumstances, and are the most eective method for solving endogeneity
problems. On the down side, laboratory experiments cannot study real crimes and generally
take place in articial environments, so the external validity of experimental results is always
questionable.
Surprisingly, a direct experimental test of the deterrence hypothesis has been conducted only
recently, by H orisch and Strassmair (2008). In their experiment, two subjects receive an endow-
ment of money and are paired to play a simple game. The player with the smaller endowment
is oered the possibility to steal part or all of the endowment of the other player. After she has
made the decision whether or not to steal, the theft is detected with some probability and a ne
is deducted from her wealth. The probability of detection and the size of the ne are varied over
treatments. This way the authors can test whether deterrence works and whether the probabil-
ity of detection and the ne are indeed substitutes. The authors nd that in accordance with the
deterrence hypothesis, the ne and the probability of detection seem to be substitutes in their
eects on stealing. In accordance with the eld evidence cited above, but in almost complete
contrast to the deterrence theory, weak deterrence signicantly increases the level of stealing
relative to the no-deterrence case. Only the highest level of deterrence (of 6 levels) signicantly
decreases stealing. Also, strong deterrence creates a clear bipolar distribution in the amount
stolen: while some steal everything, others steal nothing. H orish and Strassmaier (2008) in-
terpret this as evidence for the existence of dierent `types' of people. There are selsh types
who steal maximally if sanctions are low act as predicted by the deterrence theory. However,
the (slight) majority consists of dierent or `fair-minded' types, who do not steal maximally
in the absence of deterrence but start doing so when weak incentives are in place. Fishbacher
and G achter (2006) explicitly test for the stability of such behavior across situations, and nd
clear evidence for the existence of dierent types of players. Around 25% is found to behave
selshly, 50% behaves as a conditional cooperator, and 25% displays more complicated behavior.
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Conditional cooperators are people who condition their behavior on what they think others are
doing. Indeed, the existence of conditional cooperators is a fact that is repeatedly conrmed in
studies of dilemma games (G achter, 2006), and plays an important role in the analysis of social
norms in section 2.4.
Another interesting result from H orish and Strassmeier (2008) relates to the temporal dimension
of incentives. In the study all subjects participate in two treatments, and so within subject
comparisons between several deterrence regimes are possible. H orish and Strassmair (2008) nd
that subjects steal more if the treatment is preceded by a treatment with higher incentives. The
hysteresis-results echoes the result of Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) cited above, and is also found
in other studies, e.g. Frohlich and Oppenheimer (1995) and G achter et al. (2007). Tax evasion
has been the subject of many experimental studies. The earlier literature focuses on testing
the Sandmo-Allingham expected utility model. Surveying this literature, Alm (1998) nds that
elasticities of reported incomes to (random) audit rates generally have a small positive eect
with elasticities in the range of 0:1 to 0:2. Fines have an even smaller eect, with an estimated
elasticity of less than 0:1. Like H orish and Strassmeier (2008), Alm also stresses the great
heterogeneity between the behavior of subjects, and the importance of theory to replicate this
fact.
Sanctions have been also studied in the context of public good games, although there are sur-
prisingly few studies that directly test the introduction of a centralized sanction in a public good
game in a within subject design (perhaps because the result is supposed to be obvious). Nev-
ertheless, there is some evidence however that sanctions have a positive eect on contributions.
Shinada and Yamagishi (2007) and Guillen et al. (2006) show in a between subject design that
sanctions imposed by the experimenter raise contribution levels.3
2.2.2 Is deterrence important?
Most of the previous evidence relates to the question whether the eect of deterrence goes in
the direction conjectured by the deterrence hypothesis. Perhaps a more important question is
whether deterrence matters, in the sense that it explains the level and the variation in crime
rates. There are studies that focus on the relative importance of dierent explanations, but
these generally do not correct for the endogeneity problems mentioned above. Nevertheless, we
can nd many indications that variations in deterrence explain relatively little of the variance
in crime and tax evasion.4
3In addition to these studies, there is by now a large experimental literature on the eect of performance
incentives in principal-agent settings. This is surveyed in Fehr and Falk (2002). The gist of this literature is that
a principal's use of incentives, such as nes, bonuses and enforced contracts, does sometimes crowd out voluntary
eort provision.
4A caveat here is that most of this evidence relates to relatively small 
uctuations in deterrence rates. I
certainly do not want to extrapolate this result to say that the complete absence of a criminal justice system
would not aect compliance with the law.
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Glaeser et al. (1996) show that the variance in crime is staggering. Using data from 1980, they
show that on a cross-country level, the United States has about 150 times the homicide rate
of Japan. On a intra-country level, Atlantic City, New Jersey has about 40 times the crime
rate of nearby Ridgewood Village. And on a intra-city level the 1st precinct in NYC has about
10 times the crime rate of the 123rd precinct. They also present some suggestive gures with
respect to the relative importance of deterrence. There is no correlation between arrest rates
and crime across NY precincts. Across cities arrest rates and convictions are slightly negatively
correlated with crime (around  5%), which means that the arrest rates `explain' less than 1%
of the variation in crime. By contrast, the fraction of female headed households correlate 20%
with crime across New York precincts and and slightly higher across cities. The authors also
conduct a logit-regression analysis. They show that all the observable city-specic characteristics
(education, age, income, unemployment, the property tax rate, ratio of households headed by
females, and police per capita) explain less than 30% of the crime rate. Like I will do in the
second half of this chapter, the authors argue that social interactions (of which they present a
model in the paper) are responsible for the remaining variance.
Glaeser and Sacerdote (1999) attempt to decompose the causes of high crime in big cities.
They rst estimate that the elasticity of crime with respect to the city size is about :24, and
the elasticity of the arrest rate with respect to city size is about  0:08. Using data from two
dierent sources, they specify dierent models to get robust estimates for the elasticity of crime
to arrest rates, which they show to be between  0:2 and  0:5 (i.e. similar to Levitt 1997). This
means that the lower probability of arrest in big cities can explain between 8% and 20% of the
increased crime in big cities. The presence of more female-headed households on the other hand
can explain between one-third and one-half of the dierence.
Fajnzylber et al. (2002) use panel data to estimate the cross-country determinants of violent
crime. They include socioeconomic variables such as average educational attainment, unem-
ployment, inequality, and output growth as regressors. The number of police personnel per
capita and the existence of the death penalty proxy for the level of deterrence. They also in-
clude lags of the crime rate to correct for endogeneity. Using GMM estimation, they nd that
the deterrence variables have negative, marginally signicant but very small impact on crime.
Economic growth and income inequality are more important both in terms of signicance and
in terms of the size of the eect.
A nice and rare study of the long-run connection between deterrence and crime is provided by
Lappi-Sepp al a (2001), who describes the change in the Finnish penal regime over the last few
decades. In the 1950s, the imprisonment rate in Finland was 4 times higher than in neighboring
Scandinavian countries. Still, in 1975, Finland had one of the highest imprisonment rates in
Europe. In the subsequent 20 years, Finland brought down the prison population to the same
level of other Scandinavian countries, and to one of lowest in Europe (around 60 prisoners per
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100.000 inhabitants). Lappi-Sepp al a (2001) describes in detail the widespread reform of the
criminal code that accomplished this, mainly through decriminalizing activities and reducing
prison sentences for many others. The deterrence hypothesis would predict that crime rates
would increase. In fact however, crime statistics in Finland in the same period have not deviated
from those in other Scandinavian countries, and have remained lower than those of Sweden and
Denmark. This raises doubt about any straightforward long-run relationship between deterrence
and crime rates.
Turning to tax-evasion, there is a consensus that the real-world levels of deterrence for evasion
cannot explain the observed levels of compliance. Andreoni et al. (1998, p.855) note that
\The most signicant discrepancy that has been documented between the standard economic
model of compliance and real-world compliance behavior is that the standard model greatly
overpredicts evasion". And on page 821: \For small amounts of evasion, [...] the expected cost
of detection would appear to be extremely low for most tax-payers. So, we may ask, why are so
many households honest and why don't cheaters cheat by more?" Alm (1998) concurs that the
expected utility model greatly overpredicts evasion, and states in the conclusion of his survey on
tax evasion that \there are signicant limitations in the ability of the expected utility theory to
explain major aspects of individual compliance behavior," (1998, p. 759). Alm (1998) concludes
in his survey that social norms are one of the most important factors driving tax compliance.
In section 2.4 we will see several economic approaches to the study of social norms.
2.2.3 Summary and stylized facts
The number of studies on the eect of deterrence is overwhelming, and the picture they present
is far from consistent. Nevertheless, I will attempt to summarize the empirical results in a few
stylized facts:
1. Real-world data show that if deterrence is strong (punishments and detection probabilities
are high), such as under California's three-strikes law, the empirical literature generally
supports the claim that deterrence decreases crime. However, estimates of the size of the
eect are not very consistent.
2. Variations in deterrence explain only a relatively small portion of the real-world variation
in crime and in tax evasion.
3. Experimental studies indicate that at low levels of deterrence, the direction of the eect
of deterrence is ambiguous. A rising number of studies nds that modest amounts of
deterrence can be counterproductive.
4. The experimental literature has shown some specic eects of deterrent measures. First,
deterrence can have (adverse) eects that outlast the existence of the incentives themselves.
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Second, dierent people react dierently to deterrence measures. Specically, only around
one quarter of the population seem to be selsh agents that respond as economic theory
would predict.
The conclusion from the empirical evidence must be that the deterrence hypothesis has a mixed
press. Given that deterrence is such an important building block of economic and legal theory,
this is both surprising and important. The next sections of this chapter are dedicated to the
question why deterrence may work well in some circumstances and not in others. One answer
is that the theory is sound, but that there are practical obstacles to the implementation of
deterrence that often prevent deterrence levels to be suciently high to have an impact. We
discuss this possibility in the next section. However, some of the evidence cited suggests that
the theory itself is incomplete at best. Critics have taken this as a cue that economic models
of incentives have nothing to contribute to policy debates about criminal and deviant behavior.
However, I will argue that these critics throw out the child with the bath water. In section 2.4
I will introduce new economic models that analyze the interaction of deterrence with informal
social mechanisms. These studies show that the straightforward link between deterrence and
compliance disappears.5
2.3 Why deterrence may not work in practice
The theory of deterrence outlined above is clean and 
awless. The practical implementation
however is not so. One problem is that achieving probabilities of detection that are suciently
high to make an impact may be prohibitively costly. Robinson and Darley (1997) estimated
the objective probability of getting caught, convicted, and imprisoned for several oenses. For
homicide the probability is 45%, for rape 12%, for robbery 4%, for assault, burglary, larceny,
and motor vehicle theft, 1%. Robinson and Darley (2004) compute on the basis of data from
the American Justice Department that the average probability of being sentenced for a criminal
oense committed is 1:3%. Andreoni et al. (1998) report that in 1995, 1.7 % of all US taxpayers
were audited. Of the people who's audit was reassessed, 4.1 % paid a ne.
For this reason, Becker (1968) advocated the use of heavy penalties, and especially nes, because
these are cheap, or even protable to administer. However, there are moral bounds to the level
of sanctions that authorities can impose, given the widespread sentiment that the punishment
must be proportional to the crime. The `three strikes' law in California seems to be a good
example of this. In the survey above, Helland and Tabarrok (2007) present perhaps the clearest
5With the exception of evolutionary models, I do not consider theories that suppose some form of irrationality
on the part of potential oenders. I also do not consider theories of misperception of severity or arrest probabilities.
Robinson and Darley (2004) give a convincing account that both of these factors are at work. My reason for
focusing on informal social mechanisms is that so far, the assumptions of correct perception of deterrence and
full rationality have been seen as generally sucient for the deterrence hypothesis to hold.
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evidence around that the heavy sanctions of this legislation do indeed deter crime. The law is
heavily criticized however, both for being too harsh (people have landed life sentences on the
basis of rather innocent shoplifting crimes) and for straining the prison system too much.
The combination of costly monitoring and proportional sanctions, means that in practice it may
be very dicult to attain levels of deterrence that are high enough to substantially in
uence
behavior. This is especially true for small oenses that are hard to detect. One can think in
this respect of small crimes or misdemeanors such as littering, small amounts of tax evasion and
fare evasion. Improvements in monitoring technology may alleviate this problem in some cases.
For example, the United States tax authorities employ a sophisticated computer algorithm that
makes large underreporting of income taxes easy to detect. It is hard to imagine however that
in a free society monitoring will eliminate crime. As an illustration, consider the problems
encountered by the closed-circuit television (CCTV) system, the most elaborate monitoring
system in the world, installed by the British police to solve and prevent crime. Britain has
4.2 million security cameras, and someone living in London is lmed an estimated 300 times a
day. However, both the Home Oce in 2005 and Scotland Yard in 2008 have concluded that
the cameras are largely ineective. \CCTV was originally seen as a preventative measure,"
Detective Chief Inspector Mick Neville, the ocer in charge of the Metropolitan police unit has
told the Security Document World Conference in London6. \Billions of pounds has been spent
on the kit, but no thought has gone into how the police are going to use the images and how
they will be used in court. It's been an utter asco: only 3% of crimes were solved by CCTV.
There's no fear of CCTV. Why don't people fear it? [They think] the cameras are not working."
More recently, CCTV has also come under attack because it has been used by ocials to
prosecute small oenses like littering. Many people perceive as an invasion of privacy and a
disproportional use of the technology, demonstrating again the limits to the social acceptability
of raising deterrence.
Thus, in practice it turns out to be hard to generate high levels of deterrence. Even if such levels
are technically possible, they may not always be socially acceptable. This means that results
of experiment that document contradictions to the deterrence theory at low levels of deterrence
become more salient. In the parlance of game theory: deterrence may often not succeed in
making compliance a dominant strategy. What then, if any, is the eect of deterrence?
2.4 How formal and informal mechanisms produce compliance
In this section I survey theoretical approaches within economics that help explain the mixed
record of deterrence. The approaches I consider look at the interaction of deterrent measures
6See http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2008/may/06/ukcrime1.
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with informal incentives resulting from social interactions. I will rst brie
y discuss the mech-
anisms I consider.
First I consider the interaction of sanctions with preferences in the context of motivation crowd-
ing theory (MCT). MCT distinguishes between intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. `Intrinsic
motivation' may consist amongst other things of the joy of engaging in the activity or the feel-
ing that the activity is worth doing for moral reasons. `Extrinsic motivation' refers to formal
incentives applied by authorities as well as informal pressures from peers or other social ac-
tors. Motivation crowding theory allows that these two types of motivation are not independent
from one another. More specically, it holds that extrinsic motivation may reduce intrinsic
motivation.
Second, I allow for the fact that sanctions may impact on games played between agents. One
instance of this is in medium and long-run evolutionary games preference formation, or what I
will call internalization of values. By this I mean the endogenous formation of preferences such
as guilt, reciprocity, shame and preferences for fairness.
I also analyze the impact of sanctions on social norms and conventions in games. Social norms
are hard to dene, but here I will follow McAdams and Rasmusen (2007). They identify con-
ventions with equilibria in dierent types of games, i.e. coordination games, signaling games, or
repeated dilemma games. These are regularities that do not necessarily have normative content,
they simply constitute what is normal. The fact that there are often multiple equilibria in these
games means that conventions are to some extent accidental, such as the convention what side
of the road to drive on. Social norms are conventions that are supported at least in part by
normative attitudes. Such normative attitudes may create and sustain equilibria because they
motivate people to provide informal punishments or rewards, such as (dis)approval or esteem
(see McAdams (1997) for an elaborate account of an esteem-based account of social norms).
Naturally, there are intimate links between these three concepts. Intrinsic motivation may derive
from internalized values. Similarly, the normative attitudes that underlie social norms depend
on internalized values. Also, the evolved capacity for feeling guilt and shame makes people
susceptible to the (dis)esteem of others, a fundamental issue in the conception of norms as it is
used here.
Nevertheless, I believe there is reason to analyze these three issues separately. First, values
are dierent from motivation, because `motivation' applies to a specic action and context,
whereas values are stable entities that persist over time. Values are also dierent from norms.
The analysis of norms as Nash equilibria brings in many inter-personal considerations that are
independent of the process of internalization. Again, even though values may underlie norms,
they are thought to be deeper and more stable entities than these norms. Moreover, as McAdams
(1997) points out, internalization usually occurs only for rather abstract values such as `fairness'
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or `reciprocity'. Social norms are more practical rules of behavior that give meaning to these
values in concrete social contexts.
2.4.1 Motivation crowding theory
Frey (1997a, 1997b) has been very active in popularizing the idea amongst economists that
incentives do not just change relative prices. He has borrowed from the psychology literature
to formulate what he calls `motivation crowding theory' (MCT). MCT itself and the empirical
evidence for it are surveyed by Frey and Jegen (2001). MCT holds that people have `intrinsic
motivation' for many activities. As Deci (1975, p. 105) puts it \one is said to be intrinsically mo-
tivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent reward except the activity itself".
Crucially, according to MCT, intrinsic motivation is not independent from exernal (monetary)
incentives, or `extrinsic motivation'. Instead, external incentives may increase (`crowd in') or
reduce (`crowd-out') intrinsic motivation.
Crowding out is attributed to two psychological processes. The rst is impaired self-determination.
If the individual feels that the external incentive restricts her choice, the intrinsic motivation
becomes redundant and she acts by reducing it. This is also called the over-justication eect.
The second process is impaired self-esteem: if intervention signals that the agents motivation is
not acknowledged or not good enough, the individual may feel less recognized or less competent
and reduces her eort.
A useful theory of interdependence of preferences and incentives will have to make precise
predictions on the relation between them. Frey (1997a, 1997b) sketches the relationship between
extrinsic and intrinsic motivation. He argues that the crowding out eect is not gradual: no
matter what the size of external incentives, they tend to replace the entire intrinsic motivation.
It follows that when intrinsic motivation is large and extrinsic motivation is small, crowding
out can even lead to the opposite eect of that predicted by economic relative price theory:
discouraging behavior by monetary incentives can lead to more of that behavior.
MCT can account for the puzzling evidence generated by the (eld) experiments above that
small incentives have sometimes counterproductive eects, whereas stronger incentives seem
to work. The main application of this idea in the economics literature so far is by Bowles and
Hwang (2008), who build a model that investigates the consequences of MCT for (tax) incentives
by policy makers. In their model people have `values'; preferences to contribute to the public
good, which depend on the size of the tax rate. They explicitly model non-separable preferences
by assuming that a higher tax rate can augment or diminish preferences to contribute. They
show that a social planner that does not take the crowding eect into account when making
policy may either under or over-use incentives, depending on the social welfare objective and
the direction of the crowding eect.
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While this paper is interesting, it is a reduced form exercise which sheds little light on when
and where we can expect motivation crowding will occur. This is a general problem of MCT.
Frey (1997a) writes that the psychological conditions for crowding out to appear are:
1. External incentives crowd out intrinsic motivation if the individual aected perceive them
to be controlling.
2. External incentives crowd in intrinsic motivation if they are perceived as supportive.
However, MCT does not deliver much hints as to what is perceived as `controlling' and `support-
ive'. Instead, intrinsic motivation seems a blanket term that covers many potential motivations.
Intrinsic motivation may consist of a sense of a Kantian moral duty or a preference for au-
tonomous decision making, but also of self-esteem that comes from completing a task, or the
desire to reciprocate the nice behavior of others. Each of these motivations may interact dif-
ferently with external incentives. In this sense, intrinsic motivation is almost like a measure of
things we don't understand. A more precise characterization of intrinsic motivation and the
social situations in which it matters is therefore necessary.
2.4.2 Sanctions and Internalized Values
The idea that people have moral values is of course not new. However, the analysis of such values
as endogenous to the environment of the agent is relatively recent. Bowles (1998) provides an
excellent and wide-ranging survey of what is known about the eects of economic institutions,
and especially markets, on preferences.
Recently, researchers have started to investigate the eects of deterrent strategies on values
using evolutionary models. In general, these studies model how institutions aect the payos of
`cooperative' types vis- a-vis the payos of selsh types, and derive the evolutionary success of
these types. That is, one uses version of evolutionary theory, the so-called indirect evolutionary
approach, in which evolution impacts on preferences, rather than strategies. In an evolutionary
approach, agents are rational optimizers but evolution selects the preferences that are best
suited to the environment. Note that the term `evolutionary' does not necessarily refer to a
biological selection process, since this could take place only over a time span in which institutions
cannot be reasonably be held constant. Rather it refers to a process of cultural evolution, where
preferences spread by imitation and education.
Huck (1998) presents an evolutionary model where legal institutions have a positive eect on
preferences for remorse from cheating in bilateral exchange. One party is in the position to
cheat on the other party, which can observe cheating at a cost. Under exogenous preferences,
penalties need to be very high to deter cheating if there is zero remorse. However, under
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endogenous preferences, penalties on cheating hurt selsh individuals more than remorseful
individuals, who will always comply. Thus remorse becomes an evolutionary stable trait. This
in turn causes the optimal sanctions to be lower in the long run.
All other papers in this literature have focussed on negative impact of sanctions. Bar-Gill
and Fershtman (2004) model the evolution of preferences for fairness in the population as a
function of the contract enforcement strength of the legal system. They show rst that fairness
concerns will be widespread in an exchange economy if legal enforcement is weak. The reason
is that preferences for fairness gives sellers a good bargaining position. If an unexpected rise
in performance costs occurs, they can credibly threaten not to service the contract unless they
get a higher price. However, when the buyer has legal options to enforce the original contract,
she may prefer litigation to renegotiation with fair types. Thus, under strong enforcement, fair
preferences provide less bargaining benets, and evolution leads to lower fairness concerns.
Another mechanism by which legal enforcement can discourage the spread of virtuous character
traits is given in Bohnet et al. (2001) and Bar-Gill and Fehrstmann (2005). The general idea is
that there are two types, virtuous and selsh, which are perfectly observable. In the absence of
enforcement, people will trustful only towards virtuous types. (Probabilistic) enforcement may
make it worthwhile to trust also low types, so that the latter are better o and increase their
share in the population.
In the model of Bohnet et al. (2001) the two types play a standard trust game, in which
the receiver can decide to cheat or be trustworthy. Under endogenous preferences, there are
potentially negative long run eects of a (probabilistic) enforcement of trustworthy behavior by
third parties. If the contract is enforced by the third party, the cheater induces a cost (ne,
legal costs). When the probability of enforcement is in an intermediate range, the trustors may
be inclined to trust even if the trustee is a low type. This raises the payos of the cheaters and
increases their share in the population. In the long run, only low types remain. Low enforcement
on the other hand leads trustors to be more careful and only trust honest types. This means
that honest types will eventually take over in the population. The authors test their result
by means of an experiment, in which subjects are randomly matched to play the trust game.
In all sessions, the last six interaction rounds featured low enforcement probabilities. In the
rst rounds, enforcement probabilities varied between high, low and medium. In accordance
with their hypothesis, the authors nd that trustees who interacted only in the low enforcement
regime tended to be more trustworthy.
Bar-Gill and Fehrstmann (2005) model a similar logic in the context of a social dilemma game.
In their model some agents care for status (high types) and others don't (low types). Agents
match randomly in a 2  2 prisoners dilemma game. A decision to cooperate is a public good
in the sense that everybody prots from the average amount of cooperation in society. Status
can be acquired by contributing to the public good, and the amount of status increases in the
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average cooperation level in society. The authors show that in the evolutionary equilibrium
the high types cooperate with each other if their preference for status is strong enough. The
low types defect. If a high type meets a low type, the low type defects and the high type is
indierent between cooperating or not. The unique evolutionary stable equilibrium is one where
a fraction of high types cooperate with the low types. The authors now consider the eect of a
small subsidy on cooperation. They show that in the short run, the subsidy raises the fraction
of high types who cooperate. However, this raises the evolutionary payos of the low types,
causing their presence to increase. In the long run, this eect dominates, and the subsidy lowers
contributions in equilibrium.
This logic depends on the strong assumption that types are observable. G uth and Ocken-
fels (2005) show that when this assumption is dropped, legal institutions that punish non-
cooperation become central to the evolution of cooperative preferences. Obviously, the reason
is that cooperation can no longer be conditioned on type, and so private punishment of cheaters
is impossible. As a consequence, cheaters will always be at least as well o as non-cheaters.
In summary, sanctions may decrease the relative payos of selsh types, which decreases the
equilibrium level of such types and decreases cheating. However, countervailing dynamics exist.
When types are observable, sanctions on defection or subsidies on cooperation may increase
cooperation with selsh types. In the long run, the result is a larger share of such types which
lowers aggregate cooperation levels. These are suggestive results with potentially important
policy implications. However, they are largely derived in an empirical vacuum, given the almost
complete lack of data on the long-run eect of sanctions.
2.4.3 Deterrence, norms and conventions
Following McAdams and Rasmusen (2007) we study conventions and norms as equilibria in
coordination games, signaling games, or repeated dilemma games.
Deterrence in coordination games. Coordination games are games in which a player's
best response is to mimic the other players' action. This implies that there are multiple equilibria
in such games. These equilibria can typically be thought of as conventions, or mere regularities,
such as driving on the right or left side of the road. However, normative attitudes may also play
a role. Specically, many games that on the surface look like social dilemmas, may have the
character of coordination games due to the existence of people who behave in a reciprocal, or
conditionally cooperative way. Such people are willing to cooperate and give up (modest) payos
that come from defection, as long as they think others do so as well. The reason may be either
that they have reciprocal preferences, or they fear informal repercussions of not conforming to
standard behavior. The existence of such conditional cooperators is born out by experimental
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ndings. G achter (2006)shows that conditional cooperation plays an important role in for
example public good games, although the resulting cooperation is often fragile. Kahan (1997,
2005) argues that conditional cooperation plays a key a role in a number of social dilemma's such
as tax evasion and not-in-my-back-yard problems, and even in the decision to commit crime.
Thus, we may think of equilibria in coordination games as conventions or norms, depending on
the exact preferences that sustain them.
Sanctions may in
uence behavior in coordination games in several ways. First, they may simply
make one action so unattractive that nobody will play it anymore. Given the practical problems
to raising deterrence discussed in section 3, such sanctions may often not be feasible. If sanctions
do not make actions dominated, they can still in
uence behavior by shaping expectations or
beliefs.
A rst way in which sanctions may shape expectations, also called the focal point theory of law,
is that law can make a particular equilibrium strategy salient (Cooter 1998, McAdams 2000a).
By drawing attention to a specic equilibrium people expect that others will play it, that others
think that they themselves will play it and so on. There is indeed experimental evidence that
the mere introduction of a law can improve coordination on benecial equilibria (Bohnet and
Cooter, 2003), and that third-party cheap talk can help people achieve such coordination (see
Devetag and Ortmann (2007) for a review). McAdams & Nadler (2005) show that third party
cheap talk can foster coordination even in `mixed-motive' games in which players rank the
equilibria dierently. Brandts and Cooper (2006) explicitly compare communication with small
monetary sanctions as tools for a manager to raise coordination levels in a minimum eort
coordination game. They nd that communication that stresses the mutual benet of exerting
high eort is more eective in raising eort levels than sanctions.
The importance of beliefs has also been found in public good games. Shinada and Yamagishi
(2007) conduct a multi person prisoner's dilemma experiment with a baseline treatment and two
dierent punishment treatments. In one treatment, only one player was told that he would be
(probabilistically) punished if he did not cooperate. This raised contributions of the threatened
player substantially. In a second treatment it was made common knowledge that all participants
faced punishment for defection. The authors nd an additional eect of punishment that derives
from increased expectations of contribution levels of others. Thus, in a population of conditional
cooperators, sanctions can have a positive multiplier eect on cooperation. In a eld study on
tax evasion, Coleman (1997) nds that the most cost-eective way to increase tax payments
is to send taxpayers a letter which explicitly states that almost nobody cheats on their taxes.
Such a letter increases reported income among a large group of tax payers.
In the real world, this type of reasoning may underlie the famous but controversial `broken
window eect' (see Kahan 1997). The broken window eect is the name for the observed
fact that combating small signs of disorder (i.e. broken windows) and minor crimes such as
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panhandling can have a dramatic negative eect on the incidence of crime, both small and
serious. Kahan (1997) argues that disorder tells residents that others don't care about the
neighborhood. This causes them to also become more careless, which results in a downward
spiral. In such an environment, zero-tolerance policies that minutely combat disorder may create
a virtuous spiral by in
uencing people's beliefs about the attitudes and actions of others.
In summary, sanctions may have a positive avalanche eect on compliance in the population
if they manage to raise expectations and create a self-fullling upward spiral. Thus, by it's
second order eect on peoples' expectations, sanctions may actually be a more eective policy
instrument than standard theory allows.
A second way in which sanctions may in
uence expectations in coordination games stems from
the fact that sanctions are a reaction to the behavior they are supposed to regulate. The
introduction of a law can signal that many people are not behaving well or eciently, which
may lower the expectation of future compliance by others.
In the next chapter I present a formal model of this phenomenon. In this model, there is a
population of agents playing a public good game and a government that wants to induce coop-
eration between the agents trough the use of sanctions. The government has more information
about the types of agents in the company or society than the agents themselves. In equilib-
rium, sanctions are introduced only when there is a large number of `bad types' around, and
therefore serve as a signal which makes people more cynical about their peers. Because of the
negative signaling eect of sanctions, equilibrium sanctions are lower than they would be under
symmetric information. Chapter 4 present experimental evidence that such a signaling eect
may indeed occur.
In sum, sanctions may change behavior by in
uencing expectations about norms or conventions
in coordination games. Such changes may be positive, if sanctions raise expectations that others
will play the ecient equilibrium, or negative if sanctions indicate that the prevailing norm is
to take inecient or non-cooperative action.
Deterrence in signaling games. An increasingly rich literature focuses on the interaction
of deterrence with equilibria in signaling games. We can distinguish between several variants.
First, the use of ocial sanctions themselves can signal private information about the authorities
to agents in society. I call this vertical signals. Second, sanctions can interfere with horizontal
signals that are sent between agents in society. I discuss both these ideas in turn.
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000), discussed above, present an example of vertical signaling. They
titled their paper on Israeli daycare centers \A ne is a price", to indicate that a ne reveals
information about the cost of certain behaviors. They provide (amongst others) the following
explanation for the result that higher sanctions lead more parents to pick up their children late
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from the daycare center: in absence of any sanctions, parents are unsure about the price of
coming late. For example, they may think that if they come late too often, the manager of
the daycare centre may exclude them from the center's services altogether. Upon observing the
sanction they are reassured that the price for coming late is only small, and therefore they will
come late more often. Thus, the idea is that there is uncertainty about the `toughness' of the
authority. Small levels of sanctions then show that the authority is actually `soft' which leads
to more deviant behavior.
Ellingsen and Johannessen (2008) suggest an alternative mechanism of vertical signaling. They
argue that agents care about gaining esteem of a partner in an exchange. However, the value
of esteem to the receiver depends on the perceived character of the partner. People are more
eager to earn the respect of an altruistic or `nice' person than that of a selsh person. This
implies what political philosopher Pettit (1995) calls `the cunning of trust': trusting actions by
the rst mover can induce a reciprocal reaction, because the second mover wants to earn the
esteem of the rst mover who has revealed herself to be `nice'. Bacharach et al. (2007) conduct
an experiment which allows to distinguish between dierent reasons to be trustworthy. They do
indeed nd high levels of `trust responsiveness': people behave in a trustworthy manner because
they believe others trust them.
On the other hand, if the introduction of sanctions and other measures that restrict the choice
of the second mover is a signal of selshness or distrust on the side of the principal, the model of
Ellingsen and Johannessen (2008) can explain why second movers will trust less when the rst
mover imposes sanctions that punish trust. Ellingsen and Johannessen (2008) use the result of
an experiment by Falk and Kosfeld (2006) to motivate their model. In the experimental game,
the rst mover is a principal or employer, and the second mover is an employee or agent. The
principal has the choice to restrict the choice set of voluntary eort provision of agents, by
eliminating the choice of very low levels of eort. The results show that when principal exerts
this form of control, the eort exerted subsequently by the agent is lower on average than when
the principal does not control.
The two mechanisms identied by Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) and Ellingsen and Johannessen
(2008) dier in the assumption of why people comply. Gneezy and Rustichini assume that peo-
ple are motivated to comply out of fear of (o-equilibrium) repercussions if they don't comply.
Thus, the authority can induce compliance by maintaining expectations of suciently severe
penalties for deviance. Ellingsen and Johannesen (2008) assume that people comply because
they want to be esteemed by the authority in case she is nice. The authority should therefore
keep up the belief that she is a nice person. Whether these two strategies are mutually exclusive,
and which is most eective in dierent contexts is still an open question.
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We now turn to the interaction of deterrence with horizontal signaling between agents. Posner
(2000) discusses this issue at book-length. The most interesting example for our purposes is
Posner's analysis of the eect of deterrence on the social meaning of actions. Posner proposes
that people are motivated to signal their discount rate to others to establish a reputation as
trustworthy partners. They can do so by engaging in (symbolic) actions, which Posner calls
for concreteness `saluting the 
ag'. Posner argues that there are separating equilibria in which
those who engage in the time-consuming and costly rituals to salute the 
ag are rightly believed
to have a low discount rate. Suppose now the government were to implement a law that obliged
everybody to salute the 
ag. As a result, the separating equilibrium would be lost and no
information could be gleaned from observing someone salute the 
ag. Thus, the law alters the
meaning of the behavior. This may cause people to actually stop saluting the 
ag, because the
incentives provided by the law do not make up for the lost signaling value7.
A formal application of this reasoning is provided by B enabou and Tirole (2006), who aim to
explain how tax incentives can crowd out charitable giving. They assume that people like to be
viewed by others as both altruistic and generous with money. In the absence of tax incentives
for charitable contributions, the people who are most altruistic and care least about money are
the ones that donate, making the signal sent by donating a strong one. When tax-breaks for
donations are introduced, people who care about money will now also start donating, which
weakens the signal. In equilibrium, this may lead the agents who do not have a strong altruistic
motivation to stop donating, possibly resulting in net crowding out of donations.
This model has been tested experimentally by Ariely et al. (2009). In a lab experiment the sub-
jects had to `click for charity', i.e. they performed the boring task of hitting certain computer
keys, which were then translated into donations for several charities. The authors contrast a
private treatment and a public treatment. In the latter, the subjects had to publicly announce
the amount of donations that they accumulated to the other subjects at the end of the session.
They also interact these two treatments with a treatment in which clicks yielded additional
private benets. The results indicate that eort and donations are higher in the public treat-
ment. However, when subjects get private benets, donations in the private treatment go up
while those in the public treatment go down. The authors conclude that monetary incentives
for behaving pro-socially work better in private settings than in public ones.
Such logic may also apply to criminal acts. For example, Dur (2006) and Silverman (2004) argue
that in many inner city subcultures there exists a preference to be seen as `tough', autonomous
and unafraid of others. Criminal acts in these communities are often signals, aimed at estab-
lishing the reputation of the perpetrator as a tough type. Dur (2006) builds a model where
7There are problems with Posner's general analysis, see McAdams (2000b) for a critique. In this particular
case, the mechanism described seems contradictory: a necessary condition for the signal to become weaker when
a law is implemented is exactly that more people have started signaling, so it is hard to see how deterrence could
lead 
ag-saluting to fall. This is the reason that B enabou and Tirole (2006) need a two-dimensional type space
to generate crowding out.
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committing serious and highly risky crimes signals a high degree of toughness in equilibrium,
while committing minor crimes merely signals some intermediate degree. Agents are engaged
in a rat-race of wasteful signaling behavior. As in the analysis above, sanctions that aect the
payos of such signals may cause unexpected shifts in criminal strategies. A zero-tolerance pol-
icy that cracks down on minor oenses may discourage the intermediate types from signaling.
As a result, the really tough types will be able to signal their types by committing minor crimes
rather than serious ones, and the incidence of violent crime goes down. This constitutes an ex-
planation of the `broken-window-eect', which like the one mentioned above, operates through
modifying both the payos and the expectations of actors.
In sum, by blurring the signals that are sent by virtuous actions, sanctions may end up merely
replacing reputational motives for virtuous behavior. On the other hand, when people are
engaged in a rat-race of wasteful or criminal activities to signal their types, sanctions can have
a positive ripple eect. Deterrence of minor levels of such wasteful activities allow the whole
hierarchy of signals to shift downwards, thus decreasing the more severe forms of signaling.
Deterrence and repeated dilemma games. A nal source of norms identied by McAdams
and Rasmusen (2007) are equilibria in repeated dilemma games. For example, in the innitely
repeated prisoners dilemma there are equilibria in which both players defect forever as well
as equilibria in which both players cooperate forever. Either of the two equilibria (or one of
the many others) are candidates for a social norm. To my knowledge there are no theoretical
studies on the impact of sanctions in such games. However, one interesting study shows how
such norms are important to policy makers. Mansour et al. (2006) try to explain the follow-
ing stylized facts about the US: 1) sentences for drug tracking and police activity to combat
criminal gangs who do so went up manyfold in the last to decades, 2) the consumption of illegal
drugs went up signicantly in the same period, while 3) the price of cocain and heroin decreased
by a factor 5. The authors explain these facts using a model of gang formation. The model
assumes that in the rst round of the game, coalitions are formed by gang members who agree
(and can commit) to sharing all prots from drug trade. In the second round, gangs engage in
Cournot competition on the market for drugs. Exogenous variables are the size of the market
and the deterrence regime. An active assumption is that the detection probability increases
with the size of the gang. The authors show that under these assumptions, stronger deterrence
may increase drug productivity. The reason is that sanctions increase the cost of operating a
large gang, which may cause gangs to split up. This increases competition and may result in
more supply and a lower market price, even correcting for the probability that some gangs get
detected. The authors argue that this story resembles what happened after increased deterrence
dissolved the Mendellin and Cali drug cartels: the number of criminal organizations involved in
the production of cocaine increased, and this was eventually translated into an increase in total
production.
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Although Mansour et al. (2006) do not explicitly rely on a repeated game, the lesson to draw
from this study can easily be generalized to such situations. If criminals compete in the pro-
duction of crime in cartel-like structures, deterrence functions as a crude form of anti-trust.
Like anti-trust, deterrence may increase production by increasing competition. However, in the
context of criminal activities, this is the exact opposite of the intentions of the policy maker.
2.5 Discussion
On rst sight the lack of empirical support for the deterrence hypothesis seems like bad news
for economic theory, which makes universal claims about the eects of incentives on behavior.
However, in the previous section we have seen that the theory of incentives is more versatile than
the simplest formulation of Becker's deterrence theory suggest. Observing these new approaches,
it is perhaps surprising that it took rational choice theorists so long to face up to the rather
obvious fact that informal institutions matter for the eect of formal policies.
The reason is that below the deterrence hypothesis is a deeper `Hobbesian' paradigm of eco-
nomic man that underlies much of standard economic theory. Economic man as traditionally
conceived is selsh and individualistic. A society that results from having such agents live to-
gether can be called Hobbesian, after the 16th century philosopher Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679).
Hobbes' argument, in a nutshell, is that in absence of authority or law, humans nd themselves
in a \natural condition of mankind". In this natural condition, \every man has a right to ev-
erything", and the result is a struggle for resources, and a continuous \bellum omnium contra
omnes". Therefore, people are better o by reaching an agreement, or `social contract', in which
they yield their power to a central absolute authority, called the Leviathan. The Leviathan is
both lawmaker, executive and judiciary, and creates order establishing and maintaining the
law through corporal and pecuniary punishment. In short, the Leviathan solves what would
otherwise be the worst case scenario in which everybody cheated everyone.
The Hobbesian view has much to recommend itself. It is a great improvement over theories
of the good that rely on idealized and mistaken conceptions of human beings as intrinsically
good and nice to others, or as being able to nd their way to cooperative conduct through
pure reasoning. Clearly though, Hobbes' metaphor of the state of nature is a caricature of
human societies. Hobbes' assumption that if there is no authority or law, life will conform
to the metaphorical \war of all against all" is wrong. People have numerous mechanisms of
maintaining order in the absence of authorities. These mechanisms are based on social norms
and reciprocal arrangements. Without a centralized government, people would not go around
as atomistic individuals, dividing their time solely between killing and eating loot. This is not
so much an argument against Hobbes' work, because the state of nature serves to drive home
his point and defend the idea of a social contract. Problems start when the metaphor is used as
van der Weele, Joël (2009), On Sanctions and Signals: How Formal and Informal Mechanisms Produce Compliance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12176Deterrence in context 30
an anthropological assumption to recommend certain policies. Insisting on a Hobbesian view is
harmful because, as we have seen from the preceding survey, it does not properly predict the
eect of our policies in cases that social norms or reciprocal arrangements are present.
Insistence on the importance of social forces is of course not new. Many writers have commented
that eective social control is based needs to rely on the informal forces in society. According to
criminologist David Garland in his book The Culture of Control it is a `basic sociological truth'
that
\[T]he most important processes producing order and conformity are mainstream
social processes, located within the institutions of civil society, not the uncertain
threat of legal sanctions. The project of establishing a sovereign state monopoly
has begun to give way to a clear recognition of the dispersed, pluralistic nature of
eective social control. In this new vision, the state's task is to augment and support
these multiple actors and informal processes, rather than arrogate the crime control
task to a single specialist agency."
D. Garland (2001, p.126).
As we have seen in this survey, new approaches within economics recognize the importance
of social processes for policy making. If we analyze deterrence in interaction with (social)
preferences and as impacting on equilibrium behavior in games, played by people who maintain
moral values, its eect becomes more ambiguous. Sanctions may destabilize equilibria in such
games, and the behavior in the new equilibrium may be very dierent than the simple deterrence
hypothesis would suggest.
However, expanding the concept of economic man has further reaching implications for policy
making than just casting doubt on the eect of deterrence. It also raises questions about
the set of policy instruments that are available. Economists know how policy makers can set
incentives. But policy makers may also have tools to in
uence values in a more or less direct
manner, such as educational campaigns. A more complicated model of human nature thus also
requires examination of a broader palette of policy instruments. Moreover, policy instruments
will interact with one another in producing results.
A real world example of this idea can be found in Lappi-Sepp al a (2001). The author describes the
remarkable change in the philosophy of the Finnish penal regime during the last 40 years when
insights about the interdependence of dierent policy instruments replaced a system that was
based predominantly on repression. One of the slogans of the new ideology was that \Criminal
policy is an inseparable part of general social development policy". This slogan re
ects that
moral education and practiced at schools and other institutions is also a part of an integrated
framework to shape values in society (Lappi-Sepp al a, 2001, p. 110).
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Thus, deterrence should be analyzed in conjunction with other policy instruments, rather than
separate from it. To make this point somewhat more concrete, the remainder of this chapter
is dedicated to its illustration. The idea is that social policies that in
uence norms and values
also aect the optimal level of deterrence and other social incentives. One intuition is that
social policies that weaken norms promoting deviant behavior will reduce the need for deterrent
strategies. This is a simple matter of substitution: if the deterrence becomes more eective, the
policy maker needs less of it to direct the agent's behavior. However, the opposite may also be
true. If deterrence becomes more eective, it may become optimal to use more of it. In the next
section I illustrate this latter point in by analyzing the interaction between dierent policies in
the presence of social norms.
2.6 A formal illustration: soft and hard approaches to crime
The model I present in this section is not aimed to be realistic enough to give policy advice,
but rather to illustrate two of the central arguments of this chapter. First, I want to show
that the eect of deterrence is potentially ambiguous in environments where there is a social
norm. Second, I want to show that `soft' policies that aim to change norms are compliments to
deterrence policies. I will show that although deterrence is potentially counterproductive on its
own, it is productive when it is part of a broader policy strategy to combat crime.
To illustrate the model, consider an environment which on rst glance comes perhaps closest to
a state of nature in Western society: poor American inner city neighborhoods. These neighbor-
hoods often suer from high juvenile crime rate. In such environments, it is very important to
have the reputation of being tough, i.e. not afraid of con
ict or ghts, because this prevents one
from being the victim of crime. Silverman (2004) surveys stylized facts that are consistent with
this, such as the fact that many violent crimes are committed in front of witnesses. A reputation
for toughness can be maintained by criminal behavior, violence against others, and deance of
the authorities. Dur (2006) collects ethnographic evidence from several sources supporting the
importance of such norms. Topalli (2005, p. 797) writes
\Traditional subcultural theorists maintain that oenders operate in an environment
in which oppositional norms catering to ethics of violence, toughness and respect
dominate the social landscape."
V. Topalli (2005, p. 797).
From his own interviews with over 200 hardcore uncaught street oenders, Topalli is able to
corroborate this view. If our analysis in the last section was correct, such oppositional norms will
in
uence the eect of deterrent policies. A case study in this point is elaborated in Kahan (1997).
van der Weele, Joël (2009), On Sanctions and Signals: How Formal and Informal Mechanisms Produce Compliance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12176Deterrence in context 32
He considers the problem of combating gun control amongst youth in inner city neighborhood.
Studies show that deterrent measures that aim to suppress gun ownership, e.g. metal detectors
at schools, usually fail.8 The reason lies in the motivation for possessing a gun. In a survey,
66% of the respondents listed that they own a gun to impress friends or peers, 56% said they
wanted to be powerful or important, and 49% said it was for protection (see references in Kahan,
1997). Owning a gun confers status, because it shows you are tough and autonomous enough
to defy authority. Not owning one shows that you are weak and this may make you a victim
of aggression. A repressive strategy can reinforce the signal sent by gun ownership, because
it raises the degree of deance necessary to carry a gun. In Kahan's words \the crackdown
strategy is at war with itself". It turns out that a policy that does seem to be eective is to pay
others students to turn in gun possessors. This policy works because it changes the expressive
value of having a gun. Suddenly, those with guns are vulnerable to betrayal from within their
own communities, and do not appear so strong anymore. Also, showing guns in public becomes
now less attractive, which defeats the status-building purpose of gun possession.
Authorities can use a host of alternative instruments to decrease the visibility and status of
criminal acts in the community. Authorities may educate residents members about the eects
of criminal conduct on the community, they may oer anti-violence courses, organize alternative
pass-times for disenfranchised youth such as sporting events, they may emphasize role-models
that have found success by socially acceptable means etc. To reduce visibility, they may enlist
community members to report on crime to the police or to tell on criminals, as in the example
above. We will now show that there are complementarities between both strategies in combating
crime.
2.6.1 The model
The model consists of an authority or government, and a large population of agents. We do
not explicitly model the decision of the authority; the aim of this example is not to derive
conditions on optimal deterrence. Instead we simply examine the impact of the exogenous
levels of two dierent policy instruments on the crime rate. One instrument is a hard policy,
aimed at enforcing the law with deterrent measures, such as high level of police monitoring, or
high penalties for oenders. The other is a soft policy, which tries to curb the social norm of
respect that exists in the community for law oenders in the ways described above. The level
of the hard policy is denoted by h  0 and the level of the soft policy by s  0.
There is a countably innite population of agents indexed i = 1;2;::: Each agent is of a type
 2 [0;1] that indicates her `toughness' (dened below). The higher the type, the tougher the
agent. Agents are distributed over the type space according to the continuous cdf F(). The
8See Kahan (1997, footnote 61, who cites several studies to this extent).
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agents preferences are given by the following vNM utility function:
U(di;h;s) = B(i;h;di) + a(s)E [i j di]: (2.1)
The rst term in (3.2) is benet of crime to the individual, the second term is the respect that
the criminal earns. We assume that the benet of crime takes the following form:
B(i;h;di) =
(
0 if di = 1
i   h if di = 0
(2.2)
Naturally, the benet of crime is 0 if the agent complies. If she does not comply, she incurs a
benet that decreases in the level of hard enforcement eort, and increases in the toughness 
of the agent. Thus toughness is dened in the model such that for any level of enforcement,
tough agents gain more (lose less) from non-compliance than wimpy agents. One interpretation
is that tough agents gain more from crime because they suer less from the con
ict situations in
which crime may bring them; they are better able to handle rough treatment by the police and
to survive dicult conditions jail than wimpy agents. One can also interpret this parameter as
a moral stance: tough agents `don't care' about breaking the law and/or in
icting damage on
others, whereas wimpy agents' conscience suers from engaging in criminal activities.
The second element of the utility function is the respect that the criminal earns by showing to
be tough. E [i j di] denotes the expectation of the other agents about the type of agent i. We
assume that the agent derives positive utility from this. Reasons can be that he will be less
likely to be attacked by other agents, secures resources through a better bargaining position,
or that there are sexual benets of being known as tough. The importance of being tough is
measured by the function a(s). We assume that a is continuous, decreasing and that a(0) > 0.
The idea that the authority can in
uence the sources of esteem in the community is elaborated
above.
2.6.2 The eect of deterrence in equilibrium
In this section we derive the existence of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the game and some
implications for the eectiveness of soft and hard enforcement approaches. All proofs are in the
appendix. I assume the tie-breaking rule that an indierent agent complies.
Proposition 2.1 (Equilibrium compliance rate). If h  h < h, then there exist at least one
partial pooling equilibrium in which all types lower than a threshold type  comply and the oth-
ers don't.
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Proposition 2.1 says that if h has some intermediate level, it can give rise to a partial pooling
equilibrium, in which only the types lower than  comply. The most interesting implication of
Proposition 2.1 is that for given levels of h and s, the compliance level may be indeterminate, i.e.
there may be multiple equilibrium threshold types. The reason is that there may be dierent
combinations of the threshold toughness  and the respect premium () that satisfy the
equilibrium conditions.
To see why this is the case, we need to examine the equilibrium conditions more closely. In
a partial pooling equilibrium as described above, non-compliers receive a reputation premium,
because non-compliance shows you are amongst the `tough' guys. This premium is the dierence
between the signal sent by compliance and non-compliance, i.e. () = E[ j ;d = 0]   E[ j
;d = 1]. We call () the respect premium.
Importantly, how the respect premium changes in  depends on the shape of the distribution
F(). For example, the uniform distribution yields a constant dierence, () = 1
2. However,
as a moment's thought will reveal, any other distribution will induce the respect premium to
vary over the interval [0;1]. The curved line in Figure 2.1 depicts a respect premium based on
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Figure 2.1: Equilibrium compliance levels.
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The straight lines in Figure 2.1 represent the incentive compatibility constraint (ICC) of the
threshold type. Remember that the threshold type  is the type who is just indierent between
incurring the punishment and incurring the respect premium (), so the ICC is given by
h    = a(s)  ()
Thus, the ICC line in Figure 2.1 represents all pairs f;()g such that the threshold type is
indierent between complying and not complying for given levels of h and s. Above this line
the respect premium is suciently high to motivate non-compliance, and vice versa below it.
The position of the ICC is determined by h. A higher h shifts the ICC upwards, because a
given threshold type will need a bigger respect premium to compensate for the loss brought
about by the penalties. The ICC slopes downward, because a higher threshold type will need
less respect for a given h. The slope is determined by the norm strength: a strong norm (high
a(s)) means that a decrease in the respect premium leads to a large fall in utility which needs to
be compensated by a big increase in toughness of the threshold type. This implies a 
at ICC.
Thus, a higher level of soft policy s (i.e. a lower a(s)) decreases the norm strength and makes
the ICC steeper.
Equilibria of the game are found on the intersection of the ICC with the () curve. Here, the
equilibrium respect premium () makes the threshold type exactly indierent given the levels
of h and a(s). The fact that the respect premium is not constant, as depicted in the example
in Figure 2.1, means that there is potentially more than one equilibrium pair f;()g. For a
given level of sanctions, there can be equilibria with low levels of compliance (low ) and high
respect premia (), or with high levels of compliance and a low respect premia. The reason
is that respect premia may fall with the threshold type, so that sanctions aimed at raising the
threshold type will be counteracted by the increase in the respect premium.
We can now evaluate the eect of a change in the level of deterrence h:
Proposition 2.2 (The eectiveness of deterrence). In the equilibrium characterized in Propo-
sition 1, d
dh < 0 if and only if
d()
d <   1
a(s).
Proposition 2.2 tells us that the eect of a higher level of deterrence h in the separating equi-
librium, can actually increase crime. This counterintuitive result can be explained as follows:
raising h implies that either the equilibrium threshold type needs to be tougher, or the respect
premium needs to rise to compensate the threshold type for the greater loss caused by deter-
rence. If in equilibrium the respect premium is decreasing in  and the norm strength is high,
a combination of a lower threshold type and a higher respect premium may constitute a new
equilibrium. In other words, increased deterrence may coincide with increased informal incen-
tives in favor of crime, resulting in a higher crime rate. Graphically, one can see Proposition 2
in Figure 2.1. Point A corresponds to a point where an increase in h will lead to a decrease in
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. This happens when the ICC crosses the () line from below. Point B on the other hand
represents an equilibrium where an increase in h lowers crime.9
For our purposes, an interesting implication of Proposition 2.2 is that if s is suciently high,
h will always have a positive impact on crime. This is because s diminishes the importance of
respect, and thus a high s rules out the possibility that increased respect incentives counteract
deterrent incentives. Graphically, a higher s rotates the ICC in Figure 1, and makes sure the
ICC crosses the () line from above.
In sum, while deterrence is potentially counterproductive when applied in isolation, it is pro-
ductive in combination with a policy to disrupt oppositional social norms. Depending on the
shape of the distribution of types, hard forms of deterrence may be `at war with themselves',
because they may increase the status that is associated with crime. Softer forms of deterrence
that aim at weakening such eects may be useful complements to the standard deterrence ap-
proach. Because the policy implications depend on the exact distribution of types which is
hard to observe, this model is not suitable for making policy recommendations. But it does
illustrate two things. First, the `social landscape', made up by social norms and values is crucial
to determine the eect of deterrent polices. Second, policies that in
uence norms and values
will have an impact on the eect of deterrence. Considering a comprehensive policy strategy
that covers several instruments to combat crime is therefore indispensable.
2.7 Conclusion
In their survey of optimal enforcement in Becker's tradition, Polinsky and Shavel (2000) nd
many aspects of law enforcement to be congruent with theory. Low probability of detection is
often combined with high punishments and, punishments are higher for more serious oenses.
However, they note that the general level of deterrence is often `too low' from a theoretical point
of view. The authors argue that
\Given the ample opportunities that exist for augmenting penalties, as well as
the possible desirability of increasing enforcement eort, society should probably
raise deterrence in many areas of enforcement.\
M. A. Polinsky and S. Shavell (2000, p. 72).
9Doing such comparative statics when there are multiple equilibria may not be so convincing. However, if (
)
is downward sloping over the whole range, there may be a unique equilibrium in which the eect of increasing h
is to lower compliance.
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This may be a good recommendation in some cases, but the studies surveyed in this chapter
suggest that the one-size-ts-all attitude embodied in this statement is mistaken. We have seen
that the eect of deterrence is context dependent, and that we should not always expect it to be
eective. Theory suggests that when deterrence works well, a large part of the eect may not
come from its direct in
uence on payos. Rather, as in the case of the broken-window eect, it
may come from it's indirect eect on beliefs about what others are doing or the disruption of
harmful signaling behaviors in the population.
The argument in this chapter suggests several avenues for future research. Empirically, we need a
focus on contextualized studies, preferably with data on community level or lower. Rigid models
that aggregate statistical eects over large groups of people give us little information about
how deterrence aects behavior, as the debate over the deterrent eect of handgun ownership
(discussed in section 2.2) vividly demonstrates. Instead, carefully executed eld studies in
(semi-)controlled environments are needed to inform a more taylor-made policy approach to
deterrence. On the other side of the spectrum, laboratory studies can also be made more
contextualized by reconsidering the sacred dogma that framing in the laboratory should devoid
of any references to social context. In fact, such neutral framing makes it even harder to
apply the results outside of the lab. Although for example H orisch and Strassmeier (2008)
have demonstrated that deterrence can raise stealing in an abstract setting, it is not clear in
which circumstances we may expect this result in the real world. Preferably, such result should
be subjected to replication attempts in the eld. Finally, studies into the long term eect
of sanctions on values are almost entirely lacking. In order to be able to isolate the eect
of deterrence, such studies could combine the output of value-surveys with the institutional
arrangements in dierent countries or states.
Turning to theory, much can be gained by a further integration of the existing paradigms in
sociology, law, psychology and economics, a research program that is already well underway. As
I mentioned in the last section, specic attention should go to the eects of combining dierent
policy instruments in order to formulate a more eective and integrated policy approach. Theo-
retical research on optimal deterrence could also learn from the eld of industrial organization.
In industrial organization the endogeneity of the interactions between rms, i.e. the market
structure, is central to policy analysis. Successful antitrust measures, merger policies, r&d sub-
sidies etc. operate explicitly in an environment where rms are interacting in both competitive
and collaborative arrangements. Similarly, optimal deterrence should be calibrated to a society
of individuals that play games of signaling, coordination and long term cooperation with each
other. In this way, rational choice may nally full Gary Becker's promise in the opening quote
of this chapter, and serve as a `useful' theory of crime.




The signaling power of sanctions in
collective action.
\Laws are partly formed for the sake of good men, in order to instruct them how
they may live on friendly terms with another, and partly for the sake of those who
refuse to be instructed, whose spirit can not be subdued, or softened, or hindered
from plunging into evil."
Plato - The Laws
3.1 Introduction
What determines cooperation in social dilemmas has been a core problem for social scientists
since the beginning of the discipline. Ever since Hobbes in the 17th century threatened the
infamous `war of all against all', the dominant strand of literature highlights the role of sanctions
in coercing people to cooperate. But contemporary empirical research shows that people manage
to nd ways to cooperate even without the presence of government. There is substantial evidence
that society has a large proportion of so called conditional cooperators: agents that condition
the decision to cooperate on what they think others do. The existence of such agents means that
collective action problems may be partly a matter of coordination, and substantial cooperation
may be achieved without the need for much coercion. However, in the absence of high sanctions,
a necessary condition for such cooperation is trust; the belief that others are willing to cooperate.
Thus, if society is indeed a heterogenous mix of egoists and conditional cooperators, a pressing
and largely ignored question is how coercion and trust can be combined to induce cooperation.
Specically one may ask if trust between agents is independent of the use of sanctions? This
chapter oers an answer to this question by presenting a model in which trust and coercion
38
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interact in determining cooperation. It argues that there is a trade-o between sanctions and
trust. High sanctions are necessary when there are many egoist around, but they can also `crowd
out' trust. This can happen when the sanctioning authority has superior information about the
kind of people that make up a society, because in this case conditional cooperators will infer
from the introduction of sanctions that others are likely to be selsh. This in turn decreases the
willingness of conditional cooperators to cooperate. Conversely, the government can signal that
cooperation is the norm in society by setting low sanctions, and thus `crowd in' cooperation.
The point of departure of the model is a standard social dilemma or public good game. The
game is played by a large population of heterogeneous agents: while some of them are selsh,
others are conditional cooperators who don't mind contributing if suciently many others do so.
Agents know their own type, but not that of the other players. It can thus be rational to either
cooperate or defect, depending on a player's own type and the expectation of the type of the
rest of the players. The model includes a government or principal, who knows the distribution
of agents' types in society, and can alter the payos of the game by introducing sanctions for
defection.
The main result is that the asymmetric information about the distribution of types can lead the
government to set lower sanctions than it would do under complete information. I show that
if conditional cooperators coordinate on mutual cooperation, there is a unique class of perfect
Bayesian equilibria in which the government sets high sanctions if there are many egoists in
society, and low sanctions if there are many conditional cooperators. This means high sanctions
give a negative signal (to the conditional cooperators) and crowd out the belief that others are
of a high type. Although this decreases the motivation of conditional cooperators to cooperate,
there is no crowding out on the behavioral level, because the coercive power of the sanctions
compensates for the eect of decreased trust in others. However, the signaling eect of sanctions
leads the government to set lower sanctions in equilibrium to `crowd in' trust between citizens.
The model has applications in social dilemmas in large scale societies or organizations. An
application to tax evasion is discussed in the last section. The model asserts that the reason
why real-world policies of tax evasion often feature low sanctions, is that governments rely
on the reciprocal preferences of the tax-payers. The model suggest a rationale for evidence
that raising sanctions on tax evasion sometimes has very little, or even a negative eect on
tax evasion (Sherin and Triest, 1992). Being tough on tax evasion sends a mixed message:
although evaders are being punished, they must be numerous to be taken so seriously. Thus,
the article emphasizes a balancing act that the government must perform: It must deter those
who are, to speak with Plato, inclined to `plunge into evil', while maintaining the good men's
motivation to live on friendly terms.
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3.2 Literature
There is an increasing amount of evidence for the existence of so-called conditional cooperators.
A conditional cooperator is someone who will cooperate if she thinks others will do so as well.
Fehr and G achter (2000) and G achter (2006) review the evidence on conditional cooperation
from public good games and eld experiments. They conclude that a large amount of studies
nds much more cooperation than standard economic theory allows for, and that much of this
cooperation is conditional on (expected) cooperation of others. However, there is substantial
heterogeneity in these preferences for reciprocity or conditional cooperation. Fischbacher and
G achter (2006) among others, provide experimental evidence for the existence of a number of
types whose behavior is stable across games. They nd that close to 55% of their subjects act
as conditional cooperators, 25% act as pure free riders, and the rest shows more complicated
behavior, that often resembles conditional cooperation in the relevant range of play. Another
source of evidence for conditional cooperation comes from eld experiments that study contri-
bution levels to charities. The results of four studies surveyed in G achter (2006) are that those
subjects who received information that others contributed a lot also contribute a lot. For ex-
ample, Frey and Meyer (2004) nd that students contribute signicantly more to charity funds
if they were told that others contributed more in the past.
The existence of conditional cooperators implies that trust is a crucial variable for cooperation.
Without being overly sophisticated, we can dene trust in a collective action setting as a person's
belief that others in society are of a virtuous nature and therefore trustworthy (we provide a more
detailed denition below). The literature on trust in economics has largely been concerned with
the consequences of trust for the economy. However, the question of how beliefs are determined
by institutional arrangements has received much less attention.
One strand of literature that does investigate the relation between beliefs and institutions are
theories that combine the analysis of law and social norms (see for a survey McAdams and
Rasmusen, 2007). These theories hold that ocial rules have an impact on behavior apart from
their in
uence on payos. One of the ways in which they have such in
uence is by changing
people's expectation of what others do. Cooter (1998) argues that non-deterrent laws may help
people in this way to coordinate on ecient outcomes. For example, Tyran and Feld (2006) show
in an experimental setup that mild, non-deterrent laws, can be eective in raising contributions
in a public good game if they are the result of a public voting procedure. Such a procedure
allows people to express their intentions to cooperate. However, Kahan (2005) emphasizes that
an informational eect of the introduction of laws can also be negative. Ocial incentives
express information about the dominant social values and norms in society. Consequently,
a blanket crackdown on defection by the government in the form of high sanctions will give
people the idea that non-cooperation is the prevailing social norm. To the extent that people
are conditional cooperators, this reduces their own willingness to cooperate. This dual role of
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incentives is the main message of this chapter. In our setup, incentives have the traditional
motivational eect that economists take them to have, but they also shape the perceptions of
people about the conduct of others in society.
In the next chapter I document some direct evidence for the signaling eect of sanctions. In
general, the phenomenon falls into a category of studies that document crowding out eects of
sanctions on cooperation. A number of experiments in psychology and economics, both in the
laboratory and in the eld document that sanctions for deviant behavior sometimes increase
such behavior. This literature was brie
y alluded to in chapter 2, which discussed the study by
Gneezy and Rustichini (2000). In their eld experiment they consider ten day-care centers in
Haifa. In ve of them they introduce a ne for parents who pick up their children late. In these
ve centers the number of late-comers went up signicantly in the weeks after the introduction
of the nes and stayed up relative to the control group even after the nes had been withdrawn.
An increasing amount of studies documents similar ndings in social dilemma settings. Frey
and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) nd that people are less likely to accept siting of waste facilities
in their neighborhood when they are oered substantial nancial compensation compensation
for it. They use several indicators of `civic-mindedness' to predict individual choices whether
to accept the facility. They nd that when compensation is oered, civic mindedness is no
longer a predictor of this choice. They conclude that the compensation reduces the feelings of
civic duty of citizens. Ostmann (1998) provides experimental laboratory results that show that
external enforcement nanced by experiment participants only reduces `harvests' in common
pool problem by a small amount relative to a no-enforcement treatment. Frey and Jegen (2001)
and Bowles (2008) present surveys of the rapidly expanding empirical literature in this eld.
There is as yet little theoretical insight in the mechanisms that underlie these empirical results.
Most explanations rely on a notion of `intrinsic motivation', which is reduced when incentives
are introduced. However, this notion does not help much in predicting the kind of circum-
stances in which crowing out will occur. In this study I show that standard rational inference
upon observation of sanctions can generate crowding out of trust, which serves as an intrinsic
motivation to cooperate. Although in the model this does not lead to net crowding out on the
behavioral level, it does aect the optimal level of sanctions. Two theoretical papers present
signaling models of crowding out. They both do so in a principal-agent context. In B enabou
and Tirole (2003) the principal has more information about the characteristics of a job and the
ability of an agent to do it than the agent himself. The incentives that the principal chooses to
introduce are therefore a signal to the agent that he might not be suitable, which diminishes his
motivation for the job. Sliwka (2007) also considers a principal-agent context, in which there are
three types of agents in a rm: altruists, who take into account the principal's payo, egoists,
who maximize their own material payo, and conformists, who prefer to do whatever they think
the majority does. Because preferences of conformists depend on their beliefs about others, this
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is a psychological game. In this setting, the introduction of tight control by the principal may
signal to the conformists that most people are selsh and this in turn will cause them to lower
their eort. The principal may thus choose to trust rather than control the agents.
Like in B enabou and Tirole (2003), the signaling eect in the present model arises because the
government moves rst and has more information than the agent, a reversal of a traditional
assumption in the literature. I adapt the framework of B enabou and Tirole (2003) by incorpo-
rating multiple agents and model strategic interaction between them. The incentives that the
government uses convey information, but instead of learning something about their own type,
the agent learns something about the type of the other agents. This signaling eect is similar
to that in Sliwka (2007), but the models dier both in their focus and assumptions. Instead
of focusing on the vertical principal-agent relation, we look at the eects of information trans-
mission on the horizontal cooperation between agents in a public good game. In this context,
the model is applied to a concrete technology of social control, namely ocial sanctions. My
assumptions are more traditional than in Sliwka (2007). First, I do not use a psychological
game. Beliefs in our model do not induce a preference change but serve the more traditional
role of anticipating payos. Moreover, Sliwka (2007) assumes that there is a large proportion
of unconditionally altruistic types in the population, an assumption which is rejected by the
(experimental) evidence. I deviate from the standard homo economicus only by assuming the
well-documented conditional cooperator.
3.3 The model
The model is a sequential game of costly signaling with three dierent kinds of players: agents,
a principal and nature. The principal can be a government or a manager, and the agents
correspondingly citizens or employees. Applications exist in both public and organizational
context, but throughout this chapter I will frame the problem as a public one, and use the
words `government', `citizens' and `society'.
The central idea is the following: The citizens play a public good game with incomplete informa-
tion. In contrast to standard assumptions, some of the citizens are conditional cooperators, who
contribute only if they think a sucient number of others does so. Whether mutual cooperation
can be an equilibrium thus depends on the distribution of the types of the players. The citizens
don't know the distribution of types, but have a common prior over the possible distributions.
Nature starts the game by determining the distribution of types (thus transforming the game into
one of imperfect information). The government is the only player who observes this distribution.
It's objective is to maximize contributions to the public good. To this end it chooses the level
of sanctions for defection. The sanctions are observed by the citizens in the economy before
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they choose their own action. Since the government has more information than the citizens, the
citizens may make inferences from the sanctions about the distribution of types in society. There
is thus double-sided asymmetric information: citizens have private knowledge of their type and
the government has private knowledge of the distribution of types. In section 4 we derive the
equilibria of the game and show that asymmetric information may lead the government to set
lower sanctions in equilibrium.
Nature. At the beginning of the game, nature determines the types of all agents in society.
With probability ! each agent is chosen to be a high type. This probability is itself a random
variable 
; of which nature determines the realization. The probability that nature picks a
given ! is given by a uniform distribution with support on [0;1]. Thus, ! is the proportion of
conditional cooperators in society and 1 ! is the proportion of egoists. We call the distribution
characterized by ! the state of society.
The government. The government is the only player (apart from nature) to observe the
state of society. Thus, ! is the `type' of the government. The motivation for this assumption is
that governments or managers have an advantageous position to collect information about their
citizens or employees. Governments employ bureaucracies that collect statistics on the aggregate
behavior of citizens and keep records of the amount of law-violations. By making policy they also
gain information about the reaction of the citizens. Managers meet with employees in dierent
departments of the rm and monitor productivity, working hours and indices of their corporate
culture. Although the assumption of perfect knowledge of the type distribution is obviously
extreme, it is likely that the combination of these information sources lead governments to have
to superior knowledge about society than any individual would have.
On the basis of its knowledge, the government sets incentives g 2 R. The objective is to
maximize cooperation by the citizens in the economy. The instrument to do so is the use of
costly `sanctions', a punishment on defection by the agents. (We will use the words `sanctions',
`punishment' and `incentives' interchangeably.) The government's objective function is:
W(m;g) = m   g (3.1)
Here, m is the fraction of contributors in society, and 0 <  < 1 is a cost parameter. We oer
two interpretations for the idea that higher sanctions carry higher cost. First, one can interpret
these costs as the practical expenditures necessary to sustain a higher level of deterrence, such
as putting police on the street or raising the probability of getting caught. Second,  can
measure the moral cost of high sanctions, re
ecting the idea that in a liberal society moral
the punishment should be proportional to the crime. Although many people would agree that
van der Weele, Joël (2009), On Sanctions and Signals: How Formal and Informal Mechanisms Produce Compliance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12176The signaling power of sanctions 44
stealing a bike is wrong, few would want to institute the death penalty for bike thieves, even if
this were the most ecient way to deter them. It is of course an empirical question whether this
moral constraint actually binds in a given application, but it is likely to limit the availability of
`cheap' deterrence strategies that combine harsh penalties with low enforcement.
Note that I do not necessarily interpret the sanctions as nes, and there are no revenues to the
government from the sanctions. Although nes could be part of a sanctioning scheme, I want
to focus purely on the deterring or Hobbesian eect of sanction and not on the revenue-raising
aspect. Note also that sanctions (and their costs) are set before citizens choose their actions.
This implicitly assumes commitment by the government to carry out the sanctions once they are
in place. This is natural in a setting where sanctions are decided upon by politicians, and their
execution and enforcement is subsequently carried out by the executive and judiciary branch of
government.
Finally, the setup can easily be extended to include incentives in the form of subsidies or rewards.
If the government has the possibility to reward cooperation with a costly subsidy, doing so would
send the same signal as sanctioning defection: incentives are apparently necessary because there
are many egoists. Any incentive scheme that is costly to the government and raises the citizens'
expected utility of cooperation relative to that of defection sends such a signal.
The citizens. We assume that there is a countably innite population of agents or citizens
of measure 1, indexed i = 1;2;:::. There are two types of citizens. A fraction ! is a so-
called conditional cooperator or high type, the rests are egoists, or low types. After nature has
determined the type of each agent (and thereby the distribution), and the government has set
its policy, each agent chooses a contribution level c 2 f0;1g. The payos e of an egoistic agent
i are as follows:
e
i(ci;m) = h(m)   ci   g(ci) (3.2)
Here, h(m) is the individual payo from the public good, nanced by the contributions. We
assume that h(m) is increasing in the fraction of contributors m. Because the population consists
of an innite number of agents, the individual contribution is so small relative to the population
size that we disregard its impact on m. This approximation simplies things substantially. The
second term ci is the individual contribution and g(ci) is the government sanction, which is
imposed only if the agent defects:
g(ci) =
(
0 if ci = 1
g if ci = 0
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It is easy to see that (3.2) induces a social dilemma, because in the absence of sanctions it is a
dominant strategy for the egoists not to contribute. Egoists will only contribute if the sanctions
that the government sets for non-contribution are high enough, that is, if g  1.




h(m)   ci   g(ci) if m < m
h(m)   ci   g(ci) if m  m
(3.3)
Here  2 (0;1] and 0 < m < 1. If aggregate contribution levels are low, conditional cooperators
have the same cost of contributing as egoists. If aggregate contribution levels are high, the cost
of contributing for an conditional cooperator is lower than that of an egoist. In fact, egoists
are a special case of conditional cooperators with  = 1. The type space can thus be written
 = f1;g.
We can interpret the parameter  as a `warm-glow' from contributing that only arises when
others contribute. The strength of this warm glow decreases in . When others do not contribute,
the warm-glow disappears because one rather feels like the only `sucker' who contributes. Such
a conditional feeling of warm glow is also interpretable as a reciprocal preference. In any case,
the particular specication of preferences is not intended as being especially realistic, but rather
as a simple or reduced form that generates conditional cooperation. As such, it is consistent
with that of models that have more structural pretensions such as the ECR model of Bolton
and Ockenfels (2000) and the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
To see that these preferences generate conditional cooperation, we let p = P(m  m) denote
the subjective belief that at least the threshold fraction of people contributes, and compute the
expected utilities of contributing and defecting:
Em [e(1;m)]  Em [e(0;m)]





In words, (3.4) says that in order for a conditional cooperator to contribute, the subjective
belief that at least a fraction m will contribute will have to be high enough. The the stronger
the warm glow (the lower is ) and the stronger the sanctions g, the lower such expectations
need to be to induce contributions from the high types. Throughout the analysis we apply the
tiebreaking rule that an indierent agent complies.
In sum, the game the agents are playing is a standard public good game with two twists. The
rst twist is that the government can introduce sanctions that punish defection. The second
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twist is that a fraction ! of the players have no dominant strategy. Instead, their best response
depends on what they think other players will do.
Timing. Reiterating, the timing of the game is as follows:
1. Nature chooses the state of society characterized by the proportion of high types !.
2. The government observes ! and decides on its policy g.
3. The citizens learn their own type and the government policy g, update their prior, and
choose their contribution level c 2 f0;1g.
Trust. In this chapter, we talk about crowding out of trust. However, the denition of
trust is a notorious source of con
ict, so we take some time to get the denition right. In
the introduction, we dened trust in passing as the belief that the other is a high type. A
trusting act (in this case, contributing to the public good) is performed on the basis of this
belief. One thinks the other will cooperate because her intentions or character are virtuous.
Other denitions, like Hardin's notion of `encapsulated interest' (Hardin, 1991), dene trust
more broadly as a situation where the trustor has reason to think that the trustee cooperates
because her interests are aligned with her own. This denition includes situations where the
trustee is expected to cooperate because of external enforcement. In this article we stick with
the rst denition because we are interested in how people assess the likelihood that others
cooperate when sanctions are low. That is, trust can exist only in a situation in which the
trustor is at risk precisely because she does not know the character of the people she is facing.
By contrast, we dene as `condence' the belief that the other will cooperate out of self-interest.
So dened, we interpret trust as an `intrinsic motivation' for cooperation that can sustain
cooperation when `extrinsic motivation', i.e. sanctions, is low or absent. In the model, a
certain amount of trust dened in this way is a necessary condition for a conditional cooperator
to cooperate if g < 1. Thus, by `crowding out of trust', we mean that higher sanctions are
associated with lower trust, i.e. with a lower posterior probability of each agent that the other
agents are of a high type.
3.4 Crowding out of trust
This section is structured as follows: We start by introducing some notation and terminology. To
clear the way for the analysis of asymmetric information, we rst derive equilibria in the simpler
but instructive case of symmetric information. Proposition 3, the main result, characterizes the
equilibrium under asymmetric information. All proofs are in the Appendix.
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Let g(!) denote the government policy, and s(;g) the strategy of a citizen of type . Denote
(! j ;g) the posterior probability distribution of a citizen of type  about the state of society
!, and by U(s;m;g;) the expected utility to a citizen of playing strategy s. We dene an
equilibrium as follows:
Denition 3.1. An equilibrium consists of a government strategy g : [0;1] ! R, a posterior
belief of each agent about the true state of society  : [0;1]    R ! [0;1] and a strategy for







(! j ;g) is updated by Bayes' rule whenever possible
This denition corresponds to that of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (pBe). We restrict the
analysis to pure strategy equilibria and require that the equilibrium satisfy the Cho and Kreps
(1987) `intuitive criterion'.
3.4.1 Symmetric information
Before we tackle the asymmetric information case, it will be instructive to discuss the case in
which the citizens know !. We solve the game backwards, and start with the reaction function
of the citizens. In the absence of high sanctions and if ! >  m, conditional cooperators face a
coordination game amongst themselves. There is an equilibrium in which they all contribute,
and one in which they all defect. The equilibrium of the larger game depends on the equilibrium
in this coordination game. We will see that when high types coordinate on contribution, there
is an unique equilibrium, which features two pooling regions. We develop some terminology for
this partial-pooling (or semi-separating) equilibrium. In this equilibrium there are two regions
of realizations of !, in each of which the government plays the same policy. We call the threshold
value between the regions !. We call a region where ! 2 [0;!) (i.e. where society consists
of relatively many egoists) a `bad state of society', and those where ! 2 [!;1] a `good state
of society'. We label the government policy for this partial pooling equilibrium as follows: the
policy that is set in the bad state of society is called g1, and the policy in the good state of
society is called g2. We dene o-equilibrium beliefs oe as the beliefs that citizens have about
! when they see a policy that is not part of the equilibrium prole.
Proposition 3.1. Under symmetric information, there are two pBe:
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1. When high types coordinate on not contributing, the unique equilibrium is a `Hobbesian'
pooling equilibrium in which the government sets g = 1, and all citizens contribute. If the
government were to set g < 1, all citizens would defect.
2. When high types coordinate on contributing, the unique equilibrium features a threshold
!. A government that observes ! < ! sets a sanction g
1 = 1 and all citizens cooperate.
A government that observes !  ! sets a sanction g
2 =  < 1 and only the high types
cooperate.
As explained above, the conditional cooperators face a coordination game amongst themselves
if g < 1. In this coordination game there are multiple equilibria. Either the conditional coop-
erators can coordinate on mutual contribution, or on mutual defection. We can interpret these
equilibria as being associated with a social norm of contribution, or a social norm of defection.
The fraction of conditional cooperators determines the amount of norm adherence. The rst
part of Proposition 1 describes the `Hobbesian' pooling equilibrium, in which high types coor-
dinate on defection. In this case, high types are behaviorally equivalent to egoists, and it is
perhaps is unsurprising that the model generates a `Hobbesian' conclusion, which says that only
strong punishment will induce agents to contribute.
The second part of the Proposition tells us that when the high types coordinate on contribution,
the government strategy has a threshold !. The intuition is again straightforward: government
types below ! will never set low sanctions (< 1), because there are too many egoists around.
Inducing cooperation only from the high types generates so few contributions that it pays to set a
high sanctions. Government types above ! will set low sanctions: because there are few egoists,
low sanctions are a cheap way to induce a high level of contributions. Thus, when there are
many conditional cooperators, and those conditional cooperators follow a norm of contributing,
the government does best to implement low sanctions and tolerate a few defectors. Social norms
are such that there is no reason for the government to use costly coercive strategies.
This simple setup captures two extremes in political thinking. On the one hand, when social
norms of cooperation are absent we are led to a Hobbesian conclusion. On the other hand, it
shows that when there is a sucient amount of people who follow a cooperative social norm,
sanctions can be low. The latter is a simple consequence of the existence of conditional cooper-
ators, and something we seem to observe in many real-world social dilemmas.
3.4.2 Asymmetric information
We now turn to the case of asymmetric information, in which the government is the only player
who knows !. To start with, we can immediately verify the existence of `Hobbesian' equilibrium,
just as in the symmetric information case. The proof of the existence of this equillibrium did
van der Weele, Joël (2009), On Sanctions and Signals: How Formal and Informal Mechanisms Produce Compliance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12176The signaling power of sanctions 49
not depend on the information conditions. The reason is that when high types coordinate on
defection, their beliefs about ! are irrelevant.
Proposition 3.2. Under asymmetric information, there is a `Hobbesian' pooling pBe in which
the government sets g = 1, and everyone contributes. If the government were to set g < 1,
everyone would defect.
In the remainder of the chapter we focus on equilibria in which high types coordinate on coop-
eration, i.e. there is a norm for contribution. It turns out that under asymmetric information,
the analysis is substantially more complicated if high types coordinate on cooperation. Before
we characterize the equilibria of the game we collect some useful results that serve to narrow
down the search.
Lemma 3.1. In any pBe in which high types coordinate on cooperation there are at most two
dierent levels of sanctions g.
Lemma 1 narrows down the search substantially. It implies that there are only two possible
types of equilibria in which high types coordinate on contributing: pooling equilibria, and semi-
separating (or partial pooling) equilibria with two pooling regions. The following lemma rules
out the former:
Lemma 3.2. In a pBe in which high types coordinate on cooperation there are no pooling
equilibria.
The intuition behind this lemma is the following. Governments that observe a very bad state
of society will always set a high sanction. If they did not, the egoists who are a substantial
part of the population, would defect. On the other hand, governments that observe a very
good state of society will always want to set a low sanction, because this is a cheap way to
induce cooperation of the great majority of people. This is not immediately obvious: one might
think that there exist pooling equilibria on g = 1 supported by very pessimistic o-equilibrium
beliefs. However, we can rule out such equilibria by applying the `intuitive criterion' (Cho and
Kreps 1987), a standard renement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. An equilibrium fails the
intuitive criterion (IC) if it requires o-equilibrium beliefs that place positive probability on
types for whom deviation payos are dominated by equilibrium payos. The idea is that it is
`unreasonable' to believe that such types would have deviated. Applied to the present model,
we can show that ruling out deviations to sanctions below g = 1 of governments that observed
a very high !, requires o-equilibrium beliefs that are `unreasonable' (as judged by the intuitive
criterion). To rule out such deviations, o-equilibrium beliefs would have to be very pessimistic.
However, a deviation to a low sanction is only attractive for the governments that observe a
very good state of society, so equilibria based on such pessimistic beliefs don't survive the IC.
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Summing up the results of our two Lemmas, we know that an equilibrium should feature two
pooling regions. We are now in position to state the main result of this study:
Proposition 3.3. Crowding out of trust
1. If high types coordinate on cooperation, the unique class of pBe has two pooling regions
characterized by the parameter !. A government that observes ! < ! sets a sanction
g
1 = 1 and all citizens cooperate. A government that observes !  ! sets a sanction
g
2 < 1 and only the high types cooperate.
2. If m  1   (1   ), then under asymmetric information there exist equilibria in which
the equilibrium threshold ! is strictly lower than under symmetric information.
The rst part of Proposition 3.3 repeats the result of Proposition 3.1 that when there are many
conditional cooperators, government does best to implement low sanctions and tolerate a few
defectors. The intuition is straightforward: the government will punish heavily when it knows
that there are a lot of egoists around, because this is the only way to insure substantial amounts
of cooperation in such an environment. It will punish less heavily when it expects many citizens
to follow a norm of conditional cooperation, because cooperation can be induced cheaply in such
an environment by setting lower sanctions. However, in contrast to the symmetric information
case, such a government strategy implies crowding out of trust in equilibrium, because higher
sanctions transmit information about the state of society to the citizens. This means that
sanctions are `bad news'.
The second part of the proposition states the implication of this signaling eect for government
policy. It says that there is a continuum of equilibria under asymmetric information in which
the government plays low sanctions for values of ! where it would not do so under symmetric
information. The intuition behind this result is that when there is a norm of contribution
between the high types, the government induces trust of citizens by setting a low sanction. To
see how this works, consider a government under symmetric information that observes a state
of society ! < m. Under symmetric information, the citizens know that ! is the state of society
and the high types will not be motivated to cooperate. However, under asymmetric information,
agents are more optimistic in the sense that upon observing high sanctions, they attach positive
probability to states of society that are higher than m. Because beliefs and sanctions are
complements in generating compliance from the high types, this allows the government to set
lower sanctions. Lower sanctions make inducing cooperation cheaper, which expands the region
in which the government plays low sanctions. Thus, low sanctions induce citizens to trust each
other more and thereby they `crowd in' cooperation between the citizens.
Figure 3.1 shows the region in which the authorities play low sanctions under both symmetric
and asymmetric information. In the grey area low sanctions are played under symmetric infor-
mation. The border of this area is the unique equilibrium threshold ! for each level of m. If
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium region with low sanctions under (a)symmetric information.
we turn to asymmetric information, we see that if m < !, i.e. the threshold cooperation level
to experience a warm glow is relatively low, the equilibria under symmetric and asymmetric
information coincide. The reason is that when m is low, beliefs about m are very optimistic
under both forms of information. Thus, low sanctions do not make people more optimistic
than they would be if they knew !. Note that equilibria with high levels of !, supported by
negative o-equilibrium beliefs, cannot exist. The intuitive criterion puts a lower bound on the
o-equilibrium beliefs, and this lower bound is too high to rule out deviations to the lowest
sanction that induces cooperation from the high types.
However, if m > !, then the region where low sanctions are played expands under asymmetric
information. In the hatched area all values of ! can be equilibrium values, and ! can be lower
than under symmetric information. As mentioned above, this is because under asymmetric
information low sanctions have a positive eect on beliefs. The reason that there exist multiple
equilibria when m is relatively high, is that the lower bound of the reasonable (as judged by
the intuitive criterion) o-equilibrium beliefs is now lower than m. This means that we can nd
o-equilibrium beliefs such that no-one will cooperate when they see a deviation to a sanction
lower than the equilibrium sanction. This supports the existence of many equilibria.
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The comparative statics of , the cost of sanctions, and , the strength of the warm glow
is intuitive. If the cost of sanctions increases, the region in which low sanctions are played
increases. The same is true if the strength of the warm glow increases (a lower ).
A nal, rather subtle eect of asymmetric information is that high types are always more positive
about the state of society than low types. An agent's own type gives her information about
the state of society, because the probability that each agent is a high type is given by !. Thus,
being a high type implies that others are more likely to be a high type.
In sum, asymmetric information enlarges the region where low sanctions are can be played,
because low sanctions are `good news'. The signaling eect is a by-product of the fact that
coercion is necessary only in bad states of society. In the terminology of Kahan (2005), it is
truly the `expressive dimension' of sanctions.
3.5 Implications and discussion
The model in this chapter can incorporate two extreme views of society. When  = 1 (no warm
glow) and/or m = 1, the agents in the model are all egoists, and the model generates standard
Hobbesian predictions. If m is low and  = 0, the model admits a rather romantic equilibrium
in which equilibrium sanctions are zero: the government relies completely on social norms of
cooperation. Realistically, the truth will be somewhere in between, so even if there are many
conditional cooperators, the government still has a role to play. Although citizens' behavior
is partly driven by trust, conditional cooperators will still need a `push in the back' from a
sanctioning scheme, because they are aware that there are some egoists around which reduces
their desire to cooperate.
Second, there is no net crowding out of cooperation by sanctions. As in B enabou and Tirole
(2003), incentives are what they call `short term reinforcers'. In both models, higher sanctions
`override' the eect of diminished beliefs. Thus, an econometrician looking solely at the relation
between sanctions and cooperation, would support the standard Becker-Stigler results. However,
there is crowding out on the level of trust which in
uences the optimal sanction level. This brings
us back to the denitions of `trust' and `condence' as dened in Section 3. It should be clear
that in contrast to trust, condence increases with sanctions, because high sanctions make it in
everybody's interest to cooperate.
Even though in this model sanctions compensate for the behavioral eects of decreased trust of
agents, it suggests ways in which decreased trust may aect behavior. The model is consistent
with the experimental observations of crowding out of cooperation: a drop in contributions
if sanctions are raised to an o-equilibrium level. We must not forget that the sanctions im-
plemented in (eld) experiments are always o-equilibrium sanctions. They may thus interact
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with o-equilibrium beliefs. In this model, equilibria on low sanctions are supported by negative
o-equilibrium beliefs. Thus, implementing a deviation to a (higher) o-equilibrium sanction
may lead to less contributions.
Moreover, trust is an attitude that determines behavior in many social situations. The crowding
out of trust by incentives in one area could therefore have spill-over eects in other policy areas
and into the future. Suppose that besides playing the public good game described above, agents
are matched privately with each other to play another dilemma or trust game. In each of those
games agents face partners drawn from the state of society. A government that sets a high
sanction may improve cooperation levels in the public good game, but will induce negative
beliefs that may cause agents to defect in private interactions. Thus, a raise in sanctions in one
policy area may cause a drop in cooperative behavior in other areas. As an example, consider
the stigmatizing eect of police crackdowns on immigrant populations. This may lead people
to think that immigrants must be criminal to have merited such police action. This may make
them less willing to cooperate with immigrants in private interactions.
Sanctions may also have spillover eects into the future. Since the government cannot undo an
information transmission, trust may not easily return. For example, when high sanctions are
exogenously lowered (for reasons not described in the model) after they have been introduced,
cooperation may see a large drop, as even the by now cynical high types will refuse to cooperate.
This is consistent with experimental evidence as in Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) or G achter
et al. (2007). These studies show that when incentives are withdrawn, cooperation does not
return to pre-incentive levels.
Finally, as remarked by B enabou and Tirole (2003), one can imagine a situation where people
think they would be able to get away with defection, e.g. when non-cooperative behavior is very
hard to detect. In this case, only the negative signaling eect remains, whereas the coercive
eect of incentives disappears. A proper analysis of these cases is a task for future research.
Souvorov (2003) has worked in this direction, and shows an intertemporal `addiction to rewards'
in a two-period model of a principal and a single agent. In the context of our model, spillover
eects will result in an `addiction to sanctions' as principals will need to maintain controlling
measures to compensate for the reduced trust.
3.6 An application to tax evasion
The potential applications of the model described in this paper are various. In fact, they are
everywhere where the conditions of the model are met: The principal has more information
than the agents, some agents behave as conditional cooperators, and sanctions are costly. Ka-
han (2005) suggests applications in the public realm including not in my back yard (NIMBY)
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problems and tax evasion (discussed below). One can also think of fare evasion in public trans-
port, where the size of the penalty is an indication the norm of free riding. In the context of
organizations and personnel economics, one can apply the model to incentive structures in large
organizations and teams. In the context of sports one can think of the doping-dilemma, where
harsh sanctions are indicative of a norm of widespread use of doping.
The example of tax evasion ts the model well because it is a private activity: any single tax-
payer has very limited information on how honestly others pay their taxes. Tax oces on the
other hand estimate evasion rates. This makes tax-enforcement policies a vehicle of signals
on how widespread tax evasion is. Moreover, there is overwhelming evidence that conditional
cooperation is a prevalent attitude in tax compliance. Econometric studies conducted both
on an individual level (Scholz 1998) and on an aggregate level (Frey and Torgler 2008), show
that the decision to evade taxes is in large part based on dispositional attitudes. Especially
important are the belief that fellow taxpayers evade and the perceived legitimacy of the use of
tax revenue.
The model in this paper can explain some puzzling facts about tax evasion. Andreoni et al.
(1998, page 821) remark that \For small amounts of evasion, [...] the expected cost of detection
would appear to be extremely low for most taxpayers. So, we may ask, why are so many
households honest, and why don't cheaters cheat by more?". The model in this paper readily
provides an answer to this question: people are conditionally cooperative, and as a consequence
the government's best response is to apply mild (and cheap) sanctions instead of relying on
heavy deterrence.
Another prediction of the model is that in equilibrium, high sanctions on tax evasion only make
a dierence for low types. High types will pay their taxes for any equilibrium sanction. Wenzel
(2004) shows in the context of tax evasion that ocial sanctions are eective only for those that
have a weak personal norm of paying taxes. People with strong personal norms on the other
hand also cooperate for low sanctions.
Evidence from (eld) experiments also give some indications that a signaling eect of sanctions
is at work. Coleman (1997) reports the results of the Minnesota tax experiment, amongst 47,000
tax payers in Minnesota. Some 1700 of them received a letter announcing that they had been
randomly selected for an audit. The responses with respect to reported income were mixed:
middle and low income taxpayers increased their reported income (although most of them by
small amounts), but high-income taxpayers did not. In one treatment, the experimenters sent
another letter to 20,000 tax-payers saying that the numbers of cheating tax-payers was much
lower than commonly assumed. This signicantly increased reported income. Sherin and Triest
(1992) nd that highly publicized campaigns against tax evasion often fail to have the desired
eect, and that some campaigns may increase distrust in other citizens.
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3.7 Concluding remarks
In the last chapter, I quoted Polinsky and Shavel (2000). In their survey on theory of law
enforcement, they note that from a theoretical perspective sanctions often are too low. This
paper gives an explanation why sanctions may be `too low'. It asks whether Hobbesian coercion
in social dilemma problems remains optimal when society is a mix of conditional cooperators
and egoists. What is the optimal policy to promote cooperation if the situation in question is
a prisoners' dilemma for some and a coordination game for others? The paper shows that the
optimal level of sanctions depends on the relative proportions of the two agents in society. When
there are many egoists, the high sanction or Hobbesian solution is optimal. When there are
many conditional cooperators, a policy of low sanctions may be more ecient. If the government
knows more about the composition of types in society, this implies that high sanctions are `bad
news'. Thus, its superior information allows government to induce or crowd in cooperation
by setting low sanctions. The paper thus shows that sanctions may have a dual role. They
both change economic payos and alter agents' perception of the environment. The government
has to perform a balancing act: it has to punish the deviators, while keeping the conditional
cooperators optimistic.




Can sanctions induce pessimism?
An experiment.
4.1 Introduction
In the standard economic view, sanctions are eective because they change economic payos
and modify individuals' incentives to engage in certain actions. In the last chapter I explored
a mechanism through which sanctions can be eective, not just by their eects on payos,
but also by their eects on beliefs. The signaling eect of sanctions explored there is relevant
in environments where the authority with the ability to introduce sanctions is more informed
than those that are sanctioned. In this chapter, two collaborators1 and me provide direct
experimental evidence that such an eect can occur.
The experiment is not exactly a test of the model of chapter 3, because instead of a dilemma
game, we investigate behavior in a coordination environment. There are several reasons for this.
First, the use of a coordination game instead of a social dilemma means we do not need to verify
assumptions about the exact distribution of types, which may require a more specialized setup.
Instead, the complementarity of the actions of dierent players is already incorporated in the
payos. Second, the setup with many Pareto ranked equilibria allows us to analyse the eect
of sanctions in more detail than a setup with merely two actions. Third, in the current setup,
we are able to investigate how `small' sanctions aects play in coordination games, something
which the literature has not yet considered.
Specically, we consider the following research questions related to both the positive and nega-
tive eects of sanctions:
1This chapter is joint work with Roberto Galbiati (EconomiX Nanterre) and Karl Schlag (Universitat Pompeu
Fabra)
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1. Can the incentives associated with non-deterrent sanctions induce desired behavior and
make agents more optimistic about other players' actions?
2. In situations of imperfect information about the past behavior of other group members, can
the introduction of sanctions make agents more pessimistic about the actions of others
by giving a signal that other players do not behave well? If so, does this reduce the
eectiveness of sanctions?
We investigate these questions in an experiment based on the minimum eort game. The
minimum eort game is a coordination game with many Pareto ranked equilibria. Each player
chooses a level of costly eort, and is rewarded according the minimum of the eorts of all
players in the group. The more ecient equilibria result only if all players play individually
risky strategies. Doubt about the other player's willingness to play such a strategy may result
in inecient outcomes. Because there are multiple equilibria and players' eorts are strategic
complements, the game is particularly suitable as a workhorse to answer our questions.
Consider rst Question 1. Sanctions have a direct eect by providing incentives to choose higher
eort. They also have an indirect or forward looking belief eect due to eorts being strategic
complements. Anticipating that opponents are similarly aected by the sanctions and thus are
expected to choose higher eorts reinforces one's own incentive to choose a higher eort.
Question 2 addresses the signaling or backward looking belief eect of sanctions. When past
behavior is not directly observable, sanctions may carry a signal that things are not going so well.
After all, why introduce a sanction to suppress socially undesirable behavior when everybody
behaves saintly? In other words, sanctions may be perceived as `apparently necessary'. Thus,
the signaling eect of introducing sanctions may reduce the willingness to play a high and risky
level of eort, and decreases the eectiveness of sanctions.
To answer the questions above we describe the results of a laboratory experiment, in which we
focus on the eects of mild, non-deterrent sanctions in a coordination game. In particular, we
look at the dierences between the eects of `exogenous sanctions', and the eects of `endogenous
sanctions' (dened below). Our workhorse game is the minimum eort coordination game with
many Pareto-ranked equilibria as introduced by Goeree and Holt (2001, 2005). In all treatments
agents were matched in groups of three, where the third player was a \principal" who benetted
proportionally to the minimum eort chosen by the other two in the group. The subjects played
the minimum eort game twice, but the third player was the only one to be informed of the
outcome of the rst round before the second round was played. This information structure
was common knowledge. Before the second round of the minimum eort game was played, the
principal could decide whether to introduce a sanction F to both players in the group, that
lowered the earnings of a subject if she selected low eort. The sanction F came at a small
cost to the principal's own earnings. We call this the endogenous sanction, because it was
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introduced by a third party in a reaction to the behavior of the subjects. The sanction was
`mild' in the sense that it made playing low eort a more costly, but not a dominated strategy.
In another treatment, the same sanction F was introduced automatically. We call this the
exogenous sanction, because it was introduced by the experimenter unconditional on past eort
choices by the subjects. Across these treatments we compare the eect of sanctions on eort
choices and reported beliefs about what the other player will do.
Our results show that exogenously introduced sanctions increase beliefs about the eort that
the other player will play. As a result they eectively increase coordination on more ecient
equilibria. However, our answer to the second question reveals a signicant dierence between
endogenously and exogenously introduced sanctions. In our analysis of the data we distinguish
players on the basis of their behavior in the rst round. The signaling hypothesis leads us to
expect that people who played high eort in the rst round and are confronted with a sanction,
will infer that the eort of the other person must have been low. By contrast, someone who was
pessimistic and played low eort will not be able to make such an inference, because she also
played low, and thus a sanction may have been introduced as a reaction to her own behavior.
We thus expect a dierence between the eects of endogenous and exogenous sanctions for high
eort players, but not for low eort players. In accordance with this hypothesis, we nd that
there is a signicant dierence in the eectiveness of the two kinds of sanctions for players who
exerted high eort in the rst round. For these players, the exogenous sanction has a substantial
positive eect on eort and beliefs about the other player's eort. By contrast, the eect of
an endogenous sanctions is not distinguishable from not introducing a sanction at all. As the
signaling explanation predicts, the way in which the sanction was introduced did not matter for
those who played low eort in the rst round.
To our knowledge this is the rst study that looks empirically at the eects of sanctions on
beliefs in a minimum eort game. Moreover, it is the rst paper that empirically studies the
signaling eect that the introduction of sanctions may have. Its main message is that the
eectiveness of sanctions depends on the context in which they are introduced. On the one
hand, people recognize the incentive eects that sanctions will have on others, which multiplies
their eectiveness. On the other hand, when information about the behavior of others is limited,
as is the case in modern large-scale societies, the introduction of sanctions may cause pessimism
by drawing attention to past misbehaviors. This is especially true for those that are optimistic
and behave cooperatively. This nding implies a dicult balancing act that a government or
principal must perform: it must try too keep the optimist optimistic, while at the same time
encouraging the pessimists to change their behavior. The results of this experiment suggest
that `mild law' may not be the optimal way to do so, because it induces pessimism with little
compensation in the way of material incentives.
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A further contribution of this chapter is the use of novel statistic tests. We use a new test
developed by Schlag (2008) based on a so-called stochastic inequality (Cli, 1993). This is an
exact test designed to assess the direction of a treatment eect, without making (parametric)
assumptions about the distribution of the samples.2 Instead of comparing means in the un-
derlying distribution one compares a random observation from each distribution. Note that
the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test can only reject the hypothesis that two samples are
drawn from identical distributions. Thus, it can identify the existence of a treatment eect, but
is not informative about why the two distributions dier signicantly. For instance, without
additional assumptions, one cannot draw conclusions about whether and how the means of the
samples dier. Although the results of WMW test are completely in line with our results, its dif-
ferent null hypothesis would have only allowed us to conclude that sanctions in
uenced behavior,
we would not be able to draw conclusions how about how sanctions in
uenced behavior.
4.2 Literature
Our experimental analysis of the eects of sanctions is related to several strands of literature.
The empirical literature on crowding out is already discussed in chapters 2 and 3. `Crowding
out' refers to the tendency of material or monetary incentives to diminish the internal motivation
to engage in the desired behavior. In extreme circumstances this can lead to less of the desired
behavior. This phenomenon has been empirically documented in many economic settings (see
Frey and Jegen (2001) and Bowles (2008) for surveys). For our purposes, the most interesting
cases involve sanctions to members of a group or a society. In a well-known experiment, Gneezy
and Rustichini (2000) show that introducing a ne for picking up children late from a day-care
centre resulted in an increased number of people who picked up their children late. This eect
endured even after the sanctions had been withdrawn. Ostmann (1998) provides experimental
results showing that external enforcement nanced by experiment participants only reduces har-
vests in common pool problem by a small amount relative to a no-enforcement treatment. Frey
and Oberholzer-Gee (1997) conducted a survey on willingness to have nuclear waste repository
built in their community. Without compensation, 50.8% of the respondents answered positively,
but when the request was accompanied by an oer of (substantial) monetary compensation, the
acceptance rate dropped to 24.6%.
Most existing explanations for the crowding eect focus on a notion of `intrinsic motivation',
which can be diminished by sanctions under certain circumstances (Frey and Jegen, 2001).
Kahan (2005) suggests another explanation based on the idea that the situations in which
crowding out occurs can be viewed as coordination games. Although on the face of them,
settings like the ones mentioned above seem to resemble dilemma games, there is much evidence
2An exact test is a test where the statement about its level can be proven, in contrast to a level that is derived
from an asymptotic approximation as the sample size tends to innity.
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that coordination plays a large role in the outcome. This is due to the existence of so-called
conditional cooperators or reciprocal agents (Fehr and G achter, 2000). In determining their
behavior in social dilemmas, conditional cooperators condition their behavior on their beliefs of
what others do. G achter (2006) surveys the evidence on the existence of conditional cooperation.
Insofar as people are conditionally cooperative, their belief that others will cooperate will turn
out to be a crucial variable in determining the outcome of collective action problems.
The experiment aims to test an explanation for crowding out that was suggested in the last
chapter. That is, sanctions may provide conditional cooperators with a signal that others do
not behave well, and this will diminishes their own willingness to cooperate. Chapter 3 as well
as Sliwka (2007) provide formal models of this phenomenon.
Our research is also related to a well established strand of literature in legal scholarship: the
focal point theory of expressive law (McAdams, 2000). This view holds that laws express values
and attitudes, that can shape individual behavior. Cooter (1998) argues that the expressive
character of sanctions can be used to coordinate expectations on a benecial equilibrium. People
expect others to follow the law, and so a self-fullling equilibrium can be induced by a sanction
that penalizes behavior pertaining to other equilibria. The core idea is that for this to happen,
laws do not necessarily have to be fully deterrent (i.e. they can be mild), because their role
is merely to create focal points. Bohnet and Cooter (2001) and McAdams and Nadler (2003)
provide evidence that mild sanctions can lead to better coordination in coordination games
with two equilibria. These result is in line with results about experimental coordination games
showing that in coordination environments, even advisory cheap talk by an external party or
coordinator can help to bring about coordination on ecient equilibria (Chaudhuri and Bangun
2007, Van Huyck et al. 1992).
Finally, we relate to the experimental literature on coordination games. The specic game that
we use was introduced by Goeree and Holt (2001, 2005) who also foreshadow our answer to
question 1. Unlike the present chapter, they do not introduce sanctions between rounds, but
investigate the behavior of dierent subject populations under high and low costs of eort.
They show that over multiple periods, convergence to more ecient equilibria gradually takes
place. Devetag and Ortmann (2007) provide a comprehensive survey of experimental results in
coordination games.
In a recent paper, Brandts and Cooper (2008) compare the eectiveness of cheap talk and
monetary incentives in an experimental design close to ours. Groups consist of ve: four agents
play a minimum eort game, and a manager prots from the degree of coordination that they
reach. The manager can use nancial incentives or communication messages to try to increase
the level of cooperation. The authors nd that communication is more eective in increasing
coordination than are incentives. However, in contrast to our setup, incentives in this game
cannot give any signals since the minimum eort of the previous round is known to each player.
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In the paper that is perhaps closest to ours, Tyran and Feld (2006) explicitly compare the
eects of endogenously and exogenously introduced mild incentive or `law'. In their experiment,
subjects allocated to groups of three can rst vote on whether sanctions for defectors should be
introduced. They then play a public good game with or without the sanctions. The authors
nd that mild sanctions are eective when they result from the voting procedure, but not when
imposed exogenously (by the experimenters). The authors show that voting for mild law raises
expectations that others cooperate, and this in turn raises cooperation.
4.3 Discussion of the experimental setup
The study of sanctions comes up in settings that can often be described as either a coordination
game or a Prisoners' dilemma. We chose a coordination game as an object of study, because
in such games the rational choice depends only on the beliefs about the actions of the other
player(s) in the game. This allows us to isolate the sanctions' eects on behavior that derive
from the change in a subject's belief, and we can disregard issues to do with social preferences
and/or dominant strategies that usually play a role in Prisoners' dilemmas.
4.3.1 The experimental game
We use as a workhorse the minimum eort game by Goeree and Holt (2001 , 2005), because
it has large action spaces that allow players to express rather precisely their preferences and
beliefs. The structure of the game is as follows: two players simultaneously choose an eort level
between 110 and 170 (the bounds are chosen such that there are no clear focal points). Subjects'
payos are determined by the minimum of these two eorts, minus the cost of their own eort
times a parameter k 2 [0;1], which is the same for both players. In each period we also elicit
from each player an interval in which he believes the other will play his eort (see below). In
contrast to the original setting by Goeree and Holt (2001) in which the game is played only
once, in our experiment the game is played twice. Moreover, in some treatments (see below) a
sanction F was introduced in the second round, where F = 0:5(170   ei). Thus, F implements
a subtraction to the payos that is proportional to the deviation of the chosen second round
eort from the maximum eort (170). Although this sanction decreases the riskiness of playing
higher eort, the game remains a coordination game. The sanction is applied to both players
in the group, although the actual subtraction may dier between the players depending on
their second round eort choice. Another dierence with the game of Goeree and Holt (2001)
is the presence of a third player in the group. Depending on the treatment, this third player
is either active or inactive. When she is active, she can choose before the start of the second
round whether to introduce a sanction for both players in the group. Player 3 receives a payo
proportional to the minimum eort chosen by the other two players.
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In sum, payos in round 1 are determined as follows:
i (ei;e i) = minfei;e ig   0:85  ei; for i = 1;2;
3 (e1;e2) = 0:25  minfe1;e2g:
where i (e1;e2) is the payo of player i in tokens, ei 2 [110;170] is the eort level chosen either
by player 1 or player 2, and k is the cost of eort. In the second round the sanction F may
be implemented by either player 3 or the experimenters. Payos in round 2 are given by the
following equations:
i (ei;e i) = minfei;e ig   0:85  ei   0:5  (170   ei); for i = 1;2;
3 (e1;e2;s) = 0:25  minfe1;e2g   s  cs;
where cs is the cost of introducing a sanction for the third player and s 2 f0;1g is the choice to
introduce a sanction (1) or not (0).
An important element of the experimental design is the information structure. The third player
is the only one to be informed of the eort levels of players 1 and 2 when the rst round is
concluded. That is, at the beginning of the second round, players 1 and 2 do not know the eort
levels of the other player, nor their own payos from the rst round. However, before making
any choices in the second round, players 1 and 2 know whether a sanction has been applied to
their group. Note that players did not know before the rst round that there would be a second
round. They were informed of this only after the rst round had concluded.
4.3.1.1 Parameters, treatments, and procedures
We chose to set the cost of eort at 0:85, i.e. close to 1. The evidence reported in Goeree and
Holt (2001) indicates that in the presence of high costs of eort, individuals tend to coordinate
on lower eort levels. We wanted eort choices to be not too high in order to give player 3 an
incentive to introduce a sanction in the treatments in which she is active. We set cs = 4, a level
calibrated to induce roughly half of the players 3 to introduce a sanction.
We now describe the treatments. In all treatments, the rst round is the same: players 1 and
2 play the minimum eort game and player 3 is inactive. In the baseline treatment there is no
sanction in the second round, and player 3 is inactive. That is, the second round is conducted
exactly as the rst, and no mention of a sanction was made. We refer to this treatment as
the exogenous no-sanction (ExNS) treatment. By exogenous we mean that the choice to (not)
introduce a sanction was not conditional in any way on previous decisions by the subjects. This
was clear to the subjects because the choice was made by the experimenters in a centralized
fashion for all groups in the session. In the second treatment, sanction F is implemented in
van der Weele, Joël (2009), On Sanctions and Signals: How Formal and Informal Mechanisms Produce Compliance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12176Can sanctions induce pessimism? 63
the second round. The sanction was communicated to the players before they reported their
eort level and their beliefs about others' actions. They then played the second round with the
sanction in place. In spirit of the experimental economic literature, we refer to the sanction
in neutral terms, i.e. as a \subtraction". In the remainder, we refer to this treatment as the
exogenous sanction treatment (ExS).
Although player 3 is present in all treatments, she is only active in the third treatment. After
player 3 has observed the chosen eort levels of players 1 and 2 in the rst round, she is asked
to decide whether to a) change both player 1's and 2's payo structure in the second round by
introducing a sanction F, or b) leave the payo structure unaltered with respect to the rst
round. After player 3 has taken her decision, players' 1 and 2 are informed of it. They then play
the second round with payo structure decided by the principal. We refer to this treatment as
either the endogenous sanction treatment or EnS (if a sanction is introduced by player 3) or the
endogenous no-sanction treatment or EnNS (if no sanction was introduced).
Because the experiment features just two rounds of play and no possibility of learning, it was
very important that people understood the game correctly from the start. To this purpose we
ran a tutorial before the start of the rst round. In the tutorial, participants had 5 minutes
to come up with hypothetical eort choices of players 1 and 2 and to calculate their payos
resulting from these choices. The tutorial took place before assigning subjects to a role, so that
also players 3 could practice with the calculation of payos of players 1 and 2. In addition to
this tutorial, the input screens in the actual experiment provided subjects with the possibility
calculate their payos from a given choice. That is, after entering and before conrming their
choices, subjects could enter a hypothetical choice of the other player and let the computer
calculate their payos resulting from these choices.
The experiment was conducted in several sessions at the economics lab of the university of
Siena, Italy. The rst sessions took place in May and June 2007. Another series of sessions was
conducted in November 2007. Subjects entered their eort and belief choices on a computer
that was running on the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The number of subjects in an
experimental session varied between 18 and 30. The subjects earnings were in tokens as specied
above, which were converted into euro's at the end of the experiment at an exchange rate of 10
tokens = 0:75 euro. The instructions were read out loud to make them public knowledge. The
instructions and the input screen are provided in appendix B.
4.3.1.2 Elicitation of a belief interval
Apart from the eort choices, we are interested in the eect of sanctions on players' anticipation
of what the other will do. Therefore, in the same input screen in which players 1 and 2 enter
their eort choice, we asked them to enter beliefs about the other player's eort choice in that
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round. Rather than elicit a point belief, we decided to elicit an interval. More precisely, players
have to specify a range (i.e. a lower bound L and its upper bound U) in which the other player's
choice is believed to fall. In order to increase accuracy in belief reporting we reward a correct
guess3. The earnings from a guess are determined as follows:
i(L;U) =
(
0 if e i = 2 [L;U]
0;15  (60   (U   L)) if e i 2 [L;U]
That is, a wrong guess (the actual number chosen by the other player falls outside the specied
range) yields no payo. A correct guess (the actual number chosen by the other player lies
within the specied range) yields 15% of dierence between the length of the interval [110;170]
and the width of the interval [L;U]. Thus, the smaller the specied range, the higher the
earnings if the guess is correct. However, a smaller range also increases the risk that the guess
is not correct, in which case no tokens are earned.
Eliciting an interval has the advantage that it gives information not only about the location of
the belief distribution, but also about its dispersion. Schlag and Van der Weele (2009) show that
provided the belief distribution is single peaked, this interval scoring rule will induce rational
decision makers to include both the median and the mode of their belief distribution in the
chosen interval. Moreover, the width of the interval increases if the beliefs of the decision maker
are more noisy. This makes the width of the interval a proxy for how `sure' the decision maker is.
These results hold for both risk neutral or risk averse decision makers. Note that the alternative
quadratic scoring rule is only guaranteed to reveal the mean when the decision maker is risk
neutral.
4.4 Non-parametric tests of stochastic inequality
One contribution of this study is the use of new non-parametric tests that have been designed
for small samples (Schlag 2008). The disadvantage of existing tests is that they either add
distributional assumptions (e.g. assuming normality or restricting the parameter space so that
the alternative hypothesis is no longer the complement of the null hypothesis) or that they can
only establish that a treatment changes the distribution of outcomes, not how. Specically, the
standard non-parametric test in the experimental literature for comparing samples has been the
Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) test. The null hypothesis of this test is that the two samples
are drawn from the same population. Thus, unless one is willing to make further assumptions on
the underlying distributions (i.e. that all other moments of the probability distributions except
3G achter and Renner (2006) show that incentivizing beliefs' reporting has a positive impact on beliefs accuracy.
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the mean are equal), the WMW test cannot identify the direction of the treatment eects. It
can only establish that they are dierent.
We analyze the eect of sanctions by testing `stochastic inequality'. In order to identify the
direction of a treatment eect we compare the likelihood that one variable realizes a higher
outcome than the other. We measure this degree by the so-called stochastic dierence which
ranges from  1 to 1. Specically, given two random variables Y1 and Y2,  = Pr(Y2 > Y1)  
Pr(Y2 < Y1) is called the stochastic dierence of Y1 versus Y2.  is estimated by taking the
sample average across all pairings of the data. One says that Y2 tends to realize higher outcomes
than Y1 if (Y1;Y2) > 0. To establish a treatment eect in this direction, we test the null
hypothesis that   0. When Pr(Y1 = Y2) = 0 then this is equivalent to testing that Pr(Y2 >
Y1)  1=2. When the data is given as matched pairs then the appropriate test is a sign test.
When data is given by two independent samples, we implement the test of Schlag (2008).
Appendix A gives a more extensive formal treatment of these procedures.
It is worth noting that there are no other exact nonparametric tests for comparing means
or testing stochastic inequality given independent samples. In particular, the WMW test is
not an exact test for comparing the underlying means given two independent samples (e.g.
see simulations of Forsythe et al., 1994). Neither are there other exact nonparametric tests
for correlation; the Spearman rank correlation test can only identify non-identical distributions.
Non-exact tests of stochastic inequality have appeared in the biostatistical applications (Brunner
and Munzel, 2000). One innovation of the tests we use here is that they are exact, in the sense
of having the level that they are claimed to have, and do not rely on asymptotic approximations.
They are the rst exact tests for this stochastic inequality based on independent samples. Unlike
tests for means, the ordinal nature of tests of stochastic inequality makes them less sensitive
to outliers and hence they are very well suited to uncover signicant dierences given small
samples.
We want to emphasize that the results of the more traditional Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test
support our analyses. All signicant results that we present are also signicant, often more so,
in the corresponding WMW test (these results are available on request). However, as explained
above, without further assumptions the null hypothesis of the WMW test does not allow us to
draw conclusions about the direction of the eect. Because the WMW test is rather powerful,
we will use it when we want to gather support for a claim that two samples have similar
distributions. In this case we are not primarily interested in the direction of the eect. Rather,
we want to have the strongest possible test to falsify the claim that two samples are similar.
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4.5 Hypotheses and results
In this section we present the results of our experiment. We present our analysis by testing
conjectures that are based on the research questions mentioned in the introduction. These
conjectures are specic enough to provide us with the null hypotheses necessary for classical
statistical analysis.
4.5.1 Statistics for the entire sample
The number of participants in the experiment was 243: 45 in treatment 1, 51 in treatment 2,
and 147 in treatment 3. In treatment 3, the principal decided to introduce a sanction in 29
out of 49 groups. Each experimental session lasted roughly 35 minutes and the subjects earned
7.5 euros on average4. In the tutorial 82% (199 out of 243) correctly computed the payos
from hypothetical choices. As another indication of whether people understood the game, we
also checked whether there were `anomalous observations': people who specied an eort choice
above the upper bound of their belief interval. We found just 6 such observations.
We observe a high correlation between beliefs and eort in the rst round of each treatment,
as you would expect in a minimum eort game. The correlation coecient between the lower
bound of beliefs and the eort choice is 0:85, which is highly signicant5. The correlation
with the upper bound was somewhat lower (0:81), because many subjects specied an upper
bound at, or close to 170 in the rst round. They were thus restricted in moving this upper
bound in the second round. For most subjects this was not true for the lower bound of the
belief interval. For this reason we take the lower bound of the interval as our indicator of beliefs
throughout this chapter.
Figure 4.1 shows a histogram of rst period eort choices, aggregated over all treatments. We
see a large clustering of observations around 170, a smaller cluster around 110 and an otherwise
fairly uniform distribution6. We want to analyze the eect of the introduction of a sanction
in the second round, and hence in the remainder we focus on the changes of eort and beliefs
between rounds. We compute for each subject the change in beliefs and eort levels, and
compare these changes across treatments.
There are a few complications to analyzing changes between rounds. First of all, the observations
for the group members in the third treatment are not independent. The eort decision of one
4If this seems little, remember that the incentives were concentrated on only two (eort) choices. At each of
these choices there was thus relatively a lot at stake.
5The signicance is based on a test with the null hypothesis that the covariance is less than 0 (Schlag 2008)
6The eort levels are higher than those in Goeree and Holt (2001) with a cost of eort of 0:9. Reasons may be
that the cost of eort is slightly lower in our setup and that in the instructions we did not use the word \cost"
when referring to k.
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of rst round eort choices of all subjects.
subject in the rst round will in
uence the decision to implement a sanction by the third player.
This in turn may in
uence the eort and beliefs of the other subject in the second round. When
we do statistical testing, we correct for this dependence by taking the average of two observations
whenever the subjects come from the same group, and treating it as one observation.
Second, interpreting changes in eorts and belief intervals as reaction to the experimental setting
is not straightforward. Subjects that specied an eort level or a lower bound on beliefs of (or
close to) 170 in the rst round are unable to adjust this level upwards, and subjects who chose
close to 110 cannot adjust it further downwards. This will generate observations of zero changes
that may not re
ect the actual preferences or adjustment of beliefs of the participants.
As we will see, the general trend in the experiment was for subjects to adjust their beliefs
and eorts upwards in the second round. Thus, the problem is not severe for those who are
initially on the lower bound. Specically, there were no subjects who chose low eort (below
135 but above 110) and subsequently moved their eort downwards, and only three who chose
a (small) downward adjustment of beliefs. Therefore we do not consider those who chose 110
to be severely constrained. However, the matter is dierent for those who chose eort or belief
levels on (or close to) the upper bound of 170. It is likely that most of those subjects would
have liked to change their behavior if they had been able to move upward further, but were
constrained to do so. We believe that the fact that these people do not change their behavior
does not give us accurate information about their actual change in beliefs and their preferences
over eort levels. Therefore, we restrict ourselves to analyzing the choices of those subjects
who actually had a choice. We focus on comparing the behavior across treatments of subjects
who reported beliefs or eort lower than or equal to 165. In practice this means that for the
van der Weele, Joël (2009), On Sanctions and Signals: How Formal and Informal Mechanisms Produce Compliance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12176Can sanctions induce pessimism? 68
analysis of the beliefs, we excluded subjects who chose rst round belief levels strictly higher
than an upper bound of 165. This resulted in excluding 11 observations. For the analysis of
the eorts, we excluded subjects who chose rst round eort levels strictly higher than 165.
This resulted in the exclusion of 39 observations. The median rst round eort of the sample
thus obtained is 135. The values of the upper and lower bound that we applied are indicated in
Figure 4.1. In the remainder, we dene high eort players as those who play rst round eort in
e 2 f135;:::;165g (i.e. above the median), and low eort players as those who play rst round
eort in e 2 f110;:::;134g (i.e. below the median).
4.5.2 Eort and beliefs in the baseline treatment (ExNS)
While our analysis will focus on comparing behavior across treatments it is of interest to consider
what happens in the baseline case, where there are no exogenous sanctions. Recall that there
is no feedback between rounds in the treatment without sanctions. One might conjecture that
in the absence of feedback there is no change in eort and yet it is not clear whether behavior
should not change over time simply due to the fact that a choice is made a second time.
We present the evidence in Table 4.1. We denote by Mean ExNS1 the mean of rst round
variables in the exogenous no-sanction treatment, and by ExNS2 the second round variables.
The last column presents the estimated stochastic dierence of the rst round versus the second
n Mean ExNS1 Mean ExNS2
Stochastic Dierence
ExNS1 vs ExNS2
Eort 23 133 137 0:17
Belief 29 134 138 0:15
Table 4.1: Mean eorts, mean beliefs, and stochastic dierence between round 1 (ExNS1) and
2 (ExNS2) in the exogenous no-sanction treatment (ExNS).  Denotes signicance at 10%, 
denotes signicance at 5%,  denotes signicance at 1%:
round in treatment ExNS (remember from section 4 that this is the estimate of  = Pr(Y2 >
Y1)   Pr(Y2 < Y1)). It is worthwhile to note that testing for stochastic inequality for matched
pairs is equivalent to performing a sign test. We nd insignicant dierences in the eort
(conrmed by the Wilcoxon rank sum test). On the other hand we nd signicant evidence
that the lower belief level tends to be higher in the second round. Apparently people move up
their belief levels, but as we can see from Table 1, changes are small so people are not suciently
optimistic to change their eort levels by much.
4.5.3 The eect of exogenous sanctions (question 1)
Our rst question relates to the eects of exogenous sanctions on eorts. In the case of ex-
ogenous sanctions we can abstract from any signaling considerations because the sanction is
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Figure 4.2: The change in beliefs and sanctions for the whole sample, except those who chose
rst round eorts 2 f166;167;:::;170g or rst round beliefs 2 f166;167;:::;170g. (Number of
independent observations for each sample at the top of the bar).
unconditionally imposed by the experimenters. Sanctions are modeled in our experiment by an
additional cost of making eorts below the maximum 170: Mathematically this translates into
a reduced cost of eort. Under a given belief distribution such a change in the cost of eort
causes a rational agent to increase eort.
If the subject anticipates that the other player also increases eort, her beliefs about opponent
eort become more optimistic, which makes it rational to increase eort even more. Thus, we
expect that introducing sanctions causes an increase in beliefs but an even stronger increase in
eort. If we compare behavior in round one and round two in the sanction treatment, we cannot
separate this anticipated eect of sanctions from other eects that we observed in the case of
no sanctions. The appropriate benchmark for comparison is the treatment without sanctions.
We formulate the following conjecture about this comparison:
Conjecture 4.1. The change in eort and belief levels between rounds 1 and 2 is larger when
there are exogenous sanctions than when there are no exogenous sanctions in period 2. This
eect is more pronounced for eorts than it is for belief levels.
This conjecture can also be motivated with the results of Goeree and Holt (2001), who nd
that a lower cost of eort increases eort levels in a between-subject design. Since our sanction
eectively lowers the cost of eort, it is reasonable to conjecture that (exogenous) sanctions
will increase beliefs and eort. We now gather evidence for our conjecture. Figure 4.2 presents
the change in the means between round 1 and round 2 for the ExS and ExNS treatments. In
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Table 4.2 we report the results of our statistical analysis of conjecture 1. We estimate the
stochastic dierence of the change in eort under exogenous sanctions (ExS) versus the change
in eort under exogenous no-sanction (ExNS). To indicate changes between the two rounds of
a treatment X we use the notation dX. Similarly we consider the changes in the lower bound
of the belief intervals, comparing the change under exogenous sanctions, and the change under





Table 4.2: Values of stochastic dierence between changes in the exogenous no-sanction
(ExNS) treatment and changes in the exogenous sanction (ExS) treatment.  Denotes sig-
nicance at 10%,  denotes signicance at 5%,  denotes signicance at 1%:
dierence in terms of eort than in terms of beliefs, as is also apparent from Figure 4.2. To
formally test this nding would involve designing a new test which is outside the scope of this
chapter. However we do note that the 20% equi-tailed condence intervals overlap; by this crude
method at least this dierence is not found to be signicant.
Summary 4.1. We conrm our conjecture that changes in eorts and beliefs tend to be higher
when there are exogenously imposed sanctions in the second round than when there are no
sanctions in the second round. The data lend support to the claim this eect is stronger for
eort than for beliefs.
4.5.4 The signaling eect of sanctions (question 2)
We now investigate the eects of endogenous sanctions. We compare subjects' choices under
exogenous sanctions to subjects' choices under endogenous sanctions. Note however that there
are at least two dierences between these two groups. One dierence is that in the exogenous
case the sanction was imposed by the experimenter while in the other case it was imposed by a
subject in the experiment. A second dierence arises from the fact that the choice of a sanction
by the subject need not be unconditional (like the experimenter's sanction) or random. The
choice of a sanction may re
ect the observations of particular rst round eort choices. It is
exactly this kind of information transmission we wish to analyze, and the experiment is designed
to isolate the signaling eect from the incentive eects of sanctions, by comparing ExS and EnS.
Before we analyze the reactions of the subjects to the imposition of an endogenous sanction, we
investigate the choice of sanction by the third player.
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4.5.4.1 The choice of endogenous sanctions
To see why player 3 would decide to implement a sanction, consider her monetary incentives.
The third player is rewarded proportionally to the minimum group eort. However, imposing
sanctions carries a small cost. A maximizing principal will implement a sanction if she expects
to recoup these costs through an increased minimum eort level. When initial eort is low, there
is a large potential range for eort increases, and changing behaviors can be very protable.
Moreover, if eort is low in the rst round, there is no clear reason to think that it will rise
without a sanction. Thus we can formulate the following conjecture:
Conjecture 4.2. In the endogenous sanction treatment, the likelihood of sanctions being im-
posed by the `principal' is decreasing in the minimal eort chosen in the rst round.
In order to test this conjecture we compare the minimum rst round eort in the sanctioned
groups to the minimum rst round eort of non-sanctioned groups. We use the Wilcoxon-Mann-
Whitney test because we are interested in any dierence between the samples. However, we
cannot nd marginally signicant evidence that the distributions of minimal eort are dierent
in the groups where sanctions are imposed as compared to the group without sanctions imposed
(the p-value is 0:63). Of course the samples are small, so the test is not very powerful. However,
as Table 4.3 shows, the descriptive data do not point at large dierences either. Note that
Mean of Min.
Group Eort
# Below 165 # Above 166
No Sanction 138 17 3
Sanction 135 28 1
Table 4.3: Descriptive data on rst round minimum eort of sanctioned and non-sanctioned
groups. The columns show the mean, and the number of groups with minimum eort below
165 and above 166.
sanctions were also introduced occasionally when minimum eort was high. Note that this need
not contradict equilibrium behavior. To see this, assume that there are some subjects that
always choose low eort (`low' types) while others choose high eort as they believe that the
others that think like them also choose high eort. There can be equilibria in which a sanction
is imposed only if minimum eort is high, and therefore are a signal that the group consists of
high types. Observing no sanction be a signal that the other subject is of type low and hence it
would be best to choose low. Thus the principal will impose sanctions on high types to preserve
coordination. This behavior is optimal for all players, provided there are suciently few low
types to make play of high eort in the rst round an equilibrium. Obviously there are other
equilibria in which coordination on high eort is not sanctioned. This multiplicity may be a
reason why there is no clear pattern when sanctions are imposed. For all practical purposes
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however, we can just assume that the behavior is random. This leads us to the following
conclusion:
Summary 4.2. We have no signicant evidence that sanctioned groups had lower minimum
eort. The descriptive statistics similarly indicate a lack of a clear pattern. Sanctions seem to
be randomly imposed in our data set.
This result implies that there is no endogeneity problem that could have arisen if only low-eort
players had been sanctioned. To the extent that people who play low eort react dierent to
sanctions than others, this would have made the comparison with exogenous sanction treatment
more dicult. To this comparison we turn now.
4.5.4.2 The eect of endogenous sanctions
Although the apparently random imposition of sanctions means that there is no clear informa-
tional content of sanctions, subjects may still believe that sanctions were imposed systematically.
Specically, subjects may follow the same reasoning that led us to formulate Conjecture 4.2. If
this is the case, sanctions may still in
uence beliefs about the other group member. A small
thought exercise teaches us that the inference that can be made depends on a subjects' own
eort in the rst round. Consider a subject who believes Conjecture 4.2 to be true. Assume
rst that this subject chose high eort in the rst round. When she observes that the principal
imposes no sanction, the subject infers that the opponent chose a high eort because otherwise
they would have been sanctioned. This may give her cause for optimism, and a reason to keep
choosing high eort. On the other hand, if the high-eort subject is sanctioned, she infers that
it is likely that the opponent made a low eort. The high eort player will face the following
questions: Will the opponent react to the sanction with a sucient increase in eort such that
I should increase my own eort too? Or is the opponent simply someone with a tendency to
make low eorts even under sanctions, in which case I should lower my own eort? Compared
to the case of exogenous sanction, the observation of a sanction induces uncertainty that the
other subject chose low eort and will do so again. Now assume that the subject played low
eort in the rst round. A sanction no longer has any informational content as long as the
subject believes in Conjecture 4.2. Specically, any sanction can always be interpreted as being
aimed at the subject himself. Thus, there is no reason to assume his beliefs about the opponent
will change, and we expect him to behave much like someone under exogenous sanctions would
behave.
Note that higher order expectations that the players may have about each other may complicate
this pattern. For example, the low-eort player who observes a sanction may think that if his
opponent is a high-eort player, she will now be discouraged. We content ourselves with trying
to identify rst-order patterns. We summarize these patterns in two conjectures (remember
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from Section 5.1 that by low rst round eort we mean eort 2 f110;:::;134g, and by high
eort we mean eort 2 f135;:::;165g).
Conjecture 4.3. a) For those that chose a low eort in the rst round, the change in eorts
and beliefs under endogenous sanctions will be similar to the change under exogenous
sanctions.
b) For those that chose a high eort in the rst round, the change in eorts and beliefs will
be larger under exogenous sanctions than under endogenous sanctions (signaling eect).
We rst consider Conjecture 3a). Figure 4.3 presents the mean changes in beliefs and eort
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Figure 4.3: Means of changes in beliefs and eort across treatments, for those who played low
eort (2 f110;111;:::;134g) in the rst round. (Number of independent observations for each
sample at the top of the bar).
between the exogenous and endogenous sanction treatments. We now try to falsify Conjecture
3a). We test the null hypothesis that the distribution of change in eort is identical in the
endogenous and exogenous sanction settings. Since we are interested in any dierence between
the distributions we use the WMW test. The results in Table 4.4 show that we cannot reject
the null hypothesis of identical distributions in the exogenous and endogenous treatments, both
for eort and beliefs.
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Table 4.4: p-values of the Wilcoxon Mann-Whitney rank sumtest of the exogenous and en-
dogenous treatments for those who played low eort (2 f110;111;:::;134g) in the rst round. 
Denotes signicance at 10%,  denotes signicance at 5%,  denotes signicance at 1%:
The problem is that the sample sizes are small, so we can only provide limited evidence of
similarity.7 Therefore, we will now show that we can make similar claims about the eectiveness
of sanctions, regardless of the way they were introduced. We compare rst and second round
eorts and beliefs between the exogenous and the endogenous treatments, both for sanction and
no sanction. We report results in Table 4.5.
Stochastic Dierence
ExS1 vs. ExS2 EnS1 vs. EnS2
Eort 1 1
Belief 0:5 0:8
Table 4.5: Estimates of stochastic dierence between round 1 and round 2 of treatments ExS
and EnS, for those who played low eort (2 f110;111;:::;134g).  Denotes signicance at 10%,
 denotes signicance at 5%,  Denotes signicance at 1%:.
We nd very similar estimates of stochastic dierence in both sanction treatments. We feel
condent therefore to draw the following conclusion:
Summary 4.3. For subjects that made low eorts in the rst round we nd no signicant
evidence that endogenous and exogenous sanctions have dierent eects on either eorts or
beliefs.
We will now test conjecture 3b). In Figure 4.4 we report average changes in eorts and beliefs
across treatments for subjects who played high eorts (2 [135;165]) in the rst round. Eyeballing
the gure, it seems like the exogenous sanctions are more eective than the endogenous ones
for those who played high eort. The results based on stochastic dierences, reported in Table
4.6, conrm this. We observe signicant evidence that exogenous sanctions are more eective in
raising eort than endogenous sanctions. There is marginal signicant evidence that beliefs tend
to change more under exogenous sanctions. One wonders whether endogenous sanctions have
any eect at all. To nd out we test if there is a dierence between the endogenous sanction
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Figure 4.4: Means of changes in beliefs and eort across treatments, for those who played
high eort (2 f135;136;:::;165g) in the rst round. (Number of independent observations for





Table 4.6: Estimates of stochastic dierence between the exogenous and endogenous sanction
treatments for those who played high eort (2 f135;136;:::;165g) in the rst round.  Denotes







Table 4.7: Comparison of the baseline (ExNS) treatment and the sanction treatments for
those who played high eort (2 f135;136;:::;165g) in the rst round.  Denotes signicance at
10%,  denotes signicance at 5%,  denotes signicance at 1%:
treatment and the baseline treatment (ExNS). In the rst column of Table 4.7 we report the
p-values of the WMW test for this comparison.
We nd that endogeneity dampens the increase in eorts and beliefs. In fact, it dampens it so
7Using statistical hypothesis testing we can show at most that the dierences are not too large, since formally
it is impossible to obtain signicant evidence that the eect of endogenous and exogenous sanctions is equal.
However, the larger the sample size, the more powerful the test, and the more condent we are that the eect, if
it exists, is small.
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much that the eect of endogenous sanctions cannot be distinguished from not mentioning and
introducing sanctions at all. However, the sample sizes are small, so it is possible that we would
not be able to reject the null hypothesis of equal distributions, even if the actual dierence is
quite large. To counter this criticism, the second column of Table 4.7 shows the comparison
with the baseline treatment with the exogenous sanction. It is clear that for similar sample sizes
we get very signicant results of the eectiveness of exogenous sanction.
Summary 4.4. For subjects who played high eort in the rst round, endogenous sanctions
are less eective in raising eorts and beliefs than exogenous sanctions. In fact, the eect of
endogenous sanctions cannot be distinguished from the eect of not introducing a sanction at
all.
4.5.5 Belief intervals
Before we move to the conclusions, we investigate the results pertaining to the width of the belief
interval U   L. One of the reasons we asked the participants to specify an interval rather than
a point belief was that we are interested in the impact of sanctions on uncertainty about the
behavior of the other player, for which the size of the interval U L is a proxy (Schlag and Van der
Weele 2009). Figure 4.5 shows the changes in the width of the belief interval for those who chose
























Interval Width Mean Comparison by Treatment
Figure 4.5: Means of change in the width of the interval across treatments, for those who
chose the lower belief interval in the rst round in (2 f110;111;:::;165g) in the rst round
(number of independent observations for each sample at the top of the bar).
did not change between rounds in both no-sanction treatments, while uncertainty went down in
van der Weele, Joël (2009), On Sanctions and Signals: How Formal and Informal Mechanisms Produce Compliance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12176Can sanctions induce pessimism? 77
both sanction treatments. We can conrm this result with statistical analysis. Table 4.8 presents
the estimates of stochastic dierence between the rst and the second round interval width in
all treatments. In both no sanctions cases a test of stochastic inequality cannot reject the null
Stochastic Dierence
EnNS1 vs. EnNS2 ExNS1 vs. ExNS1 EnS2 vs. EnS2 ExS1 vs. ExS2
Interval Width 0:067 0:0  0:31  0:46
Table 4.8: Estimates of stochastic dierence between the round 1 and round 2, for those who
chose the lower belief interval in the rst round in (2 f110;111;:::;165g) in the rst round. 
Denotes signicance at 10%,  denotes signicance at 5%,  Denotes signicance at 1%:.
hypothesis that the distributions in the two rounds are equal at the 10% level. By contrast, we
nd that there is signicant evidence that the interval decreases under exogenous sanctions and
marginally signicant evidence that the interval decreases under endogenous sanctions. This
reinforces our conclusion that sanctions facilitate coordination partly by reducing uncertainty
about the behavior of others.
If sanctions were to have a signaling eect, we would expect for those subjects who chose high
eort (2 f135;136;:::;165g) in the rst round, that the reduction in uncertainty is smaller
under endogenous sanctions than under exogenous sanctions. Testing the direction of the eect
with stochastic inequality, we nd that the tendency of the decrease in uncertainty is in fact
signicant at 1% in the exogenous sanction treatment, while under endogenous sanctions it is no
longer signicant. Moreover, the estimates for stochastic inequality do not reveal a signicant
dierence between EnS and either ExNS or EnNS. This indicates that endogenous sanctions
do not reduce uncertainty for those who played high eort in the rst round relative to the
no-sanction treatments. It thus seems that sanctions reduce uncertainty in general, except
for endogenous sanction applied to those who played high eort. This is congruent with our
signaling explanation. However, when we directly compare the change in the interval width
between both sanction treatments for those who played high eort, we cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no dierence.
Summary 4.5. Uncertainty about the choice of the other player, as measured by the width of
the belief interval, declines in the sanction treatments. There is no evidence of a change in the
no-sanction treatments. For those who played high eort in the rst round, the reduction in
uncertainty only occurs under exogenous sanctions.
4.6 Discussion and conclusion
The results of our experiment allow us to conclusively answer our two questions. Over the
whole sample, exogenous sanctions clearly have a positive eect on eort levels and beliefs
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about others' eort level. However, the way in which sanctions are introduced matters. This
manifests itself in the fact that for people who played relatively high eort in the rst round,
the dierence between the eect of an endogenously and an exogenously introduced sanction
is signicant. In fact, the endogenously introduced sanctions cannot be distinguished from the
treatment without (exogenous) sanctions.
We think that the most plausible rationale for this result is the idea that underlies our hy-
potheses. The endogenous introduction of sanctions gives subjects a signal that the other group
member did not `cooperate', in the sense that she selected low eort. This tends to make peo-
ple more pessimistic about the eort played by their companion in the group and less willing
to move up in eort themselves. For those who played high eort initially this pessimism is
re
ected in the fact that beliefs and eort do not signicantly increase under endogenous sanc-
tions. We also found that uncertainty, as measured by the width of the belief interval, does not
go down under endogenous sanctions as it does under exogenous sanctions. A signaling eect
also explains why the dierence between the sanction treatments does not occur for people that
play low eort in the rst round. For them this signaling eect is less pronounced, because they
may think that the sanction was aimed at them rather than at the other player in the group.
Our results discredit a naive view of deterrence in which it is only the economic incentives that
matter for behavior. The literature on crowding and intrinsic motivation had already established
that sanctions may have adverse eects in some situations. We have identied another reason
why sanctions may be ineective. The result supplies a motivation why `mild law' may not work.
In contrast to Tyran and Feld (2006), we provide evidence that the endogenous introduction of
sanctions rather than the exogenous one may be the cause of problems. In Tyran and Feld, a
voting procedure for the introduction of a mild sanction gives people the opportunity to send
a public signal that they are willing to cooperate. This in turn leads to increased cooperation.
In our experiment, the introduction is under the discretion of a third player who has observed
past play of the game. This setup re
ects more closely the arrangements of a society where
people make the laws through representatives, rather than directly. In this case a sanction sends
exactly the opposite signal: sanctions are apparently necessary to keep people from deviating
from the ecient outcome. The results show not only that such an eect can exist when the
information conditions are right, but also that it is potentially quite substantial. Our study
thus suggests that mild law may not be the best instrument in this case, because it does not
compensate for this signaling eect by providing adequate incentives for ecient behavior.
In our experiment we observed the fact that the signaling eect was not present for low eort
players, because the groups were so small that the sanction was likely to re
ect their own
behavior. However, in real life, relevant communities consist of many more than two people. This
means that even people who play low eort may interpret the sanction as a signal, because it is
unlikely that a sanction is introduced on the basis of the behavior of one person. Assuming some
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external validity of the experiment, one can conclude that a sanctioning authority needs to attain
a careful balance between correcting the behavior of deviants or pessimists and maintaining the
optimistic beliefs of cooperators. The results of this study have implications for both public
policies and manager-employees relationships in rms. As pointed out by Brandts and Cooper
(2006), coordination failure can cause corporations and other organizations to become trapped
in unsatisfactory situations both for managers and employee.
How to attain such a balance is an interesting further research question that goes beyond the
aim of this paper. One possibility is to try to avoid the issue altogether by implementing harsh
laws making undesired action very costly. Such a deterrent law would presumably override the
signaling eect. However, such laws and their enforcement may be costly to implement in the
real world, since they require at least some probability of detection for undesired activity and
potentially costly sanctioning activities. Another possibility to investigate is whether appropri-
ate framing of the introduction of a law can mitigate the signaling eect. In the tradition of
experimental economics, this paper has tried to use neutral framing, replacing \eort" with \a
number", and \sanction" with \subtraction". In real life however, a policy maker could attempt
to surround the introduction of sanctions by soothing or stimulating messages. For example, one
may say the actual number of people who deviate from the ecient strategy is small, or express
the expectation that they will conform to the sanction. However, it is theoretically unclear
why such cheap talk would be eective. The experiments by Brandts and Cooper (2008) and
Van Huyck et al. (1992) incorporate the possibility of a principal to send written messages and
suggestions to the agents. These studies could be combined with the asymmetric information
structure in this paper in order to study this issue.
Last but not least, we wish to push forward the use of exact tests that \let the data speak" and
do not add distributional assumptions. One approach in the experimental literature on crowding
out has been to use the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test to uncover dierences in distributions,
and to complement this test by looking at the descriptive statistics to make statements about
the direction of the eect. A more popular approach throughout the experimental literature
has been to implicitly use the WMW test as test for comparing means, without mentioning
the condition needed for its validity, namely that all moments of the distributions except the
rst have to be the same. A contribution of our paper is the use of new tests (that are exact
but do not impose additional distributional assumptions) that allow us to test directly for a
negative impact of sanctions. We think these tests are an important addition to the toolbox of
economists working with small data sets.




How procedures can improve
voluntary compliance
5.1 Introduction
The previous chapters investigated the use of sanctions in the presence of social interactions.
In this chapter we will move away from the focus on sanctions and look at an alternative policy
instrument to induce compliance: participatory procedures.
A large literature in social psychology, sociology and political science is devoted to the phe-
nomenon of participatory decision-making. One of the main ndings of this literature is that
procedures that allow participation by employees or citizens, increase cooperation and compli-
ance with decisions. This eect occurs independently of whether the actual outcome of the
procedure is favorable to the agent. A second, more recent nding is that people pay more at-
tention to procedures if they are uncertain about key aspects of their environment, e.g. if there
is the threat of layos in their company, or uncertainty about the character of the authority.
These facts have led social scientists to construct a variety of theories that aim to explain
why people value procedures. In psychology, the `group value' (Lind and Tyler, 1988, Tyler
and Lind, 1992) links procedures to the identity of the agents. Procedures that exclude an
agent from the decision-making process will weaken the identication of the agent with the
authority or the wider community and lead to less cooperative behavior. To explain the second
fact, Lind and van den Bos (2002) propose that people use `cognitive shortcuts' to substitute
information about the nature of procedures for information about their environment that they
are lacking. In economics, Frey et al. (2004) have used the stylized facts above to argue that
people have preferences over dierent procedures which should be incorporated in economic
models of institutions.
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This chapter abstracts from postulating preferences over procedures, cognitive shortcuts or the
identity of agents. Instead, I proceed in two steps to explain how participation can lead to more
cooperation even under adverse outcomes. First, I propose a stylized denition of participatory
procedures. I dene decision-making procedures as stochastic processes, in which the degree of
participation is re
ected in the ex-ante probability p that the agent (rather than the authority)
gets her preferred outcome. The larger this probability, the higher the degree of participation.
Such a denition interprets participatory procedures as institutions that endow the agent with
`bargaining power' or `stochastic control rights'.
Armed with this denition, I formulate a simple signaling model between two players, an au-
thority and an agent. There is asymmetric information about the type of the authority. She
can either be selsh and care only about her own payo, or she can be benevolent and take the
payos of the agent into account to some extent. The two players have a con
ict of interest
whether to implement a project A, favored by the agent, or B, favored by the authority. The
model has two stages, a decision-making stage and a cooperation or execution stage. In the
decision-making stage the authority can decide on the degree of participation p of the procedure,
where p is simply the ex-ante probability that the project will be A. Nature then determines
the outcome of the procedure according to the chosen p. In the execution stage, the authority
and the agent simultaneously choose a costly eort level. The eort levels are complements in
determining the payos of the project. For given eort levels, project A provides higher payos
to the agent whereas project B provides higher payos to the authority.
I then show formally that in this game there exists a unique separating equilibrium in which the
degree of participation allowed by the authority is a credible signals of the latter's type. In such
a separating equilibrium, procedures aect compliance for two reasons. First, a participatory
procedure is more likely to yield the project that the agent prefers. Since this project gives
him higher returns, the agent is more motivated to exert eort. I call this the outcome eect,
which does not depend on the signaling role of procedures. Second, participatory procedures
increase cooperation even if they result in a decision to carry out the inferior project (from
the agent's point of view). This procedural eect arises because a fair procedure reveals the
benevolent intentions of the authorities. An authority that reveals herself to be benevolent will
be expected to exert higher eort in the cooperation phase, because she will internalize some of
the benets of her eort to the agent. Since eorts are complements, participatory procedures
induce the agent to raise his eort level independently of the outcome of the procedure. I show
that the separating equilibrium exists for arbitrarily small levels of benevolence, as long as the
con
ict of interest between the agent and the authority if high enough, so that signaling is
suciently costly.
The predictions of this model are in line with the evidence on participatory procedures. Most im-
portantly, it replicates the fact, mentioned above, that both favorable outcomes and procedures
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per se raise cooperation. The model also predicts that uncertainty about the trustworthiness of
the authority makes the nature of procedures more important. Furthermore, perceived trust-
worthiness of authorities is indeed a major factor in compliance decisions by agents (Tyler and
DeGoey 1996). Finally, survey studies show that job satisfaction is positively related to the
participatory decision-making. The model predicts this, since cooperation, and hence utility is
higher under participatory procedures.
The denition of participation used in this chapter is closely related to that of `control' used in
the economic literature on delegation. However, the focus of the present study is dierent. In
the delegation literature, the central trade-o is between the loss of control of the authority and
the amount of information available at the decision-making level. In this study I focus on the
information that is transmitted by the act of sharing power itself. The chapter also relates to
the literature on gift giving (Carmichael and MacLeod 1997). In essence, this chapter interprets
participatory procedures as costly gifts, in which the authority accepts a probability of losing
his favorite project to signal his trustworthiness and increase cooperation by the other party.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section gives a more elaborate account of research
on participatory decision-making in social psychology, and provides more detailed evidence for
the stylized facts mentioned in this introduction. Section 3 introduces the stylized denition of
participation used in this chapter. Section 4 presents the model and Section 5 the main results,
which are discussed in Section 6.
5.2 Literature
The literature on (participatory) procedures in social psychology often goes under the term
`procedural fairness' or `procedural justice'1. This stems from the well-documented tendency
of people to attribute a subjective label of `fairness' to procedures only if these allow sucient
possibility for participation of the agent (see Lind and Tyler (1988) and Tyler (2004) for surveys).
The terminology used to indicate participation is somewhat diuse. Many studies use the term
\voice", which can refer to direct decision-making control or to the mere possibility by agents
to present evidence or arguments for their position. Some studies explicitly refer to the former
as `decision control' and the latter as `process control'.
1This literature is huge by all measures: a metastudy by Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) counts more
than 400 empirical studies into the eect of organizational procedures alone. I cannot do more here than give a
representative 
avor of the results.
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Why do participatory procedures matter? Early explanations for the question why
agents value participatory procedures focused on instrumental reasons. On the basis of experi-
ments in dispute resolution, Thibaut and Walker (1975) argued that participation is important
because it allows agents to secure better outcomes for themselves.
However, research done in the 1980s showed that although the outcome of a decision matters,
participation generates increased compliance with the rules and cooperation with the authorities
regardless of the outcome of the procedure to the agent. A well-known study is Tyler (1990),
who reports the result of a large panel survey in which people are interviewed before and after
they had interactions with the Chicago court and police system. In telephone interviews, people
were asked (among other things) about several aspects of the procedures used by the authorities,
including their possibilities to express their opinions and in
uence the outcomes of the decisions.
They were also asked to evaluate the authorities and their attitudes towards compliance with
the law. Tyler nds that trust in the authorities and positive attitudes towards compliance
depend strongly on possibilities for participation in decision-making, regardless of the outcome
of the procedure (e.g. the decision in the court case).
Participatory procedures also induce a positive evaluation of authorities (see Lind and Tyler
(1988) for a survey) which in turn fosters cooperation. Tyler and DeGoey (1996) survey evidence
about trust in institutions in dierent areas, such as the family and the workplace, and even
national institutions as the police, congress and the supreme court. They show that trust in
authorities consistently increases feelings of obligation to organizational rules and laws. Feld
and Frey (2001) nd that if there is a relationship based on trust between the taxpayer and the
administration, tax evasion is lower.
In the area of tax evasion Pommerehne and Weck Hannemann (1996) and Frey (1997) show peo-
ple are willing to cooperate more under participatory procedures. Controlling for demographic
variables, income and the size of deterrence variables, they show that Swiss cantons that im-
plement more direct democracy measures (referenda, town-hall meetings etc.) have lower rates
of tax evasion. Smith (1992) produced similar evidence for the United States. In a laboratory
experiment, Alm et al. (1993) nd that the level of voluntary compliance increases if tax payers
are able to vote on the type of public good that is provided (i.e. the charity towards which the
contributions are directed).
In the realm of organizational decision-making, Cohen-Charash and Spector (2001) conduct a
meta-analysis of the psychological literature that studies the eects of measures of `organiza-
tional justice'. They use data from 190 experimental and survey studies (both in the laboratory
and eld), comprising a total of 64,757 participants. They nd that the variable \voice", a
blanket expression for diverse forms of participation in decision-making procedures, correlates
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signicantly2 and strongly (:52) with measures of procedural justice that were used in these stud-
ies. In turn, procedural justice correlates signicantly with measures of `work performance' (:45),
`compliance with decisions' (:14), `job satisfaction' (:43), `organizational citizenship behavior'
(:23), `organizational commitment' (:50), `trust in the supervisor' (:59), `trust in the organiza-
tion' (:43), `counterproductive work behaviors' ( 0:28) and `turnover intentions' ( 0:22). These
correlations are often stronger than the corresponding correlations for `distributional fairness'.
The fact that participatory procedures per se induce people to be more cooperative, has led
researchers to argue that people value participation for other reasons than being able to in
uence
the outcome. For example, the premise of the relational model (Tyler and Lind 1992) and the
related group value model (Lind and Tyler 1988), is that people are anxious to belong to social
groups and communities. Participation is important because it conveys to the individual that
she is a full-
edged member of the community, which increases self-esteem, identication with
the group and the motivation to contribute. As a result of such theories, Frey et al. (2004) argue
that economic modellers should take into account preferences that are specied over procedures
rather than outcomes.
When do participatory procedures matter? Based on a survey of several studies,
Lind and van den Bos (2002) argue that the details of procedures matter most when people
are uncertain about key elements in their environment. Van den Bos et al. (1998) test the
hypothesis that voice is especially important when people are insecure about the character of
authorities. In an experiment, a third party distributed lottery tickets between two people
that had concluded an experimental task. Between treatments, the experimenters varied the
information supplied to the subjects about the trustworthiness of the third party. They nd
that the satisfaction with the allocation of the tickets depends on whether the subjects were able
to communicate their preferences to the decision maker. However, this is only the case when
people were not informed about the trustworthiness of the authority. The authors conclude
that when people do not know the trustworthiness of the authority, they rely more heavily
on the participatory aspects of the procedure at the time of evaluating the nal outcome. In
a eld study, Van den Bos et al. (2000) interviewed parents about the the quality of their
children's daycare centres. They found that parents who indicated to be more unsure about the
trustworthiness of the centre's organization, were more in
uenced by the quality of the centre's
procedures in their nal evaluation of its reliability.
This and similar evidence has led to new theories in social psychology, most notably `uncer-
tainty management theory' (Lind and van den Bos, 2002). This theory holds that procedures
help people cope with uncertainties that come up in their lives. People use `cognitive shortcuts'
2I report the correlations only for eld studies, which were the most numerous in the sample. The correlations
for laboratory studies were similar. `Signicantly' refers to the fact that the 95% condence intervals do not
contain 0.
van der Weele, Joël (2009), On Sanctions and Signals: How Formal and Informal Mechanisms Produce Compliance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12176How procedures can improve voluntary compliance 85
to substitute information that they lack about their environment with information about the
perceived `fairness' of procedures, of which participation is an important element. According to
Lind and van den Bos (2002, p. 196), fair procedures thus allow people to \maintain positive
aect, feel favourable towards the organization, and engage in the sort of pro-organizational be-
havior (e.g. accepting supervisor's orders, obeying company policies, going \above and beyond"
the call of duty) that have long been known to be linked to fair process and fair outcomes [...].
These pro-organizational attitudes and behaviors are \safe" because fairness reduces the anxiety
about being excluded or exploited, anxieties that might otherwise become very worrisome in
uncertain contexts".
Economic literature on delegation and information. The denition of participation
that I will propose is formally close to that of control rights in the economic literature on
delegation. This literature investigates the trade-o between a loss of control from delegation
and the benecial eects of increased information at the decision-making level. In Aghion and
Tirole (1997), delegation gives the agent incentives to gather more information and take better
decisions. However, she may also use her freedom to carry out sub-optimal projects (from
the authorities' point of view). In Aghion et al. (2002, 2004) the principal learns the type of
the agent by delegating control to her and observing her behavior. In contrast, the present
paper asks how control can be used to transfer information to the agent and how this aect
cooperation.
Closest to the present paper, at least in it's formal setup, is Dessein (2005). Dessein considers
a model between an entrepreneur and an investor. Ex-ante, the entrepreneur has more more
information about the viability of the project. After the contract is signed, new, public infor-
mation about the project arrives. If the information is bad, restructuring the project is optimal
for the investor, but not for the entrepreneur, who receives private benets from carrying out
the original project. Dessein (2005) shows that the entrepreneur can signal his initial private
information by contractually giving away control over the restructuring decision. The reason is
that the `good' investor knows that future information is likely to be positive, and hence the
control will not actually be exercised. The current paper oers a more general interpretation
of `stochastic control rights'. It also makes less specic assumptions about the timing and the
information structure of the game.
5.3 An operational account of participatory procedures.
In this section I will propose a denition of participation that ranks procedures with respect
to the degree of control or in
uence that they delegate to the agent. In the real world there is
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a plethora of institutions that embody some form of participation. As mentioned above, psy-
chologist have distinguished between `decision control' (voting, vetoing, etc.) and the weaker
`process control' (the expression of arguments). There is extensive evidence that both forms
of control matter (see Lind and Tyler (1988) for a survey), but having some in
uence on the
outcome seems to be a necessary condition to increase evaluations of the procedures and sub-
sequent compliance. In an experiment, Lind et al. (1990) nd that `instrumental participation'
(participation that allows an agent to have an in
uence on the outcome) has a bigger eect
on the positive evaluation of procedures than `non-instrumental participation' (e.g. the mere
opportunity to express opinion). Tyler (1987) shows that when people have the impression that
their arguments are not taken seriously, the benecial eect of non-instrumental participation
disappears. Thus, the benecial eects of participation are due in large part (although not
exclusively) to its link with control.
In the literature on deliberative democracy, Arnstein (1969) has ranked various forms of partic-
ipatory procedures according to the degree of control over decisions in her well-known `ladder
of participation', which is reproduced in Figure 5.1. The sports of the ladder represent several
Figure 5.1: Arnstein's (1969) ladder of participation. (Reproduced with permission of the
Taylor and Francis Group.)
dierent stages of participation, ranging from non-participation, via tokenism (i.e. procedures
designed as window dressing for participation), to direct citizen control. The picture suggests
that in any relationship between an authority and agents (i.e. employees or citizens), there is a
continuum of participatory procedures that can be ranked according to the in
uence that they
allow.
These considerations lead me to propose the following stylized denition of participatory pro-
cedures
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Denition 5.1 (Participation). A procedure implements `participation of degree p' if the ex-ante
probability that the agent obtains his preferred outcome through the procedure is p.
According to this denition, procedures are stochastic processes, the outcome of which is un-
certain ex-ante. However, one can establish ex-ante how likely the agent is to get a preferred
outcome in a given procedure. This probability is a consequence of the degree to which the
procedure invites participation by the agent. Alternatively one can interpret the probability
p as the bargaining power of the agent embedded in the procedure, or the degree to which
control is delegated. The fact that participation is not a binary phenomenon is re
ected in the
assumption that p 2 [0;1].
Consider the following concrete examples from an organizational context. An employer who
puts up a suggestion-box on the wall would implement a p close to zero: no employee expects to
exert great in
uence through such an institution. On the other end of the spectrum, having a
representation of the employees amongst the senior management of the company and endowing
them with signicant bargaining (or even veto) powers would implement a p close to 1. Another
example of a high p would be a government that commits itself to the outcome of a public
referendum.
The notion of procedures proposed here abstracts completely from all aspects that relate to the
process of decision-making itself. For example, it does not take into account that agents may
have preferences to express their opinion or the benecial eects of self-determination (Lind et
al. 1990). I also abstract from the possibility that people change their preferences and that \the
force of the better argument" (Habermas, 1990, p.158-9) may resolve con
icts of interest. In
the current setup, procedures do not resolve con
icts of interests, they are merely institutions
for managing them.
5.4 The model
In this section I present a model of costly signaling. In the model, there are two dierent kind
of players: an authority (she) and a subordinate (he). The players are indicated by t 2 fa;sg,
where a stands for `authority' and s for `subordinate' or agent. There are two dierent types
or natures n 2 fA;Bg of the project, over which preferences of the players diverge. Players
decide rst which project is chosen, and subsequently cooperate on the chosen project. The
crux of the model is that the authority can signal a concern for the agents' welfare by giving
up decision-making power over a the type of project. Such delegation of decision-making power
generates a motive to contribute for the subordinate because he is less afraid that he will be
exploited in the subsequent cooperation stage.
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Timing. The timing of the model is as follows:
1. Nature determines the preferences of the authority. With probability 1=2 the authority is
`selsh' and with probability 1=2 she is `benevolent' (as explained below).
2. Procedural stage.
(a) The authority decides on the degree of participation p 2 [0;1] of the procedure.
(b) Nature decides the outcome of the procedure. The agent gets his preferred project (A)
with probability p, and the authority gets her preferred project (B) with probability
1   p.
3. Cooperation stage. After having observed both p and the outcome of the project, the
agent and the authority simultaneously decide their level of cooperation et(n;p)  0.
Payos from the project. The output G of the project is determined by the eort of the




where  2 [0;1]. Apart from the eort levels, each player's payo depends on the type of




gG if project n is the preferred project of player t
G if project n is not the preferred project of player t,
(5.2)
where g > 1. Thus, g is a measure of the con
ict of interest between the two players. The larger
is g, the larger the dierence in payos between the two projects, and the larger is the con
ict
of interest. It is not necessary for the results that the authority is certain that the agent prefers
project A. What matters is that the agent with some probability prefers project A.
The agent. There is one agent (occasionally referred to as a subordinate), with the following
von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:





Here, the second term in the utility function captures the loss from the costly eort to the
authority.
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The authority. The authority has the following von Neumann-Morgenstern preferences





The parameter a is drawn by nature from f0;g. If a = 0 we call the decision maker `author-
itarian' or `selsh'. If a =  2 (0;1) we call the decision maker `benevolent' or `altruistic'. If
the decision maker is benevolent, she has preferences over the payos s of the agent from the
project3. Everything else equal, the decision maker prefers higher payos of the agent from the
project. The size of  determines the strength of the benevolent motives. Since  < 1 there
is always a con
ict of interest between the authority and the agent even if the authority is
benevolent, because she always values her own payos more.
In summary, the game consists of a simultaneous move game, preceded by a procedural stage
that opens up the opportunity for the authority to signal. Note that neither player has a
preference over procedures p; they care only about the payos from the project.
Applications. The model can be applied to an authority that relies on cooperation from
subordinates or agents but has imperfect sanctioning possibilities. Applications to workplace
situations are perhaps most salient. In this case the manager or supervisor is the authority and
the employee the agent. To the extent that work eort is non-contractible, management needs
to rely on the voluntary cooperation of it's employees. In many cases the output of the company
will depend on the ability of management and the workers to cooperate constructively. That is,
both the eort levels of the management and the employees are necessary for a good result, so
the complementarity between eort levels assumed in the model arises naturally.
Another application is between two partners in a joint venture. Whereas one partner may have
the decision-making power about the nature of the venture, its success depends on the eort
and contributions of both partners.
Finally one can think of organizations without real sanctioning power that need to rely on the
voluntary cooperation of their members. This is true for many volunteer organizations, but
also of large international decision making bodies such as the UN or the IMF. In this case the
authority may consist of a subset of the members while the agents are the remaining members.
Complementarity arises because cooperation between all the members is necessary for eective
policy making.
3The fact that s is the same function as in the specication of the agent's preferences is for notational
simplicity. What is important is that both functions represent the same preferences. The model results go
through similarly if we posit altruistic preferences over us rather than s. The present specication is however
computationally easier.
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5.5 Participatory procedures as a signal
In this section we look for a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game. As is customary, we
mandate that this equilibrium satises the Cho and Kreps (1987) Intuitive Criterion.
Let et(n;p) denote the eort level of player t when procedure p resulted in outcome n, and
denote equilibrium values by . We solve the game backwards. In the last round of the game,
both players simultaneously choose an eort. Because the payos are concave and the costs of





i.e. for any given n and p, the benevolent authority will always exert a higher eort than the
selsh authority. The reason is that the benevolent authority internalizes a part of the payos of
the agent, and therefore her marginal utility of eort is higher than that of the selsh authority.
The eorts of the two players are complements, because a higher eort of the other player raises
the marginal utility of the other player. This leads to the second observation: it follows from
(5.5) that the eort of the agent will depend on his beliefs about the type of the authority. If
he believes the authority is benevolent, he will be more motivated to exert high eort.
We now move to the procedural stage. Before characterizing the optimal p, we formulate a
useful lemma, that will lay the basis for the existence of a separating equilibrium. We assume
that authority chooses p, knowing that her own eort in the second stage is a best response
against the eort of the agent, i.e. ea(n;p) = e
a (es(n;p)), which is a function of es(n;p) only.
With some suppression of notation we can now express the expected utility of the authority as
follows:
Ua (p;es(n;p)) = p  ua (A;es(A;p)) + (1   p)  ua (B;es(B;p)):
It is possible to show that this expected utility function satises the following single crossing
property









> U (p;es(n;p)): (5.6)
Lemma 5.1 says that whenever the selsh authority is indierent between a pair fp0;es(n;p0)g
and fp;es(n;p)g, the benevolent authority will strictly prefer the pair with the higher p. We
call this a single-crossing condition because in eect it ensures that the indierence curves of
van der Weele, Joël (2009), On Sanctions and Signals: How Formal and Informal Mechanisms Produce Compliance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12176How procedures can improve voluntary compliance 91
the dierent types cross at most once. The proof of this claim is intuitive: raising p is less costly
for the benevolent authority than for the selsh authority. Whereas the loss of her favorite
project is a pure loss to the latter, the benevolent authority internalizes some of the gain to
the agent. It should be no surprise that a useful single crossing property in this game should
be in expected utility. The signaling variable of the authority is p, the probability with which
her non-preferred outcome A occurs. Thus, although the signaling variable does not directly
in
uence the authority's outcome in any given state, it changes her expected outcome through
modifying the probability of each state. Before we move on to the equilibrium results, I rst
dene a distinction that is central to the model.
Outcome and procedural eects. A central point of the paper is to distinguish between
two eects of procedures on the cooperation level of the agent. The rst is the eect of decision
outcomes, the second is the eect of procedures. To avoid confusion, I provide formal denitions
of both.
Denition 5.2. An `outcome eect' exists for a given level of participation  p if es(A;  p) 6=
es(B;  p). The outcome eect is positive if es(A;  p) > es(B;  p).
Thus, an `outcome eect' exists when for a given p, the outcome of the procedure changes the
cooperation level of the agent. A positive output eect means that contributions rise when the
project is the one favoured by the agent (A). Note that the term `outcome' refers here to the
outcome of the decision-making procedure (i.e. A or B), not to the utility level of the agent at
the end of the game.
Denition 5.3. A `procedural eect' exists for a given outcome n 2 fA;Bg and some values
p and p0 where p0 6= p, if es(n;p0) 6= es(n;p). The procedural eect is positive if p0 > p )
es(n;p0) > es(n;p).
Denition 5.3 states that the contribution level of an agent does not only depend on the outcome
itself, but also on the degree of participation of the procedure by which the outcome was
established. A positive procedural eect means that contributions rise with a more participatory
procedure. Note that the eect cannot exist in a pooling equilibrium, because it requires that
there are at least two equilibrium values of p.
With these denitions in hand, we can derive the existence and characteristics of a separating
equilibrium in our game.








a unique separating equilibrium in pure strategies in which
a) the selsh authority chooses p
0 = 0,
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b) the benevolent authority chooses
0 < p
(g;) < 1 if  <  (g)
1 if    (g);
(5.7)








Proposition 1 says that the procedure is a signal of the type of the authority. Observing p
 > 0
means that the authority is benevolent, whereas observing p = 0 means that the authority
is selsh. The intuition behind the existence of the separating equilibrium is the following.
Consider the choice between p
0 and p
. From the point of view of the authority, two things are
relevant. On the one hand, choosing p
 leads to higher equilibrium contributions, as one can
see from Proposition 1c). This increases utility to the authority for a given outcome A or B.
On the other hand, choosing a higher p increases the probability that the authority will end up
with the wrong project. The existence of the separating equilibrium comes from the fact that
delegating control is more costly for the selsh authority. The equilibrium exists only if  is not
too high relative to g. The intuition behind this condition is that a high  increases the eort
of the agent in the second round, and thus it becomes more protable to the selsh type mimic
the signal. Thus, if g is low relative to , the selsh type is willing to mimick even the strongest
signal (setting p = 1) in which case the separating equilibrium collapses.
Proposition 5:1b) tell us that the procedure chosen by the benevolent authority depends on 
and g. If  is high relative to g (but not so high that it violates the equilibrium condition), then
the benevolent authority prefers to implement project A. Note that the con
ict of interest is
still there: for given eort levels, the authority would prefer to carry out project B. However,
when  is high, the increased cooperation of the agent makes implementing A so attractive, that
it outweighs the loss to the authority of her favorite project. As a consequence, the authority
will set p
 = 1.
On the other hand, if  is low relative to g, the increased cooperation by the agent does not
compensate the loss of project B. Then, the benevolent authority sets p
 at the lowest level
such that the incentive compatibility constraint of the low type is satised. This incentive com-
patibility constrained is graphed in Figure 5.2. If the con
ict of interest increases, inducing
participation becomes more costly. Thus, a lower p will be sucient to deter the low type from
copying the signal. Furthermore, if  increases, the curve in Figure 5.2 shifts upwards. The
reason is that the higher is , the higher is the level of eort of the agent under participation,
because he anticipates a higher eort level of the authority. Therefore, it becomes more attrac-
tive for the selsh authority to mimic the benevolent authority, and the benevolent authority
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needs to set a higher p
 in order to signal her type in equilibrium. Note that this implies that
there exist equilibria even for arbitrarily small levels of benevolence. All that is required for
an equilibrium to exist is that the con
ict of interest is large enough relative to the level of
benevolence. Naturally, when benevolence is low, the level of p
 will also be low.














Figure 5.2: The equilibrium p
 as a function of the con
ict of interest g.
Proposition 5:1c) tells us that both the output and the procedural eect are positive. This
means the model can account for the main stylized facts observed in the procedural fairness
literature: the positive impact on contribution levels of both favorable decision outcomes and





will note that for the same (adverse) result B of the procedure, the agent selects a higher eort if
the procedure allowed more participation. Not observing the type of the authority and ignoring
the underlying strategic considerations of the game, the observer may be tempted to conclude
that the agent in the game has preferences over procedures. In the context of the model however,
the increased cooperation can be explained by conventional preferences.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium results from applying the intuitive criterion to rule out pooling
equilibria on low participation levels. In any pooling equilibrium, deviations to higher levels of p
by the low type are dominated by the equilibrium strategy. As a result, the only o-equilibrium
beliefs that are admitted by the intuitive criterion are () = 1, which causes the high type to
deviate from the (candidate) pooling equilibrium.
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5.6 Discussion
In this section we discuss some implications of the model, relate it to the literature discussed in
section 2 and contrast the predictions of the signaling explanation with explanations by other
models.
Procedures and cooperation. In the second round of the game the agents play a game
that resembles the Prisoners' dilemma. If both players are selsh, the eort levels in the Nash
equilibrium are inecient. That is, a Pareto improvement could be obtained if both agents
would exert higher eort. However, this is not an equilibrium, because the players do not
take into account the positive externality of their eort on the other player. To some extent,
the benevolent authority does take this externality into account and this improves eciency.
Participatory procedures serve to improve eciency further by making the benevolence common
knowledge, which in turn increases the eort of the agent and the authority. Thus, utility of
the agent is higher under participatory procedures, regardless of the outcome of the procedure.
This feature means that the model can explain the robust fact that participation correlates with
higher rates of job satisfaction (Cohen-Charash and Spector 2001).
The analysis of signaling equilibria also ts well with the idea of `token participation', introduced
by Arnstein (1969). Token participation refers to participatory procedures that are designed
as windowdressing to give people the idea that they have in
uence, whereas in fact they have
little. An example of this would be to invite agents to a decision meeting but to ignore their
remarks. The model predicts that only suciently high levels of real in
uence will serve as a
signal of benevolence. Indeed, Thibaut et al. (1974) provide evidence that if people feel that
participation is fake, and that they cannot actually exert any in
uence, they provide especially
low evaluations of the procedure.
In essence, this paper interprets participatory procedures as costly gifts, intended to improve
cooperation in (repeated) dilemma games (Carmichael and MacLeod 1997). Of course there are
other, more direct ways to give gifts, but in cases where decisions about disputed options have
to be made, participation is likely to be a highly salient way to do so.
Relation to social psychology. The signaling model does have important overlaps with
some of the models in the social psychology literature that were mentioned in the introduction.
It is related closely to the `fairness heuristic' and `uncertainty management' theories (Lind and
Van den Bos 2002). In these theories, the agent uses information implicit in the fairness of
procedures to form judgements about his environment, in this case the trustworthiness of the
authority. However, in contrast to the psychology literature, the present model outlines a clear
reason for such judgements (the existence of a separating equilibrium) and a straightforward
van der Weele, Joël (2009), On Sanctions and Signals: How Formal and Informal Mechanisms Produce Compliance 
European University Institute
 
DOI: 10.2870/12176How procedures can improve voluntary compliance 95
mechanism (Bayesian updating) by which it takes place. The paper is also related to the
relational model (Lind and Tyler 1992). Like in the relational model, the agent takes the
fairness of procedures as a signal of his importance to the authority.
In contrast to most of the psychology literature the present paper gives an account of procedures
in purely instrumental terms. The psychological models just mentioned are conceptually richer,
because they allow for other factors such as the identity of the agent or preferences to express
opinions. This makes such theories more versatile, but also more complicated. The use of
instrumental models can help clarify where richer conceptual models are needed.
Testing instrumental versus intrinsic models of participation. This paper argues for
a conception in which preferences for procedural fairness are instrumental or extrinsic. This
contrasts to the approach of Frey et al. (2004) who argue that people derive utility directly
from fair institutions, i.e. the preferences are intrinsic. The signaling model explains the
stylized fact that fairness matters more in the presence of uncertainty (about trustworthiness).
An intrinsic approach cannot explain this. On the other hand, a signaling approach does not
explain empirical results that pure expression without any potential to change outcomes matters
for the evaluation of procedures and authorities. Lind et al. (1990) show that such preferences
play a role, but also that they are quantitatively smaller than the eects of decision control.
Tyler (1987) shows that people react more positively to procedures if they believe that the
authority seriously considered their arguments prior to decision-making.
The current model also predicts that participatory or `fair' procedures mandated by a third
party will be less eective than when these procedures are voluntarily introduced. Manda-
tory participation may raise cooperation levels by providing better outcomes but will not send
a signal of benevolence, because they do not reveal the character of the authority. By con-
trast, an approach that posits (only) intrinsic preferences for fair procedures would predict that
mandatory and voluntary institutions are equally succesful in raising cooperation.
Feldman and Tyler (2008) have attempted to test whether mandating voice procedures is an
eective way to increase compliance. They interviewed employees in Israeli rms and asked
the reactions of the employees to two dierent (and ctitious) introductions of participatory
procedures: voluntarily by the employer or mandated by the government. The results are not
fully conclusive. They nd that the mandated introduction raises willingness to comply by more,
but only for those whose actual employer had no participatory procedures in place. For those
who enjoyed such procedures in their real working environment, the eect of the voluntarily
introduced procedure was bigger. This evidence may re
ect that employees who did not enjoy
voice procedures in reality, were skeptical towards the voluntary provision and have more faith
in mandated procedures. On the other hand, those that already had a good view of their
employer may have seen the voluntary provision as further evidence of the trustworthiness of




the employer. However, the fact that this study relies on ctitious scenarios and self-reported
compliance under such ctitious scenarios, makes further research desirable.
Finally, it will be dicult to disentangle the eects of signaling and reciprocity. In the model,
agent are always selsh, while the authority may be benevolent. The reason for this modeling
choice is to show that we need not infer reciprocal attitutes in agents if they react positively
to fair procedures. Complementarity in levels of cooperation suces for the result. However, it
may be more realistic to assume that the agent is reciprocal, in the sense that he will care about
the authority's payo if he thinks the authority cares about his. If this is the case, the result
in this paper will obtain more easily, because by signaling his type the authority does not only
induce trust, but also reciprocity.
5.7 Conclusion
In this paper I model participation in decision-making procedures as the degree of (stochastic)
in
uence that people have on the decision-making process. I then showed that if an authority
can commit to the outcomes of such procedures, they can be used as a signaling device. A
procedure with ample participation possibilities indicates that the authority is of a good type
that will not exploit the agent. Thus, participation increases trust and cooperation, even if the
actual outcome of the procedure is not benecial to the agent. This matches the most impor-
tant stylized fact in the literature on procedural fairness, namely that participatory procedures
increase compliance, regardless of their outcome. The model can also explain why participation
is especially important when there is uncertainty about the type of the authorities, and why
participation increases job satisfaction.
Decision procedures and procedural fairness are complex phenomena and I do not claim to have
delivered anything more than a rst step to an economic understanding of it. Nevertheless, I
believe that taking a formal approach to decision-making procedures allows some important con-
ceptual clarications, and among other things, will help to understand when a less reductionist
approach is necessary.




Epilogue: from deterrence to
participation?
\The purpose of getting power is to be able to give it away."
Aneurin Bevan (1897-1960).
When the allied forces landed in Sicily on the 10th of July 1943, they split the task of conquering
the island. The combined British-Canadian forces would advance north along the eastern coast,
while the Americans would march west towards Palermo. On the paper, the former task was by
far the easier. The Italian-German force in the east was outnumbered ve to one and ill-equiped.
Nevertheless, they put up a staunch ght, employing clever tricks, such as making up for their
lack of ammunition by using recrackers to divert enemy re. It took the British and Canadians
5 weeks and some thousands of casualties to arrive in Messina on the Northern shore.
Their American Seventh Army on the other hand had to conquer the mountainous inland of the
island where about 60,000 Italian-German defense forces were concentrated, amongst which a
German tank division. Moreover, these forces had taken up strategic positions in the dicult
mountainous terrain that had been proven to be an almost unconquerable hideout. Nevertheless,
the Americans covered the 100 mile distance from Agrigento to Palermo in a remarkable four
days without meeting any noticeable resistance.
What caused this enormous dierence between the two forces? A popular account is that the
Americans employed the services of the Sicilian-born American gangster `Lucky' Luciano, who
was also a patriotic American. His contacts within the Sicilian Maa, and especially with
the powerful Sicilian boss Don Cal o have been said to be instrumental in guaranteeing the
American Army a free passage across the island. Although the actual in
uence of the Maa
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on the outcome of the invasion is debated1 there is little doubt that the Allies cooperated with
the Maa in conquering the island (Newark, 2007). Through the contacts of Luciano the Maa
allegedly gathered intelligence for the Allies and sabotaged Axis war eorts. After the invasion,
the organization helped suppress dockworkers' strikes and communist gatherings. On their part,
immediately after they reached Palermo, the Allies appointed Don Cal o mayor of his village
as well as Honorary Colonel of the US Army. Luciano's 30 to 50 year sentence was converted
and he was paroled in 1946. Moreover, the Allies appointed Maosi to important positions
all over Sicily. On the basis of recently declassied documents Newark (2007) writes that the
whole allied change of command, all the way up to Roosevelt and Eisenhower condoned the
cooperation, and that the Allies on some occasions even armed the Maa.
This tale underscores several points that have been made in this thesis. First, it is a stark
example of the fact that eective rule 
ows not merely from force, but from the informal forces
in society. While the British and Canadians were ghting hard in the east, the American army
walked south to north across Sicily's mainland without encountering any resistance.
Second, the example drives home the message in chapter 2, namely that knowledge of the social
landscape in a society is indispensable for any governing authority. In the Sicilian case, the Allies
were well prepared. They had made sure that 15% of the invading force consisted of Sicilians
who had migrated to the US, so that they would be more likely to be greeted as liberators.
They had primed their connections with the Maa via Lucky Luciano, facilitating the invasion
and subsequent occupation. One can contrast these preparations with the conquest of Iraq in
2003, where the Allies did not have a good idea of the sociological conditions in the country,
and were not able to respond adequately to the ethnic tensions.
Third, it shows the importance of the strategic devolution of power. After the invasion of
Sicily, the rst thing the American's did was to enlist the informal groups in society to secure
order. Through the quick devolution of power to local underground power structures (the
Maa) they immediately established a form of eective local rule, and lled the power vacuum
that existed after the fall of fascism. Again, this contrasts sharply with the events in Iraq.
There, instead of delegating power, the Americans immediately dissolved the most important
power structures (the Sunni dominated army and Ba'th party). This augmented the post-
Saddam power vacuum so that it could not be lled even by the supremely eective American
force. Setting up alternative power structures proved slow and costly: although a token Iraqi
governing council was quickly established, by the time general elections were held in December
2005 (the earlier elections for provisional government had been boycotted by the Sunni's) the
country was already engaged in severe sectarian violence. It is telling that the fragile order in
1The account here is based largely on Norman Lewis' (1964), who argues in his book the The Honored Society
that the Maa captured the Italian commander of the defense forces and caused the Italian troops to desert.
However, Newark (2007) plays down the in
uence of the Maa on the outcome of the invasion and argues in
Maa Allies that the Italians simply gave up the ght.




Iraq today relies on the US paying and arming their former enemies in the Sunni insurgency
(see Dawisha (2009) for a political history of Iraq before and after the invasion).
These examples vividly illustrate that governing without civil society is impossible. Cooperation
with organizations like the Sunni insurgents and the Maa was vital to establish social order
in the short run. Although Sicily and Iraq are war time examples, they carry lessons for
peace-time policy making. If social order stems from the informal structures of civil society,
and not just from the threat of force by the state, social control cannot simply be imposed
by strong incentives. Instead, to rule eectively the state has to share it's powers and devolve
responsibilities to individuals and groups in civil society. This point is made well by criminologist
David Garland. In his book The Culture of Control he has studied crime-ghting policies in
Britain and the United States over the last decades. In his conclusion he states that
\The lesson of the twentieth century experience is that the nation state cannot
any longer hope to govern by means of sovereign commands issued to obedient
subjects, and this is true whether the concern is to deliver welfare, to secure economic
prosperity, or to maintain `law and order'. In the complex, dierentiated world of
late modernity, eective, legitimate government must devolve power and share the
work of social control with local organizations and communities."
D. Garland (2001, p. 205).
Thus, as was argued in chapter 2, economists need a radical overhaul from their traditional
Hobbesian way of thinking about policy making. Instead, what is needed is better understanding
of the possibilities of governing through participation and devolution of power.
The importance of this can again be understood by references to the invasion of Sicily. Although
the cooperation with the Maa brought short-term gains, the long-term eects are not at all
pretty. In the rst weeks after the allied invasion the Maa re-established its grip over Sicily
that had been weakened under the fascist regime. Today, Sicilian society is still bearing the
consequences of this Allied trade-o. It does not take a wizard to predict that installing a
criminal organization in the driver's seat is not conducive to long-run prosperity. However, as
Garland's quote demonstrates, eective government will have to nd some way to devolve power
in order to govern eectively. Economists understand relatively little of these processes. Some
elements may t relatively easily into an economics framework. For example, in the Sicilian
story, the collaboration between the Allies and the Maa seems to have been a simple quid pro
quo exchange. The Maa supplied help in securing the Allies war objectives, whereas the Allies
helped, or at least did not obstruct, the Maa's post-war power grab. These kind of deals and
their associated complexities (issues of commitment, reputation etc.) are well-understood by
economists.




However, this does by no means exhaust the possibilities to use delegation for eective rule. One
of the most important issues connected to participatory governance that has escaped rational
choice theorists is that of legitimacy. Many studies have shown that participation in decision-
making extends `legitimacy' to the authority (Tyler, 2004). In turn, this legitimacy is one of
the main currencies by which eective rule is exercised: People tend to cooperate more with
authorities that they view to as legitimate and tend to ignore the commands of those that they
do not (see also the references in Chapter 5).
This suggests a completely dierent style of governing than the command and control framework.
Indeed, participation is in some sense the opposite of deterrence, in that it gives less control
to the authority. Tyler (2008) sketches an optimistic picture of how participatory procedures
and legitimacy can all but replace deterrent strategies. I am not similarly optimistic, but I do
think that legitimacy is an under-researched topic in economics. How legitimacy is established
and how it can be used to generate voluntary compliance are important questions that rational
choice theorists have ignored.
By contrast, social psychologists have done much work on this topic. Chapter 4 outlined the
main psychological theories about the benets of participatory government. These revolve
around the material benets that an individual can secure by being able to in
uence decisions
(Thibaut and Walker, 1975), identication with the group (Lind and Tyler, 1988) and the
resolution of uncertainty about the environment (van den Bos and Lind, 2002).
I think that an interdisciplinary approach to this subject would benet both social psychology
and economics. Formal denition of the concepts of `legitimacy' itself, but also of related con-
cepts such as `respect', and `authority', could bring intellectual clarity to this eld. Chapter
5 shows an example of how economic models can deliver such clarity. I think the model pre-
sented in this chapter considerably sharpens the concepts that are implicit in both the `fairness
heuristic' and `uncertainty management' theories developed by van den Bos and Lind (2002).
On the other hand, economists and rational choice theorists can also learn from psychologists.
This is especially the case with respect to the aspects of compliance and decisions making
that have to do with identity. Lind and Tyler (1988) stress the concept of group identity in
their `group value' theory. The idea is that by being able to participate in decision-making
and express their opinions, agents identify with the group, and to some degree internalize the
group benet as their own. There are many subtle issues here that on rst glance seem to
defy economic modeling techniques. Nevertheless, there is progress. For example, B enabou and
Tirole (2007) provide a very interesting model of identity formation, that can explain a wide
variety of behaviors and institutions that were previously unintelligible to standard economic
theory. Another area of progress is on the concept of esteem. The group value theory says that
participation in decision-making in the group is important because it confers the esteem of the
group on the individual. The economics of esteem-based incentives is a topic that currently




receives a lot of attention in economics (Ellingsen and Johannesen 2007, Brennan and Pettit
2004).
In short, an integration of the conceptual frameworks of economics and social psychology may
enrich these two disciplines. Moreover, by recognizing that less control is sometimes more, we
may end up with a more eective and humane way to exercise social control.





Proofs of Chapter 2
Proof of Proposition 2.1. A separating equilibrium exists if the threshold type is indierent
between complying or not. It is easy to see that a single-crossing condition holds, such that
if the threshold type is indierent, all types higher than the threshold type will prefer not to
comply, and all types lower than the threshold type will prefer to comply.
Denote the threshold type by . The utility of the threshold type is:
u(d) =    h + a(s)E[ j ;d]:
Requiring indierence between complying and not complying yields the following:
u(0) = u(1)





where () = E[ j ;d = 0]   E[ j ;d = 1], the dierence in respect for compliers and
deviators.




















we know that h 
a(s) crosses () at least once, guaranteeing the existence of at least one sepa-
rating equilibrium.
We know from the denition of () that (0) = E[] and (1) = 1 E[]. Using this it is easy
to derive that minfa(s)E[];1 + a(s)(1   E[])g  h < maxfa(s)E[];1 + a(s)(1   E[])g is
a sucient condition for (A.2). (The fact that the second inequality is strict has to do with the
tiebreaking rule that an indierent type complies. For a separating equilibrium one needs to a
positive fraction of agents who do not comply.)
Proof of Proposition 2.2. In the proof of Proposition 1 we derived the equilibrium condition for
the threshold type: h =  + a(s)(). If we take the total derivative of this expression with
respect to h and  we get:











It follows that d
dh < 0 ,
d()
d <   1
a(s).
Proofs of Chapter 3
Proof of Proposition 3.1. Proof of 1. We work backwards through the game, and start by
characterizing the agents reaction functions. We know from (3.2) and (3.4) that both types
have a `threshold sanction': for lower sanctions than this threshold they defect, for higher
sanctions they cooperate. Low types cooperate when the sanction is higher than 1, and defect
otherwise. From (3.4) we know that high types cooperate when g  1   (1   )p(m > m), and
defect otherwise. In the symmetric information when  m it is sucient that
g   (A.4)
The reaction functions imply that when g < 1, all egoists defect and the conditional cooperators
face a coordination game between themselves. If all other high types defect it is best for a high
type to also defect. If all other high types cooperate, it is a best response for the high types to
cooperate (at least when !  m). Suppose high types coordinate on defection. In this case the
government can set g < 1 resulting in m = 0, or it can set g = 1 resulting in m = 1. From the
objective function of the government it is straightforward to verify that when  < 1, the latter
strategy dominates the former.
Proof of 2. Above we derived the reaction functions of the citizens. We known that (A.4) holds
with equality in equilibrium, so that g
2 = , because the government always sets the lowest









2  1   
!  1   (1   g
2) (A.5)
In equilibrium, this `incentive compatibility constraint' holds with equality for the lowest govern-
ment type that sets low sanctions, and with inequality for all higher types. Since the government
will always set the lowest possible sanctions in equilibrium, i.e. g
2 = , the threshold government
type is given by 1   (1   ).





1   (1   ) if m < 1   (1   )
m if m  1   (1   )
(A.6)
Proof of Proposition 3.2. Identical to that of Proposition 3.1, Part 1.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. From the reaction functions derived above, we see that contribution by
the low types implies contribution by the high types. Thus, there are at most three dierent
equilibrium action proles for the citizens in the economy: one where both types contribute, one
where only the high types contribute, and one where nobody contributes. This means that in
equilibrium there are at most three dierent levels of sanctions g. If there were more, two such
levels induce the same strategic reactions by the agents. This cannot be an equilibrium since
the government would always deviate to the lower and cheaper sanction that induces a given
reaction. This means that the three sanction levels that are candidates to feature in equilibrium
are the ones that most cheaply induce the three possible citizens' strategy proles described
above. From the citizens' reaction functions, we see that setting g = 0 and g = 1 is the cheapest
way of inducing respectively no cooperation and full cooperation. Since we assumed that  < 1,
we see from the welfare function that setting g = 1 and inducing full cooperation always yields
a higher payo to the government than setting g = 0 and leaving everybody to defect.
Therefore, defection by all agents in the economy can not be an equilibrium outcome. We are
left with at most two possible equilibrium outcomes: one where both types contribute, one
where only the high types contribute. As a consequence, there are at most two sanction levels,
one associated with each outcome.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. We prove the lemma by showing the following:




1. A government that observes ! = 0 sets g = 1 in equilibrium.







Proof of 1. In a state of society w = 0 where everybody is egoistic, setting g < 1 will lead
everyone to defect which cannot be optimal for the government.
Proof of 2. The proof is based on the application of the `intuitive criterion' (Cho and Kreps
1987), a renement of Bayesian Nash equilibrium. An equilibrium fails the intuitive criterion
(IC) if it requires o-equilibrium beliefs that place positive probability on types for whom
deviation payos are dominated by equilibrium payos. The idea is that it is `unreasonable'
to believe that such types would have deviated. Denote by 
(g0) the set of government types
who will deviate to an o equilibrium sanction g0. We call beliefs with full density inside 
(g0)
`IC-admissible'. Then [0;1]=
(g0) is the set of types who would never deviate to a sanction g0.
Beliefs with density in this set are `non IC-admissible'.
We make two observations that restrict the set of deviations that we need to consider. First,
o-equilibrium sanctions are attractive deviations for a given government type ! if they induce
at least as many contributions as in equilibrium for a lower sanction level. We need not consider
deviations to g = 1 because by Lemma 1 and the rst part of this proof, these are always on the
equilibrium path. For a deviation to a sanction level g < 1, the contribution level will be either
! or 0. A deviation cannot be protable if contributions are 0. Thus, we focus on deviations to
sanctions g0 that induce a contribution level of !. From (A.4) we know that if g0 < , sanctions
will never (for any beliefs) induce cooperation from high types, and so we look only at deviations
to sanctions   g0 < 1.
Second, we can restrict our attention to deviations by the government type ! = 1. In this case
the whole population consists of high types, and a contribution level of ! equals the maximum
contribution level. Therefore, if this type does not deviate, other types will not do so either.
In sum, a pooling equilibrium exists if for ! = 1 and for all g0 6= g there exist o-equilibrium
beliefs that:
1. are `IC-admissible', and
2. lead to zero contributions, thus making deviations unprotable.
Consider deviations from the pooling equilibrium in which the government plays g = 1 and
everyone contributes. If the government ! = 1 deviates to a lower sanction g0 < 1, it will gen-
erate full contributions if the o-equilibrium sanction induces cooperation from the high types.





(g0) of government types that will deviate under such circumstances is determined by
comparing the government's utility in equilibrium to that of a deviation:
EW(!;g0)  EW(!;g = 1)
!   g0  1   
!  1   (1   g0) (A.7)
Thus, we have 
(g0) = [1   (1   g0);1]. The best case for a pooling equilibrium is made when
o-equilibrium beliefs are as low as possible. The most negative o-equilibrium beliefs that are
admissible by the IC are a degenerate distribution with full density on 1   (1   g0). These
beliefs will lead to zero contributions if m > 1   (1   g0). Solving for g0 yields
g0 < 1  
1

(1   m) (A.8)
Thus, if an o-equilibrium sanction   g0 < 1 satises g0  1   1
(1   m), we can nd IC
admissible beliefs that induce positive contribution levels.





 g0 < 1, for which
there are no IC-admissible beliefs that are suciently low to induce a zero cooperation level.
Thus, for the type ! = 1 there is a protable deviation to a sanction that is slightly lower than
1. Thus, a pooling equilibrium on g = 1 cannot exist.
Proof of Proposition 3.3. Note that for various reasons we cannot use a standard single crossing
property condition (sanctions are equally costly for each government type, and the decision
variable of the agents is binary). The proof proceeds in four steps. First, we characterize the
citizens' posterior belief about the distribution of types in the economy. Agents base their
beliefs on the government's policy and their own type. We derive only the posterior beliefs of
conditional cooperators (high types) under a sanction g < 1, because this is the only case in
which beliefs matter for the choice of action1.
Conditional on g2 < 1 and  =  we compute from Bayes' rule the posterior belief distribution
(!) that a given distribution ! has been chosen by nature. The common prior is that each
distribution is equally likely to be chosen by nature. Obviously (
 = ! < ! j g = g2; = ) =
0 , because the agent knows that a low sanction is played only if !  !. The posterior for 

1Concerns of space lead me to omit the full characterization of posterior beliefs of agents. These are available
on request.




= !  ! is:
(
 = !  ! j  = ;g = g2) =
P (
 = ! [  =  [ !  ! )













 = ! j  = ;g = g2) =
(
0 if ! < !
2!
1 (!)2 if !  ! (A.9)
Second, we determine the best response of the citizens in the economy to any government policy
given their posterior beliefs and their type. Both types will cooperate under g1 = 1: We know
that the best response of a low type is to defect whenever g < 1. Remains to analyze the case
of a high type who observes g2. From (3.4) we know that best response of a high type is to
cooperate if and only if P(m > m) 
1 g
1 .
To get the best response of the citizens, we have to compute the equilibrium value P(m > m j
g
2) from the equilibrium beliefs. If m  !, it is straightforward that P(m > m j g
2) = 1.
Substituting this in (3.4) yields the equilibrium condition for the cooperation of high types
g
2   (A.10)
If m > ! the equilibrium beliefs are given by the following equation:








Substituting this in (3.4) yields the equilibrium condition for the cooperation of high types:
g
2 
m2   (!)2 + (1   m2)
1   (!)2 (A.11)
Third, the best response of the government types is described by the incentive compatibility
constraint (A.5) derived above, that gives the threshold type that is indierent between the
high and the low sanction. We now know the reaction functions of all the players, depending
on the parameters.




The fourth step is deriving the equilibrium conditions on the parameter values, starting with
the equilibrium sanction. We need to consider both the case when m > ! and the complement.
Case 1: m  !.
In this case, equilibrium beliefs P(m > m) = 1, and so from (3.4) it follows that g
2   is
sucient for cooperation of the high types. From the ICC of the government (A.5) it follows
that !  1   (1   ). If these two conditions hold with equality it is easy to check that they
constitute an equilibrium. Deviations to g2 >  are never protable and deviations to g2 < 
lead to m = 0.
Now suppose that g
2 > . Consider a deviation to g0 = . The intuitive criterion species
(see proof of Lemma 3.2) that the lowest reasonable o equilibrium beliefs are 1  (1 g0). A
deviation to g0 =  is thus protable as long as m  1   (1   ).
Case 2: m > !.




1 (!)2 . From the government's ICC one








1 (!)2 , so ! = ! and is given by (A.12) with equality. It is clear
that deviations to g0 > g
2 are never protable. Deviations to   g0 < g
2 are unprotable as
long as m > 1 (1 g0) (see proof of Lemma 3.2). We know from the government's ICC that
! > 1   (1   g0). Thus we have that m > ! > 1   (1   g0). This means we can always nd
o-equilibrium beliefs that make a deviation unprotable and the equilibrium exists.
Now consider as an equilibrium sanction g
2 >
m2 (!)2+(1 m2)
1 (!)2 , and thus (by the ICC), ! > !.
It is clear that deviations to g0 > g
2 are never protable. Deviations to   g0 < g
2 can be ruled







= 1   (1   ) if m < 1   (1   )
2 [!;m] if m  1   (1   )
where ! is given in (A.12).
Proof of 2. Comparing ! just derived, with ! in Proposition 3.1, the proof is immediate.




Proofs of Chapter 5
Proof of Lemma 5.1. A sucient condition for the result is that the indierence curves of the
two types cross only once in the identied region. This will guarantee that the change in es to
compensate the authority for a change in p is larger for the selsh authority than for the benevo-
lent authority. Let fp;es(n;p;a)g be the indierence curve of type a, i.e. Ua(p;es(n;p;a))  Ua.
We assume that the eort of the authority is a best response to the eort of the agent, i.e.
ea(n;p) = e
a (es(n;p;a)), which is a function of es(n;p;a) only. Taking the derivative of

































Let us rst investigate the case in which the authority is compensated for the change in p by a































where in the second line we used the envelope theorem to set
@e
a(A;p)













It remains to derive the components of (A.15) and show that (A.13) holds. First consider the
denominator. To ease notation we denote es(n;p;a) by esn. We nd
@0 (A;esA)
@esA
= (1   )(esA)
  (eaA)
 ; and (A.16)
@ (A;esA)
@esA
= (1 + g)(1   )(esA)
  (eaA)
 (A.17)








































The best responses e
a(n;p) in the simultaneous move game are readily calculated by taking rst





























We insert these best responses of the authority into the expressions for the denominator (A.16),




































which is always satised.
An analogue argument exists if compensation is in es(B;p;a), but this is omitted here for reasons
of space. Thus, we showed that for a small increase in p, the high type needs to be compensated




with a smaller increase in es(p) than the low type. This means the indierence curves cross
only once.
Proof of Proposition 5.1. The outline of the proof is as follows. We rst derive the optimal
levels of eort of the authority and the agent. Then we show the conditions under which exists
a ~ p > 0 with (a =  j ~ p) = 1, such that the selsh authority is indierent between setting ~ p and
p = 0 (the equilibrium level in the separating equilibrium). We then show that the benevolent
authority always prefers to set ~ p to any other p. Finally, we prove uniqueness by ruling out
pooling equilibria. To ease notation we denote et(n;p) by etn.
Equilibrium eort levels. Optimal eort levels are derived by taking derivatives of t for the
agent and both types of authorities, yielding the reaction functions. Equilibrium levels are then
computed by solving the system of reaction functions for eort levels. Note that eort levels will
depend on the information of the agent. It is straightforward to compute the equilibrium eort
levels under complete information (as is the case in a separating equilibrium). The optimal
eort level of the agent is:
e
sA = [g (1   )]
2 




sB = [1   ]
2 
2 [(g + 1)]

2 (A.25)
Where 1 = 1 if the authority is a high type and 0 otherwise. The equilibrium level of the
authority is:
e
aA = [g (1   )]
1+




aB = [1   ]
1+
2 [(g + 1)]
1 
2 (A.27)
Note that when the we calculate the deviations to o-equilibrium actions, the beliefs of the
agent may not be correct. Specically, when the agent (mistakenly) thinks the authority is a
high type, these are the optimal eorts of the selsh authority:
e












2 [g + ]
(1 )
2(2 ) (A.29)
Indierence of the selsh type. Assume there is a  p > 0 with associated beliefs (a =  j  p) = 1
and denote by  esn the optimal eort level of the agent under such maximally optimistic beliefs
(found in A.24 and A.25 when 1 = 1). Similarly, assume that (a = 0 j p = 0) = 1 and denote
by esn the optimal eort level of the agent under such maximally pessimistic beliefs (found in
A.24 and A.25 when 1 = 0). Then, it is easy to see from the optimal eort levels derived above
that esn <  esn. Thus, we know that u0 (A;esA;e
aA) < u0 (A;  esA;e
aA). Then, by the continuity




of U0 in p, if u0 (B;esB;e
aB)  u0 (A;  esA;e
aA), there exists a ~ p such that the selsh type is
indierent between f~ p;  esng and f0;esng. The condition for this to be satised is
u0 (B;esB;e
































 [1 + g]
(1 )
2 












Furthermore, because u0 (A;  eaA;e
aA) < u0 (B;  eaB;e
aA) and U0 is linear in p, it follows that
the selsh type always prefers p = 0 to any  p 2 [~ p;1]. (We will follow the tiebreaking rule that
an indierent authority sets p = 0).
Strategy of the benevolent type. If the selsh type is indierent between f~ p;  esng and f0;esng,
then by Lemma 5.1 we know that the high type prefers to set ~ p to p = 0. Therefore ~ p is a
canditate for a separating equilibrium. What about deviations to other levels of p? Consider
rst deviations to  p 2 (0; ~ p). Suppose o equilibrium beliefs are such that (a =  j  p) = 0.
These beliefs do not violate the Intuitive Criterion, because we know from (A.30) that the selsh
type would always mimic the benevolent type if she were to set p 2 (0; ~ p) and beliefs are such
that (a =  j  p) = 1. Then, because U is linear in p, U( p) < U(p = 0) < U(~ p). Thus, such
deviations are not protable.
Now consider deviations to  p 2 (~ p;1]. Because a low type will never set p in this area, the intu-
itive criterion tell us that the only reasonable o-equilibrium beliefs are  = (a =  j  p  ~ p) = 1.
Thus, deviations are protable if:
u0 (A;  eaA;e

































1  [(g + )]

g1  (1 + g)








=   (A.31)
Suppose rst that (A.31) holds. In that case, the high type is better o under project A then
under project B. Thus, she will set p
 = 1.
Now suppose that (A.31) does not hold. In this case the high type prefers to implement project
B. Because U is linear in p, the high type will never deviate to  p 2 (~ p;1]. It follows that there




is a separating equilibrium in which the low type sets p = 0 and the high type sets p
 = ~ p ,
where ~ p is such that
u0 (B;esB;e
aB) = ~ p  u0 (A;  esA;e
aA) + (1   ~ p)  u0 (B;  esB;e
aB) or
~ p =
u0 (B;  esB;e






























It remains to show that both these high type strategies can occur in equilibrium. We have
derived two constraints on the parameteres  and g: (A.30) is a sucient condition for the
existence of an equilibrium, whereas (A.31) gives the optimal strategy of the high type. We
show that there is a  g > 1 such that (A.30) implies (A.31) and only if g   g. It is easy to derive







































So, (A.31) crosses (A.30) only once and from above.
Uniqueness. Consider now a candidate pooling equilibrium on some level 0  ppool < p
 and
some level of eort of the agent esn(ppool) = esn (E[a]). This would indeed be an equilibrium
if it were supported by suciently low o-equilibrium beliefs. However, we can rule out such
beliefs for deviations to high levels of p by applying the intuitive criterion.
We know that in this pooling equilibrium the low type has a higher utility than in the separating
equilibrium above (or she would deviate to p = 0). This implies that if (A.30) holds, there
exists a ^ p < ~ p such that the low type is indierent between fppool;esn(E[a])g and f^ p;  esng,
where, as before,  esn is the optimal eort level of the agent under maximally optimistic beliefs.
Because the expected utility of the low type is continuously decreasing in p, deviating to any
p > ^ p is dominated for the low type, and as a consequence the intuitive criterion prescribes
that (a =  j p  ^ p) = 1. By Lemma 1 we know that if the low type is indierent between




fppool;esn(E)g and f^ p;  esng, the high type prefers to set f^ p; ^ esng, and therefore prefers to deviate.
This implies that the candidate pooling equilibrium is not an equilibrium.




Stochastic dierence and inequality
Given two random variables Y1 and Y2,  (Y1;Y2) = Pr(Y2 > Y1)   Pr(Y2 < Y1) is called the
stochastic dierence of Y1 verses Y2: The stochastic dierence can be estimated by computing
the sample analogues. Consider rst the case of matched pairs where data is given by joint
observations of Y1 and Y2. The estimate is calculated by ignoring all pairs in which Y1 = Y2
and then taking the dierence between the empirical frequency of pairs with Y2 > Y1 and of
pairs in which Y2 < Y1. Now consider the case in which there are two independent samples,
one associated to each variable. Here one can estimate  by considering the frequency of
Y2 > Y1 among all possible pairs and subtracting from this the frequency in which Y2 < Y1
among all these pairs. The resulting estimates are unbiased.
If  (Y1;Y2) > 0 then one says that Y2 tends to yield larger outcomes than Y1: We wish to
identify signicant evidence that Y2 tends to yield larger outcomes than Y1: So we wish to test
the null hypothesis H0 :  (Y1;Y2)  0 against the alternative hypothesis H1 :  (Y1;Y2) > 0 for
a given specied level : This is called a test of stochastic inequality (Cli, 1993, Brunner and
Munzel, 2000).
Assume that data has the form of matched pairs as given by n independent observations of
(Y1;Y2): Then this test reduces to a sign test. One uses a binomial test to test whether the
probability that Y2 > Y1 conditional on Y2 6= Y1 is  1=2.
Now assume instead that data is given by two independent samples of Y1 and of Y2. Let ni be
the number of observations of Yi; i = 1;2: We present an exact test of these hypotheses due to
Schlag (2008).
Randomly match one observation of each sample to generate minfn1;n2g matched pairs.
Then determine a rejection probability based on the randomized version of the sign test with
size 0:2  . The combination of the matching and the probabilistic recommendation yields an
exact randomized test with size 0:2  . We proceed as follows to derive an exact
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nonrandomized test that has level . Reject the null hypothesis if the rejection probability of
the above randomized test is above 0:2. Note that the factor used to reduce the size of the
randomized test is equal to the threshold used to translate the randomized recommendation
into a deterministic recommendation.





I report instructions for the endogenous sanction treatment.
Originally in Italian
Instructions for the rst round
Introduction
Welcome! You are going to take part in an experimental study of decision making. Please follow
these instructions carefully. You will be paid according to your performance. At the end of the
experiment we will tell you how much you earned.
Once everyone is seated we will formally start the experiment by reading the instructions. After
this reading you will have the opportunity to ask us questions about the procedure. However at
no time may you communicate with any of the other participants of your session. Please also
refrain from talking to others about your experience until tomorrow in order not to in
uence
others taking part in our experiment. Please turn o your mobiles in case they are still switched
on. We hope you have fun.
Matching and assignment to a role
The computer will assign you by chance (i.e. at random) to a group consisting of three partic-
ipants. You will not know the identity of the other two in your group and they will not know
your identity. The computer will also assign a role to each in this group. Two of this group
(from now on: player 1 and player 2) will have to take a decision as described below, the third
(from now on: player 3) will be inactive but still will earn some money.
Decisions and Earnings
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During the experiment any choice will lead to some earnings expressed in tokens. Total earnings
at the end of the experiment are determined by the sum of all earnings and will then be converted
into money at the exchange rate of
1 token = 7.5 Eurocents (or equivalently: 100 tokens=7,5 Euro)
It will not be possible to have negative earnings at the end.
Player 1 and Player 2
Players 1 and 2 will simultaneously each be asked to make two decisions: to choose a number
and to make a guess about which number the other player chooses. Both decisions have to be
entered into a decision screen that is described in more detail below. Neither player will observe
the decisions of the other player.
Choosing a Number
Both player 1 and player 2 have to choose a number. This number can be any number between
and including 110 and 170 (fractions or decimals not allowed).
The earnings in tokens of either player 1 or player 2 from choosing a number are determined as
follows. A player receives the lower of the two numbers chosen by player 1 and player 2 minus
85% of their own number.
This has the following implications:
- Assume players 1 and 2 chose the same number. Then a player will receive his/her own
number (since both numbers are equal, this is also the lowest number) minus 85% of his/her
own number.
- Assume that players 1 and 2 chose dierent numbers. Then, the player who chose the
lower number could have increased his earnings by choosing a slightly higher number. However,
the player who chose the higher number could have increased his earnings by choosing a slightly
lower number.
The following mathematical representation will not be read out loud.
Suppose (among players 1 and 2) that one of them chooses the number Y and the other chooses
the number Z.
If Y = Z then the player who chose Y receives Y   0:85 Y.
If Y < Z then the player who chose Y receives Y   0:85 Y.
If Y > Z then player who chose Y receives Z   0:85 Y.
In addition, players 1 and 2 rst receive a xed amount of 35 tokens.




Guessing the other's choice
In addition to specifying a number, both player 1 and player 2 are asked to make a guess about
the number chosen by the other player. The guess is made by specifying a range (given by its
lower bound L and its upper bound U) in which the other player's choice is believed to belong.
The earnings in tokens of either player 1 or player 2 from making this guess are determined
as follows. A wrong guess (the actual number chosen by the other player falls outside the
specied range) yields nothing. A correct guess (the actual number chosen by the other player
lies within the specied range) yields 15% of the dierence between 60 and the width of the
range U-L. Therefore the smaller the specied range, the higher the earnings if the guess is
correct. However, a smaller range also increases the risk that the guess is not correct, in which
case no tokens are earned.
The following mathematical representation will not be read out loud:
If the number Z chosen by the other player lies in the range (it is greater than or equal to L
and less than or equal to U) then the player who has chosen L and U gets 0:15(60 (U  L))




Figure C.1: Input screen in the rst round.
Player 3




Player 3 does not make any decision during the experiment and earns an amount of tokens equal
to 25% of the smaller of the two numbers chosen by players 1 and 2.
A more mathematical representation of this statement will not be read out loud:
Tokens earned by player three = 0.25 (smaller of the two numbers chosen by player 1 and
player 2)
Tutorial
Before the experiment starts, so before roles are assigned, all participants have the possibility
to practice and to get used to the structure of the game. To this end, you will participate in
a tutorial round, where you will see the decision screen as described above. You will have 5
minutes to enter as many dierent values as you like for both your own number and your guess,
and the other player's hypothetical number. You can then use the check button to see what
your earnings from these numbers and your guess would be. You are encouraged to verify the
calculation behind the earnings of both the number choice and the guess. The values entered in
this tutorial have no in
uence on your earnings and will not be recorded. After 5 minutes the
tutorial will stop and the experiment will start.
Final Remarks
During the experiment, you are not permitted to speak or communicate with the other partici-
pants. If you have a question while the experiment is going on, please raise your hand and one
of the experimenters will come and answer it.
At this time, do you have any questions about the instructions or procedures? If you have a
question, please raise your hands and one of the experimenters will come to your seat to answer
it.
Instructions for the second round
Introduction
Now we run a second and nal experiment. Earnings will be added to your previous earnings.
After this new experiment everything is over and your total payment will be calculated.
This new experiment is very similar to the previous one up to some changes we highlight.
Matching and roles
All participants are matched with the same people as before and keep the roles they had before.
Decisions and Earnings




IN CONTRAST to the previous experiment, player 3 now also makes a decision.
Player 3
At the start of the experiment, before player 1 and 2 make any decisions, player 3 observes
the numbers chosen by players 1 and 2 in the previous experiment. After having observed
these numbers, player 3 makes a decision that determines how earnings of players 1 and 2 are
calculated in this new experiment. The outcome of this decision is observed by players 1 and 2
before they make their choices. Player 3 has the following two choices:
a) NOT CHANGE: To choose \not change" means that the earnings of all players are as in
the previous experiment. In particular, player 3 earns 25% of the smaller of the two numbers
chosen by players 1 and 2.
b) CHANGE: To choose \change" means that earnings in tokens of all players are changed
as follows. Players 1 and 2 receive the lower of the two numbers chosen minus 85% of their
own number minus 50% of the dierence between 170 and the player's own chosen number.
. That is, relative to the previous experiment, there is an extra amount subtracted to your
earnings that is larger the smaller your number is. Player 3 earns 25% of the smaller of the
two numbers chosen by players 1 and 2 minus 4. The terms that are new as compared to the
previous experiment have been underlined.
Mathematical illustration not to be read out loud:
Suppose player 3 chooses \change" and (among players 1 and 2) that one of them chooses the
number Y and the other chooses the number Z.
If Y = Z then the player who chose Y receives Y   0:85  Y   0:5  (170   Y ).
and player 3 receives 0:25  Y   4.
If Y < Z then the player who chose Y receives Y   0:85  Y   0:5  (170   Y ).
and player 3 receives 0:25  Y   4.
If Y > Z then player who chose Y gets Z   0:85  Y   0:5  (170   Y )
and player 3 receives 0:25  Z   4.
Regardless of the choice of player 3, player 1 and 2 also receive a xed amount of 35 tokens.
Player 1 and Player 2
As in the previous experiment, players 1 and 2 make two decisions: choose a number and make a
guess by specifying a range. Earnings from making the guess are as in the previous experiment,
earnings from choosing a number are specied above.





If you have any questions then please ask them now.
Please do not log o the computer when the experiment is over.
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